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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses a recurrent question of our time – whether democracy can 
secure environmental sustainability – by drawing on literatures in the normative 
theory of democracy, social choice theory and environmental politics. I propose a 
basic, yet substantial organising principle, the ‘dilemma of green democracy’, which 
maps out the possibility of realising green outcomes under democratic constraints. 
Interdisciplinary ideas from neighbouring disciplines are also imported for the 
purpose of studying the design of good environmental-democratic institutions. The 
analytical framework is an integrated one, comprising formal choice theory and 
normative democratic theory. 
The first part of the thesis focuses on the possibility of environmental-
democratic institutions. Chapter 1 introduces the dilemma of green democracy – a 
conflict between three plausible desiderata for environmental democracy – and 
suggests several proposals for avoiding the dilemma. It concludes that, as long as the 
dilemma is resolved, it is logically possible to construct environmental-democratic 
institutions. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 assess the desirability of the different proposals in 
terms of procedure and outcome. The general conclusion is that whether these 
proposals are desirable depends on a number of conditions and/or contextual factors. 
The second part of the thesis examines the substantive issues in designing 
environmental-democratic institutions. Chapter 5 discusses how the discursive 
dilemma in social choice theory and the normative ends of deliberation constrain the 
inputs of such institutions. Chapter 6 demonstrates how the concept of distributed 
cognition, drawn from cognitive/computer science, reconciles the tension between 
technocracy and democracy. Chapter 7 suggests how the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, drawn from psychology, challenges the epistemic performance of 
practicable (environmental-) deliberative-democratic institutions. 
The overall conclusion is two-fold. First, democracy can, at least in principle, 
secure environmental sustainability, provided that the dilemma of green democracy 
is resolved. Second, interdisciplinary ideas are useful for designing good democratic 
institutions for collective environmental decision-making. This conclusion has 
implications not only for intellectual enquiry, but also for institutional design in 
practice. 
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PREFACE 
 
This thesis addresses a recurrent question of our time: can democracy secure 
environmental sustainability? The question is relevant insofar as we value both 
democracy and the environment; the question is pressing since democratic decisions 
can sometimes be detrimental to the environment – a problem we are all too familiar 
with. The seven chapters of this thesis approach this issue from the perspective of 
political theory. I will argue that, subject to certain constraints, it is possible for 
democracy to secure environmental sustainability. In particular, I will draw on 
interdisciplinary ideas to suggest that we can construct desirable democratic 
institutions for collective environmental decision-making. 
The first chapter opens up the discussion with a key argument of the thesis, i.e., 
that of the ‘dilemma of green democracy’. This dilemma posits that there is no 
logical or unconditional relationship between democratic decisions and 
environmental sustainability. More specifically, three plausible conditions for 
collective environmental decision-making – robustness to pluralism, consensus 
preservation and green outcomes – are mutually inconsistent, meaning that they 
cannot be satisfied simultaneously.
1
 To construct a logically possible environmental-
democratic institution, it is necessary that we avoid the dilemma by relaxing at least 
one of the conditions. I identify a number of escape routes from the dilemma, and 
introduce each proposal by drawing on literatures from democratic/political theory 
and empirical examples in environmental politics. Overall, the dilemma of green 
democracy serves as an organising principle for the subsequent chapters in Part I, 
where these proposals will be examined in detail. 
In Chapter 2, I focus on two proposals according to which the input 
requirement on a democratic procedure (robustness to pluralism) is relaxed, namely 
exogenous and endogenous domain restrictions (also known as ‘eco-filtering’ and 
‘eco-transformation’, respectively). I discuss, from the perspectives of procedure and 
outcome, whether both proposals are desirable in terms of democratic inclusiveness 
and the generation of green outcomes. I find that both proposals produce green 
collective decisions only if we ensure that green opinions are available in the first 
place. Besides, eco-transformation is more inclusive than eco-filtering, and the 
                                                 
1
 This dilemma mirrors the ‘democratic trilemma’ introduced by List (2011c). See Chapter 1 for 
details. 
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inclusiveness of the former depends on the aggregation procedure used, as well as on 
the type of decision agenda in question. 
Chapter 3 proceeds to examine five proposals according to which the 
responsiveness requirement on a democratic procedure (consensus preservation) is 
relaxed. These proposals include eco-authoritarianism, eco-technocracy, eco-
libertarianism, substantive environmental rights and procedural environmental rights. 
I assess, from the perspectives of procedure and outcome, whether these proposals 
are normatively desirable in terms of equality in democratic responsiveness and the 
generation of green outcomes. In addition, I ask whether they are practically feasible 
in the real world. I conclude that, from the angle of participation, eco-
authoritarianism, eco-technocracy and eco-libertarianism are less democratic than 
substantive and procedural environmental rights, whereas from the angle of 
producing green outcomes, eco-authoritarianism and substantive environmental 
rights are more attractive. As for the practical feasibility of these proposals, this 
depends on a number of contextual factors. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the remaining two proposals, according to which the 
output requirement on a democratic procedure (green outcomes) is relaxed, i.e., 
pragmatic (green) democracy and probabilistic green democracy. I first evaluate, 
from the perspective of procedure, whether both proposals are desirable in terms of 
democratic inclusiveness and equality in democratic responsiveness. Then, I assess, 
from the perspective of outcome, whether these are desirable on the basis of the 
celebrated Condorcet jury theorem. I find that whether both proposals are 
procedurally appealing depends much on circumstances, and that whether they 
generate green or correct decisions depends on whether certain conditions of the 
Condorcet jury theorem are fulfilled. 
Part I concludes that democracy can, at least in principle, secure environmental 
sustainability, provided that the dilemma of green democracy is resolved. So, 
environmental-democratic institutions are logically possible. This constitutes a 
concrete foundation for looking into how we can design good environmental-
democratic institutions, which is explored in Part II of the thesis. All three chapters 
in Part II address some substantive issues of institutional design inspired by ideas 
drawn from social choice theory and other disciplines outside political theory. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss how the normative ends of deliberation and the 
discursive dilemma constrain the input condition of (environmental-) deliberative-
 13 
 
democratic institutions. In particular, I consider a theoretical challenge, called the 
‘discursive dilemma’, for democratic institutions with deliberation and post-
deliberation aggregation, or ‘deliberation-then-aggregation’ (DTA) institutions. I 
offer a critique of the normative ends of deliberation proposed by Dryzek and 
Niemeyer (2006/2007), i.e., meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality, which 
specify when deliberation should terminate and proceed to aggregation. I argue that 
the two deliberative ends pave the way for the discursive dilemma in the post-
deliberation aggregation, and that this can produce unstable collective decisions on 
agendas with multiple interconnected propositions. Having said this, the problem can 
be avoided if we redefine the notion of meta-consensus in a more stringent manner, 
which would, however, further constrain the diversity of admissible inputs for post-
deliberation aggregation. 
In the remaining two chapters, I consider some ideas from cognitive/computer 
science and psychology and demonstrate how these offer insights into designing 
desirable environmental-democratic institutions. In Chapter 6, I discuss how we may 
make use of the concept of distributed cognition in order to reconcile the perennial 
tension between two prominent positions in collective environmental decision-
making, namely technocracy and democracy. I show that this reconciliation is 
possible by means of modifying the responsiveness condition of a democratic 
institution such that its decision mechanism is a kind of ‘distributed premise-based 
procedure’. Such a modified (DTA) institution, or Specialist Environmental 
Democracy (SED), is an example of a good environmental-democratic institution 
which balances epistemic performance and procedural fairness, i.e., the two 
desiderata emphasised by technocracy and democracy, respectively. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the output condition of (environmental-) deliberative-
democratic institutions and discusses how the theory of cognitive dissonance is 
relevant to designing these institutions. I show that cognitive dissonance can 
undermine the epistemic quality of deliberative decisions if individuals are required 
to decide whether or not to adjust their behaviour. Such a problem can easily arise 
for DTA institutions employing Goodin’s (2003) ‘internal-reflective’ deliberation 
followed immediately by aggregation. This reveals the tension between several 
desiderata for a good (environmental-) deliberative-democratic institution, and hence 
the necessary trade-offs we have to make in order to design practicable democratic 
institutions for collective (environmental) decision-making.  
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Figure 0.1: Overview of the thesis 
 
 
Figure 0.1 shows the overall structure of this thesis. As mentioned, Chapter 1 
outlines the dilemma of green democracy – a key argument of the thesis and the 
organising principle for the subsequent chapters in Part I. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 can be 
seen as stand-alone chapters, since they examine the normative desirability (and 
practical applicability) of different proposals in which various conditions are relaxed. 
However, they are in some sense connected, because they all demonstrate how it is 
possible to construct environmental-democratic institutions. The three chapters in 
Part II are also connected to the previous chapters. The arguments of all three 
chapters are based on the assumption that the condition of green outcomes is relaxed 
from the dilemma of green democracy, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4. Moreover, 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are related to Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively, in the sense that 
they focus on similar requirements on a democratic institution (i.e., input, 
responsiveness and output, respectively). At the same time, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are 
also independent chapters, since they deal with stand-alone issues concerning the 
substantive design of environmental-democratic institutions. 
Dilemma of Green Democracy 
(Chapter 1) 
PART I: Possibility of 
Environmental-democratic 
Institutions 
PART II: Design of 
Environmental-democratic 
Institutions 
Input Condition:            
Relaxing Robustness to Pluralism 
(Chapter 2) 
Responsiveness Condition:  
Relaxing Consensus Preservation 
(Chapter 3) 
Output Condition:          
Relaxing Green Outcomes        
(Chapter 4) 
Input Condition: Discursive 
Dilemma and Deliberative Ends 
(Chapter 5) 
Responsiveness Condition:  
Distributed Cognition and ‘Technocratic- 
Democratic’ Divide (Chapter 6) 
Output Condition: Cognitive 
Dissonance and Deliberative-democratic 
Institutions (Chapter 7)    
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CHAPTER 1 
     
A DILEMMA OF GREEN DEMOCRACY 
 
Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as 
it is black. 
– Henry Ford2 
 
Can democratic decision-making secure environmental sustainability? This question 
matters because of the importance we attach to both democracy and environmental 
protection. An influential view from green political theory holds that democracy is 
good for the environment. Following a relatively brief period in the 1970s in which 
the opposite view was prominent (e.g., Hardin, 1968; Heilbroner, 1974; Ophuls, 
1977), “today we find almost no one who identifies their own [green political] theory 
as anti-democratic” (Meyer, 2006, p. 783). Since the 1980s, a new idea, ‘green 
democracy’, or its variants such as ‘environmental democracy’, ‘ecological 
democracy’ and ‘biocracy’, has emerged to capture the purported positive 
relationship between democracy and the environment (e.g., Paehlke, 1995; Dobson, 
1996a; Eckersley, 1996; Jacobs, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Ball, 2006).  
Green democracy is intended to be the marriage of democracy and 
environmentalism and, if successful, provides a strong justification for relying on 
democratic decision-making to protect the environment, and even for trying to 
address some of the world’s environmental problems through democratisation. But is 
green democracy a plausible idea? And how exactly should we understand the 
relationship between democracy and environmental sustainability?  
In this chapter, I want to draw attention to some basic, yet under-appreciated 
conceptual difficulties in linking democratic decisions with green outcomes. I argue 
that, if there is any relationship at all between the two, it is not a logical and 
unconditional one, but at most a contingent and highly conditional one, which relies 
on a number of additional constraints and assumptions that cannot be supposed to 
apply in general. Acknowledging these difficulties, I suggest, enables us to come to a 
                                                 
2
 This remark was made about the Model T in 1909. See Ford (1922), My Life and Work, pp. 71-72. 
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better understanding of what green democrats must show in order to defend and 
substantiate their view, and more importantly, in what ways we can secure 
environmental sustainability through democratic decision-making.
3
 
Although I use some simple axiomatic arguments to highlight a dilemma of 
green democracy, the contribution of this chapter lies not so much in these arguments 
– indeed, I have chosen the simplest arguments in order to make my point – but 
rather in their use to map out, and critically review, the recent debate on green 
democracy. This in turn illustrates the necessary trade-offs in designing democratic 
institutions for environmental decision-making more generally. The present 
enterprise of mapping out the logical space of possible positions on green democracy 
follows the template of the ‘democratic trilemma’, as introduced by List (2011c). 
 
 
1.1 Origin of the problem 
 
The idea of green democracy goes back to the 1970s, when a list of environmental 
phenomena such as pollution, exhaustion of natural resources and overpopulation 
were first perceived as problems at the collective level. A triggering point was the 
‘limit to growth’ thesis introduced by the Club of Rome in 1972. This thesis contends 
that the exponential growth of economic activities will bring about environmental 
costs that the Earth can soon no longer bear, and that hitting this ceiling is a recipe 
for global disaster. As a response, there emerged a discourse – survivalism – which 
attempted to stop humans from taking the fast track to devastation (Dryzek, 2005). It 
insisted that democratic decision-making systems lack the required incentive 
structure for anyone to voluntarily submit to measures that will tackle the 
environmental crisis (Dobson, 2007). Instead, an authoritarian system devised by 
experts and professionals that imposed strong and drastic governmental control on 
human activities would be the only effective way out (Heilbroner, 1974; Ophuls, 
1977; see also the discussion in Section 1.4).  
Green democracy disagrees with the authoritarian position based on 
survivalism.
4
 As environmental concerns became more influential in shaping the 
                                                 
3
 As I shall discuss in the next section, previous controversies over green democracy focus mainly on 
the tension between democratic means and environmental ends, as well as on which of these should 
prevail in case of conflict. This overlooks the possibility of reconciling the tension in some alternative 
way to simply a hard choice between democratic means and environmental ends. 
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political agenda from the 1980s, there emerged a more optimistic view of resolving 
the ‘tragedy’ through democracy. Various social movements on environmental issues 
which began to take hold in real-world democratic states opened up an opportunity 
for political parties to dedicate themselves to the environment. These green political 
parties developed gradually, from national to regional and local levels (Eckersley, 
2006). They upheld similar political principles, which could often be generalised 
within the ‘four pillars’ of green politics, namely ecological responsibility, grassroots 
democracy, social justice and non-violence.
5
 
Among these pillars, ecological responsibility is the declared goal of these 
political parties. On the other hand, grassroots democracy can be considered a means 
of pursuing the goal of ecological responsibility. The real-world attempt of green 
politics to tie ecological responsibility to (grassroots) democracy provides an 
excellent context for the idea of green democracy to flourish within green political 
theory.  
Ecological responsibility can be understood as founded on the principle of 
environmental sustainability (or sustainable development). The principle suggests 
that, if the environment is to sustain over time, then development in human society – 
economic, social or political – has to be constrained (Carter, 2007). Generally 
speaking, such constraint requires that any development which meets the needs of the 
present humans should not undermine the possibility for future generations to satisfy 
their own needs.
6
 The specific requirements of the constraint depend on the 
substantive interpretation of environmental sustainability which remains essentially 
contestable.
7
  Having said that, the principle spells out a general concern of the green, 
                                                                                                                                          
4
 An opposing view to survivalism was the Promethean response. This views the environmental 
situations far more optimistically than survivalism, contending that humans are able to offer solutions 
to various environmental problems through the development of technologies and social organisations 
in markets. For more detailed discussion, see Simon and Kahn (1998); Easterbrook (1998); Ehrlich 
and Ehrlich (1998); Dryzek (2005), pp. 51-72. 
5
 The ‘four pillars’ were set out by the 1983 political programme of the German Green party, Die 
Grünen. 
6
 This represents a broad definition of sustainable development from the Brundtland Report in 1987 
which has, since then, been widely accepted: “Humanity has the ability to make development 
sustainable – to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 8). 
7
 For example, Baker (2006) identifies four different forms of sustainable development which can be 
arranged in a ‘ladder’ – with the ideal model at the top, the pollution control approach at the bottom, 
and the strong and the weak conceptions of sustainable development in between. Each rung of the 
‘ladder’ is associated with different political scenarios, policy implications as well as philosophical 
beliefs. See also Carter (2007), pp. 213-216. 
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which is to ensure a certain quality of the environment for a certain period of time 
into the future.  
Taking environmental sustainability as a starting point, green democracy can 
be regarded as a predominantly normative idea which seeks to establish a link 
between green concerns and democracy, the latter being a classic concept in 
normative political theory (e.g., Doberty and de Geus, 1996). Some recent research 
has also expanded the discussion of green democracy to cover enquiries into how this 
could be realised in the empirical arena (e.g., Mason, 1999; Mitchell, 2006a, 2006b).
8
 
If these projects are successful, they will not only demonstrate the practicability of 
green democracy, but also provide reassurance that we need not sacrifice democracy 
in exchange for an effective solution to the environmental crisis. In other words, 
contrary to what survivalists believe, there is no conflict between democracy and 
environmental sustainability, and “you can have your cake and eat it”. 
 
The means-ends debate 
The idea of green democracy is, however, not without controversy. It is not difficult 
to imagine a situation where democracy fails to deliver outcomes which are pro-
environmental. Carter (2007) gives us a straightforward example: on the one hand, 
“most experts agree that climate change prevention requires tough restrictions in car 
use and high petrol taxes”. On the other hand, it is possible, or even likely, that 
“governments are reluctant to implement such unpopular policies because an angry 
electorate might vote them out of office” (Carter, 2007, pp. 53-54). In what way, then, 
can we substantiate the idea of green democracy? 
Goodin (1992) offers a classic critique of the connection between the means of 
(grassroots) democracy and the ends of environmentalism. He contrasts two strands 
of green political theory, i.e., green theory of value and green theory of agency. The 
former represents a unified moral position of the greens which “tells us what things 
are of value and why”, whereas the latter “advises on how to go about pursuing those 
[green] values” (Goodin, 1992, p. 15). Broadly conceived, environmentalism and 
democracy are examples of, respectively, a green theory of value and a green theory 
of agency.  
                                                 
8
 On the theory side, there are also discussions about the sites of its application which include civil 
society (Dryzek, 2000; 2003), the state (Eckersley, 2004), outside the state (Luke, 1999), as well as 
the global level (Holden, 2002). 
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More generally, while theories of value focus on the values themselves as well 
as on the outcomes, theories of agency concern actions, choices and the mechanisms 
which produce these actions and choices (Goodin, 1992, p. 115). Goodin contends 
that the two theories should be regarded as separate since they are not only logically 
separable but also supported by genuinely different arguments (Goodin, 1992, p. 
119). If two theories are independent in this manner, it is hard to ensure that the 
means based on one would in fact serve the ends specified by the other (Goodin, 
1992, p. 168). By the same token, the relationship between democracy and 
environmentalism is problematic because: 
“To advocate democracy is to advocate procedures, to advocate 
environmentalism is to advocate substantive outcomes: what guarantee 
can we have that the former procedures will yield the latter sorts of 
outcomes?” (Goodin, 1992, p. 168) 
 
Saward (1993) also highlights a similar tension. He asserts that: 
“[G]reen democracy seeks to define and enact a broad conception of the 
good to which individuals must conform. If democracy is understood as 
responsive rule …, meaning that rulers are responsive to the felt wishes 
of (a majority of) citizens, then there is a natural compatibility … which 
does not obtain between ecologism and democracy.” (pp. 68-69) 
 
As a result, “[i]f governments, to be democratic, must respond to the felt wishes of a 
majority of citizens, then greens have little comeback if a majority does not want 
green outcomes” (Saward, 1996, p. 93). This echoes the speculation, as in Carter’s 
(2007) example above, that government is reluctant to implement unpopular policy 
in order to achieve pro-environmental objectives. If such a view is correct, then there 
is a tension between democratic means and environmental ends.
9
 
How could we resolve such a tension between means and ends? Goodin (1992) 
suggests that we should prioritise environmental ends over democratic means. 
Because of the logical primitive in the moral system of green thinking, “it is more 
important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or 
through any particular agency” (p. 120). In other words, it matters more that the 
                                                 
9
 See also Doherty and de Geus (1996), pp. 8-9; and Ball (2006), pp. 132-134.  
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designated environmental ends can be achieved than that they are achieved through 
democratic means. Environmental ends, therefore, justify whatever means are 
necessary, be these democratic or not, as long as the means in question bring about 
the environmental ends. 
If it so happens that only non-democratic means can produce environmental 
ends, then, according to Goodin, democracy may be sacrificed to pro-environmental 
outcomes. This argument appears vulnerable to the risk of green democracy 
degenerating into some kind of authoritarian procedure (Saward, 1993).
10
 As Dobson 
(1996a) argues: 
“If the green theory of value and green theories of agency really are 
separate, and if the former is so overridingly important, then it can be 
made to sound as though any theory of agency – again, even (or perhaps 
especially) an authoritarian one – will do as long as it brings about the 
desired end …” (p. 133)  
 
Is the means-ends tension as simple as an ‘either-or’ constraint, in which, as Goodin 
insists, one can be entirely sacrificed to the other? Eckersley (1996) argues against 
Goodin that democratic means are at least as important as environmental ends. This 
is because democracy and environmental sustainability are both necessary conditions 
for humans to exercise their autonomy to flourish. If moral priority is given to 
autonomy as such, then democratic means should not be traded for environmental 
ends, since a non-democratic or authoritarian procedure would “fundamentally 
[infringe] the rights of humans to choose their own destiny” (Eckersley, 1996, p. 
223).  
Saward (1996) acknowledges the possibility of building environmental 
considerations into democratic procedures through the stipulation of environmental 
rights. He contends that “[c]onsistent democrats will want to prevent environmental 
harm to citizens, and will recognise a green democratic right to that effect” (Saward, 
1996, p. 88). In this way, “[t]he idea that democracy is a means, and 
environmentalism an end, breaks down; environmental goals become an integral part 
of democratic means to democratic ends” (Saward, 1996, p. 88).  
                                                 
10
 See also the discussion on eco-authoritarianism and eco-technocracy in Section 1.4 and Chapter 3. 
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If Saward and Eckersley are both correct, then environmental ends and 
democratic means need to be made compatible with each other. This is all the more 
pressing since, as Carter’s (2007) example above highlights, a tension does exist 
between democracy and environmental outcomes and this threatens the very 
foundation of green democracy. To achieve a reconciliation, one starting point is to 
map out the ‘logical space’ of green democracy and to identify the minimal 
conditions which are necessary for democracy and environmental sustainability to 
co-exist.
11
 
 
 
1.2 A conceptual dilemma 
 
A group of individuals (e.g., citizens) is faced with a collective choice between 
certain alternatives. Call the set of alternatives X. To keep things simple, I assume 
that only some (not all) of the alternatives, say those in a proper subset Y of X, are 
environmentally sustainable, or ‘green’.12 Each individual has an opinion as to which 
alternative should be chosen.
13
 We are looking for a decision procedure which 
assigns to each combination of individual opinions a resulting collective choice. 
Notice that this is a very broad notion: it may include, but need not be restricted to, a 
voting procedure. Even an extensive deliberative process can count as a decision 
procedure in the present sense, insofar as it eventually generates a collective choice 
on the basis of individual inputs (Figure 1.1).
14
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 See List (2011c) for a defence of methodology. 
12
 At first sight, it might remain difficult to decide what alternatives should be regarded as ‘green’, 
since the meaning of environmental sustainability, as mentioned earlier, remains essentially 
contestable. However, such issue is irrelevant for the purpose of developing the present argument. As 
we shall see below, the conceptual dilemma is a formal argument which can accommodate any 
conception of green alternatives on the basis of different substantive interpretations of environmental 
sustainability. In other words, it is not necessary that we specify what exactly count(s) as a green 
alternative; we, instead, need only to assume that some alternatives are green while some others       
are not.            
13
 More generally, each individual could have a preference ordering over the alternatives, but this 
assumption is not needed for the most basic exposition of the problem. 
14
 See Chapter 5 on how deliberation and voting may together serve as a single decision-making 
procedure. 
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Figure 1.1: Decision procedure 
 
Can we find a decision procedure that would satisfy a green democrat? At first sight, 
the following might seem to be the minimal requirements for green democracy: 
Robustness to pluralism: The decision procedure is able to cope with 
conditions of pluralism: it accepts as input any logically possible 
combination of individual opinions on the alternatives in X.
15
 
Consensus preservation: The decision procedure exhibits at least a 
minimal level of democratic responsiveness, in that, if all individuals 
support the same alternative, this alternative is collectively chosen.
16
 
Green outcomes: The decision procedure always generates a green 
outcome, in that the chosen alternative is in Y.
17
 
The dilemma of green democracy: There exists no decision procedure 
that meets the three requirements at once. 
 
This result mirrors the ‘democratic trilemma’ introduced by List (2011c), a related 
conflict between the requirements of robustness to pluralism, basic majoritarianism 
and collective rationality.  
Why does the present dilemma arise? The mechanism behind the conflict 
between the three requirements is extremely simple. Assume, for a contradiction, that 
there is some decision procedure that meets the three requirements together. What 
follows from this? Because the procedure is robust to pluralism, it will produce a 
                                                 
15
 This requirement is a version of the universal-domain condition in social choice theory. Its 
interpretation as a condition of robustness to pluralism comes from List (2011c). 
16
 This requirement is, in essence, a version of the Pareto principle. 
17
 This requirement is a substantive outcome constraint, which does not yet exist in this precise form 
in the existing literature. 
Individual opinions 
Collective choice 
Decision procedure 
(e.g., voting; deliberation) 
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well-defined outcome for any combination of individual opinions. Now consider a 
situation in which all individuals unanimously support one of the non-green 
alternatives (that is, an alternative outside the green subset Y). By consensus 
preservation, this unanimously supported alternative must be collectively chosen. But 
this violates the requirement of green outcomes, which contradicts the assumption 
that our procedure meets all three requirements.
18
 
We must conclude that, at least in strictly logical terms, at most two of the 
three requirements can be met at once. This raises the obvious question of which 
requirement to relax, and how exactly to relax it. I suggest that the present problem 
allows us to map out, and critically assess, different approaches to green democracy. 
This dilemma also generalises the previous observations about the tension between 
democracy and environmental sustainability as in the means-ends debate.
19
 
 
 
1.3 How to avoid the dilemma I: Relaxing robustness to pluralism  
 
I have, so far, demanded that green democracy operates under the condition of 
pluralism, with potentially diverse and conflicting individual opinions. This 
condition is not only a normative desideratum but also responds to an important 
empirical fact, i.e., the fact of pluralism. After all, people disagree about the world as 
a result of having different desires and beliefs that shape their opinions. There is no 
reason for environmental problems to be immune to pluralism. On the contrary, as 
Smith (2003) acknowledges, “value conflict is at the heart of environmental politics” 
(p. 1).  
                                                 
18
 Note that the dilemma of green democracy is a formal argument which does not depend on any 
substantive conception of environmental sustainability. For instance, a particular alternative, Z, may 
no longer be considered green as the conceptions of environmental sustainability that we base on 
change from one to another (e.g., from weaker to stronger). Nevertheless, this fact alone does not 
affect the quality of the argument, as long as there is/are some alternative(s) other than Z which can be 
regarded as green according to the given conception of environmental sustainability. In other words, if 
it is true, as assumed, that, regardless of the substantive conceptions of environmental sustainability, 
some alternatives are green whilst others are not, then the dilemma of green democracy stands since it 
remains possible that all individuals support a non-green alternative. 
19
 Although the dilemma of green democracy does not assume any substantive conceptions of 
environmental sustainability, the latter may still have implications for determining which of the three 
requirements should be relaxed in order to avoid the dilemma. However, this issue is beyond the 
scope of the thesis, since my emphasis here is on the formal relationship between democracy and 
environmental sustainability rather than the substantive interpretations of either concept. 
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At first sight, the condition of robustness to pluralism seems hard to relax. 
However, under different circumstances there may be different levels of pluralism. 
For example, for groups or societies which are internally cohesive, individual 
opinions may be more or less homogeneous; or, even if there are divergent opinions, 
there may be democratic mechanisms which reduce the scope and level of 
disagreement. In these cases, the decision procedure may only need to cope with a 
restricted level of pluralism or, more technically, with a restricted domain of inputs. 
Below I discuss two major approaches to domain restrictions, following List (2011c) 
in distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous approaches. 
 
Proposal 1: Exogenous domain restrictions 
This approach ‘filters out’ or rejects any inputs that fail to meet certain conditions, 
such as being sufficiently green-minded, from inclusion in the democratic process. 
More formally, any individual opinions in support of alternatives that do not fall into 
the subset of green outcomes, Y, are exogenously barred from admission to the 
decision procedure. In this way, green democracy does not consider any inputs which 
are, or can be read as, contrary to, or inconsistent with environmental sustainability.  
One justification for exogenous domain restrictions, or ‘eco-filtering’, is that 
green opinions should in principle be prioritised, based on certain normative theories 
in environmental ethics such as eco-centrism (e.g., Leopold, 1949; Naess, 1989) and 
ethical extensionism (e.g., Singer, 1976; Norton, 1991). Eco-centrism, where humans 
are subject to part of the eco-system, argues that the environment is intrinsically 
valuable. Ethical extensionism argues that non-human entities should be regarded, 
alongside humans, as moral beings. 
For example, Arne Naess (1989) advocates the view that “the flourishing of 
human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value”, and hence that both entities 
should have “the equal right to live and blossom” (p. 29). Similarly, Peter Singer 
(1974) argues that sentient beings, such as animals, with “the capacity for suffering 
and enjoying things” have interests which deserve equal consideration with those of 
humans (p. 175). On the basis of these normative theories, eco-filtering may be 
introduced in order to rule out any inputs which are contrary to the relevant 
normative requirements. 
It is easy to see how eco-filtering circumvents the dilemma of green democracy. 
Suppose there is a mixture of individual opinions, green and non-green. On adopting 
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eco-filtering, only the green opinions are accepted as admissible inputs to the 
decision procedure whereas those of the non-green are set aside. Thus all the inputs 
that the decision procedure has to cope with are green. As long as the procedure 
picks one of these options (such as the majority or plurality winner among the green 
options) as the collective choice, the condition of green outcomes will be satisfied. 
While eco-filtering can effectively bring about green outcomes without 
compromising on consensus preservation, this approach is vulnerable to two 
criticisms. First, it is possible for the decision procedure so formulated to degenerate 
into a virtually undemocratic procedure. Consider a situation in which there is a strict 
majority of individuals in the group (e.g., 80%) who personally prefer the non-green 
alternative, compared to the minority (e.g., 20%) who prefer the green. The 
procedure we have constructed would need to disenfranchise the 80% non-green-
minded individuals unless they are willing to change their votes to green. This, in 
effect, ensures that a minority choice prevails, which is a seemingly undemocratic 
outcome. 
Second, eco-filtering reduces green democracy from a decision-making 
procedure to a purely ethical position of the green-minded. Given consensus 
preservation, in order for green democracy to work, the domains have to be restricted 
in such a way that the admissible inputs are identical to the green outcomes. This 
renders green democracy a trivial idea, since collective decisions are always a 
corollary of the condition of green outcomes instead of depending on the contingent 
combination of individual opinions. Green democracy is hence reducible to the 
condition that collective decisions should be green under all circumstances. Although, 
in this sense, green democracy may be morally justifiable, the decision procedure is 
no longer sensitive to the plurality of relevant values. As Smith (2003) points out: 
“Environmental ethics evades the fundamental task of offering insights 
into how we are to mediate between the plethora of environmental and 
non-environmental values … There is a diversity of values … that we 
appeal to in making judgment. Value pluralism does not banish 
disagreement and conflict through the creation of a sophisticated 
theoretical framework [such as environmental ethics].” (p. 27)  
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Proposal 2: Endogenous domain restrictions 
While restricting the domain of admissible individual opinions exogenously is 
sufficient for avoiding the dilemma of green democracy, it is by no means necessary. 
The dilemma can also be avoided through endogenous domain restrictions. Unlike its 
exogenous counterpart, this approach does not bar ‘unqualified’ inputs, from the 
outset, from entering the decision procedure. Instead, it ‘processes’ any ‘unqualified’ 
inputs in such a way that they all become admissible inputs. In the case of green 
democracy, any individual opinions not falling into the subset of green outcomes, Y, 
will be ‘processed’ in such a way that they are made to fall into Y. 
 
First possibility: Eco-transformation 
‘Eco-transformation’ is a possible mechanism for processing individual opinions in 
the required way. This can be achieved by persuading individuals to revise any 
opinions from non-green to green, such as through deliberation.
20
 In green political 
theory, green democracy is often advocated as consisting of certain deliberative 
arrangements (e.g., Dobson, 1996b; Jacobs, 1997; Barry, 1999; Dryzek, 2000; 
Goodin, 2003; Smith, 2003; Eckersley, 2004). Deliberation enables individuals to 
conduct reasoned public debate and/or discussion about their opinions, in which they 
can either revise or retain their original opinions. What results from deliberation is 
either a universal consensus or an on-going divergence of opinions. 
The reformulation of green democracy as comprising deliberation can in 
principle resolve the dilemma of green democracy. Consider, once again, a 
combination of green and non-green opinions. Rather than rejecting the non-green 
opinions from the outset as in the case of eco-filtering, eco-transformation aims at 
producing green opinions in the domain by persuading individuals to change their 
opinions from non-green to green. Eventually, if such a change is successfully 
achieved with all or a sufficient number of individual opinions, then the resulting 
democratic outcome – again, for example, the majority or plurality winner among the 
individual votes – will be green. In this way, the condition of green outcomes will be 
met.
21
 
                                                 
20
 At the same time, eco-transformation may also be realised through publicity and education. See 
Chapter 2 for further discussion. 
21
 See Chapter 2 for a detailed illustration. 
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Deliberation is appealing at least on the grounds of inclusion and equality. On 
the one hand, a prominent view in environmental ethics holds that entities such as 
nature and non-human animals, as well as future generations of humans and non-
humans, are relevant stakeholders and have their own interests in issues of 
environmental sustainability. Deliberation allows these interests to be unveiled and 
considered in decision-making (e.g., Goodin, 1996; Dryzek, 2000; Eckersley, 2004). 
Dryzek (2000), for instance, contends that the interests of non-humans will be 
reflected in deliberation because: 
“[T]he practice of effective listening has to be central to any discursive 
democracy … We should [therefore] listen to signals emanating from the 
natural world with the same sort of respect we accord communication 
emanating from human subjects, and as requiring equally careful 
interpretation.” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 149)22  
 
On the other hand, deliberation satisfies democratic equality by offering all 
individuals an equal opportunity to articulate, discuss and amend their opinions. This 
enhances democratic legitimacy (Cohen, 2003), especially for environmental 
decisions which are often dominated by a certain group of people, such as experts 
and professionals (e.g., Barry, 1999; Smith, 2003).
23
 
Some arguments for eco-transformation make the positive claim that 
deliberation enhances the likelihood of green collective decisions. This is because, in 
deliberation, individuals are expected to justify their opinions in a public setting. As 
the reasons cited play a significant role in processing these opinions, individuals are 
able to develop more ‘other-regarding’ perspectives in formulating their opinions 
(Miller, 1992). Such other-regarding perspectives have much in common with the 
ethical reasoning in environmental philosophy, notably the inclusion and 
consideration of non-humans’ interests (e.g., Goodin, 1996; Smith, 2001; Eckersley, 
2004). For example, Goodin (1996) argues that: 
“[Discursive] participatory democracy makes the political system more 
responsive to green values because the more others there are who have to 
                                                 
22
 Similarly, Eckersley (2004) argues that “[p]ublic spirited political deliberation is the process by 
which we learn of our dependence on others (and the environment) and the process by which we learn 
to recognize and respect differently situated others (including nonhuman others and future 
generations).” (Eckersley, 2004, p. 115; her emphasis) 
23
 See Chapter 6 for further discussion. 
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be given an explanation, the more likely it is that there will be someone 
among them who internalizes the interests of nature.” (Goodin, 1996, p. 
845; emphasis added) 
 
It is also claimed that deliberation can foster cooperative behaviour among 
individuals, which then overcomes the collective action problems in many 
environmental challenges. Dryzek (1987) asserts that “the discursive processes 
central to communicative rationalization are likely to promote ‘cooperative’ over 
‘defecting’ strategies in the prisoners’ dilemma”, and this is backed up by empirical 
research findings (e.g., Jerdee and Rosen, 1974; Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, 
1977).
24
 All in all, a process of deliberation makes it easier for green values to 
emerge and is thus more prone to arriving at green decisions (Arias-Maldonado, 
2007; Carter, 2007). 
An objection to eco-transformation, however, is that deliberation is by no 
means sufficient to guarantee green decisions. The problem is that deliberation as a 
procedure may or may not produce substantive outcomes of environmental 
sustainability.
25
 It is true that individuals may formulate green opinions from the 
other-regarding perspective, but whether they actually do so is another (empirical) 
question. This is because individuals may still, even after a period of deliberation, 
prioritise some other considerations over those of the environment, or may simply 
dismiss any green opinions, however reasonable, that they dislike.
26
 
 Hence, there is no way we can conclude that eco-transformation in the form of 
deliberation can always circumvent the dilemma of green democracy. Instead, this 
depends on empirical circumstances.
27
  
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 See Chapter 2 for further discussion. 
25
 Cf. Goodin (1992) and the dilemma of green democracy above. 
26
 As Dobson (1993) argues, “there is no guarantee that the free and equal conversations that ensue 
will grant a more valued status to the non-human world than it has at present” (Dobson, 1993, p. 198; 
emphasis added). Similarly, Smith (2003) argues that “deliberative politics cannot guarantee that 
environmental values will necessarily be given a higher priority in decisions. All that can be 
guaranteed is that the values we associate with the non-human world can at least be articulated and 
defended. All voices have the right to be heard ... However, an equal right to be heard does not 
guarantee priority in judgments and decisions.” (Smith, 2003, pp. 66-67; his emphasis) 
27
 See Chapter 2 for more formal discussion on how a decision procedure can guarantee green 
outcomes upon relaxing robustness to pluralism. 
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Second possibility: Contextual congruence 
While deliberation may, depending on circumstances, produce green collective 
decisions, the former is not a necessary condition for the latter. It is possible, 
alternatively, for green opinions to emerge spontaneously even without deliberation. 
In this case, there are no ‘unqualified’ inputs that need to be processed by any 
mechanism and the dilemma of green democracy is automatically resolved. This 
congruence between individual opinions and expected collective outcomes depends, 
again, on empirical circumstances.
28
 
This congruence can arise when there are positive synergies between what is 
good for oneself and what is good for the environment. In other words, when both 
goods coincide, even if individuals formulate opinions solely based on their own 
interests, these opinions can also be green. This can be a result of culture, customs 
and/or traditions which make people sufficiently green-minded. Besides, this can 
occur in a context where people are accustomed to a green lifestyle, where people are 
passionate about the environment, or where people are simply in close proximity to 
nature (think of people living in a beautiful Alpine village). 
Alternatively, such contextual congruence may also be achieved by education 
or by introducing fiscal incentives/disincentives.
29
 These strategies do not directly act 
on individual opinions, but foster a favourable context for individuals to formulate 
their opinions accordingly. However, whether we can generally correlate these 
strategies with green opinions depends crucially on what the relevant individuals 
eventually come to believe and on how they act in a particular context. 
 
Summary 
In sum, we may, for the purpose of avoiding the dilemma of green democracy, relax 
the condition of robustness to pluralism by restricting, either exogenously or 
endogenously, the domain of admissible inputs to the democratic procedure. 
Exogenous domain restrictions (or eco-filtering) prevent, in the first place, non-green 
individual opinions from being accepted into the decision procedure. This can be 
                                                 
28
 We notice, at least, that in 2007, the Board of Directors of San Francisco, democratically elected by 
its local constituencies, voted for legislation which banned plastic shopping bags in that city. See “San 
Francisco Board Votes to Ban Some Plastic Bags”, New York Times (28 March 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/28/us/28plastic.html (accessed 2 March 2011). 
29
 Examples of fiscal incentives/disincentives include subsidised public bicycle hire and congestion 
charging aimed at reducing the use of private vehicles in a metropolitan area. Notice that the use of 
these incentives/disincentives does not render collective decision-making unnecessary as in eco-
libertarianism (see Section 1.4). 
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grounded on certain normative theories in environmental ethics. Endogenous domain 
restrictions, by contrast, aim to transform non-green opinions into green ones. Such a 
change in opinions may be induced by deliberation (i.e., eco-transformation) or may 
emerge spontaneously without any external mechanism (i.e., contextual congruence). 
 
 
1.4 How to avoid the dilemma II: Relaxing consensus preservation 
 
In addition to restricting the domain, it is also possible to avoid the dilemma of green 
democracy by relaxing consensus preservation. This responsiveness condition is 
minimal, in the sense that it only requires the decision procedure not to overrule 
unanimously held individual opinions. In other words, as long as there is a slight 
disagreement between individual opinions, it becomes possible – consistently with 
consensus preservation – for the decision procedure to process the inputs in any way, 
democratic or undemocratic. 
To relax consensus preservation is to allow unanimous agreements to be 
overruled. This can be achieved by either restricting the decision power of 
individuals or restricting permissible decisions. When there are unanimous non-green 
opinions, the former approach renders the decision procedure unresponsive to these, 
whereas the latter approach overrules non-green outcomes after consideration by the 
decision procedure. Eco-authoritarianism, eco-technocracy and eco-libertarianism 
are examples of the former, whilst substantive environmental rights and procedural 
environmental rights are examples of the latter.    
     
Proposal 1: Restricting the decision power of individuals 
This approach reduces the influence of individuals’ opinions on the decision-making 
process despite the fact that these opinions have been, in accordance with the 
condition of robustness to pluralism, accepted by the decision procedure as 
admissible inputs. The present ‘exogenous’ restriction of individuals’ decision power 
can be realised by either of the following routes: 
 imposing prescribed outcomes, e.g., eco-authoritarianism;  
 being biased towards the opinion(s) of certain special 
individual(s), e.g., eco-technocracy; or 
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 dismissing collective decision-making altogether, e.g., eco-
libertarianism. 
 
First possibility: Eco-authoritarianism 
Eco-authoritarianism prescribes and imposes a green alternative as the collective 
outcome, overruling any non-green alternatives supported by individuals. Robert 
Heilbroner (1974) suggests that humans, when faced with environmental crises, must 
“enforce whatever adaptational or transformational changes … for survival” (p. 175). 
Enforcing these changes “requires action on the grand scale” and “this will 
necessitate central authority” (p. 176). In particular, a monastic organisation of 
society with “a ‘religious’ orientation with a ‘military’ discipline … offers the 
greatest promise of making those enormous transformations needed to reach a new 
stable socio-economic basis” (pp. 176-177). This implies that, in the context of 
decision-making, some decision alternatives that are contrary to the goal of human 
survival, such as a non-green alternative forbidding adaptational or transformational 
changes, will be ruled out by the central authority. 
Similarly, William Ophuls (1977) argues that “ecological scarcity … seems to 
engender overwhelming pressures toward political systems that are frankly 
authoritarian by current standards” (p. 163). Ophuls thinks that there is no other way 
to check the overexploitation of resources or, to ensure the competent direction of a 
complex society’s affairs according to steady-state imperatives which balance 
consumption and provision of environmental resources. 
Overexploitation of resources is possible when individuals are free to consume 
scarce resources in such a way that they benefit individually from consumption 
without bearing the cost of the depletion of resources. This is Garret Hardin’s (1968) 
celebrated notion of the ‘tragedy of the commons’.30 Ophuls contends that “the logic 
of individualism creates conditions that require the reimposition of some kind of 
absolutism in order to avoid the ruin” (Ophuls, 1973, p. 228; cited in de Geus, p. 
191). He also agrees with Hardin that overexploitation of resources can be tackled by 
‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’ which comprises the restriction of the 
freedom of all individuals to consume scarce resources in the commons. This implies 
that, in the context of decision-making, certain decision alternatives which are 
                                                 
30
 See Chapter 2 for further discussion. 
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contrary to the restriction of freedom, such as a non-green alternative permitting 
unlimited consumption of resources, will be ruled out by an authoritarian political 
system.    
Hardin (1968) argues that “the only way we can preserve and nurture other and 
more precious freedom is by relinquishing the freedom to breed”, and “only so, can 
we put an end to this aspect of the tragedy of the commons” (p. 1248). He suggests 
that the overpopulation problem can be tackled by central regulation and 
enforcement that restrains the freedom to procreate.  
An example of such population control is the ‘one-child policy’ implemented 
since 1979 in China (Roberts, 2011, pp. 168-170). This policy is aimed at stabilising 
population growth in China so as to relieve the economic, social and environmental 
problems associated with overpopulation. Families subject to this policy are not 
allowed to have more than one child unless granted special permission. The policy 
has been implemented coercively in some regions, including by means such as 
raising the minimum age for marriage, fines for those having a larger number of 
children and even forced abortion.
31
 
More generally, eco-authoritarianism can also describe the industrial 
environmental regulation in China before the mid-1990s. Shi and Zhang (2007) 
suggest that the authoritarian state of China was a dominant actor in environmental 
management which commanded, controlled and impacted on industry and the 
community (p. 128). Measures aimed at improving the quality of the environment, 
including laws, regulations and regulatory schemes, were implemented by the State 
Environmental Protection Agency, a national environmental authority, as well as by 
a number of Environmental Protection Bureaus at the provincial, municipal, county 
and township levels (p. 128).  
Mainstream criticisms of eco-authoritarianism focus on its failure, as compared 
to democracy, to accommodate the plurality of environmental values and opinions as 
well as the interests of future humans and non-human entities. Ball (2006) argues 
that an authoritarian system cannot “represent and take into account the interests 
of … animals and eco-systems”, partly because “authoritarian rule is, politically 
speaking, a monoculture” which, as “a multiculture consisting of diverse and 
                                                 
31
 Besides population control, there are other examples of eco-authoritarianism which concern the 
building of dams to generate hydro-electricity, including those in China, India, Malaysia and 
Thailand. These building projects have been carried out despite the objections from indigenous 
populations in forests (see Doyle and McEachern, 2008, p. 233). 
 34 
 
sometimes cacophonous voices, interests, and agendas” (p. 145), is different from 
democracy. Other challenges are raised regarding the impracticability of eco-
authoritarianism in the current economic and political context. As Carter (2007) 
observes, “the draconian prescriptions of survivalism”, such as those advocated by 
Heilbroner and Ophuls, “seem impractical in a modern world dominated 
economically by global capitalism and politically by liberal democracy” (p. 43). 
  
Second possibility: Eco-technocracy 
An alternative to eco-authoritarianism is eco-technocracy. Unlike eco-
authoritarianism, eco-technocracy, instead of directly prescribing and imposing a 
green alternative as the collective outcome, grants the decision power primarily to 
elites, experts and professionals. A green collective decision is available if, and only 
if, these exclusive technocrats submit green opinions (or judgments) as inputs to the 
decision procedure.  
Recall what Ophuls (1977) suggests as the second reason for eco-
authoritarianism, namely to ensure the competent direction of a complex society’s 
affairs according to steady-state imperatives. Ophuls perceives environmental 
decisions as significantly involving technology, and “more technology means greater 
complexity and greater need for knowledge and technical expertise” (p. 159). Thus, 
“the average citizen will not be able to make a constructive contribution to decision 
making, so that ‘experts’ and ‘authorities’ will perform rule” (p. 159). He goes on to 
assert that the ecologically complex steady-state society needs to be ruled by “a class 
of ecological mandarins who possess the esoteric knowledge”, and “only those 
possessing the ecological and other competencies necessary to make prudent 
decisions [are] allowed full participation in the political process” (p. 163). He 
acknowledges that such a society is less democratic and more oligarchic than today’s 
industrial societies. 
In practice, eco-technocracy can be understood as a set of institutions for 
environmental decision-making, emphasising the rational management of the 
environment based on the best available expertise for the sake of the public interest 
(Dryzek, 2005). Examples of eco-technocratic institutions include (Dryzek, 2005, pp. 
76-82): 
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 resource management bureaucracies with individuals possessing 
relevant scientific and professional expertise, such as the Bureau 
of Land Management and the Fish and Wildlife Service in the 
United States (U.S.); 
 pollution control agencies whose authority of claims is rested on 
the scientific and professional expertise, such as Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Pollution in the Department of the Environment in 
the United Kingdom (U.K.); and 
 expert advisory commissions in which experts provide advice on 
environmental matters, such as the Council on Environmental 
Quality in the U.S. and the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution in the U.K.
32
 
 
Like eco-authoritarianism, eco-technocracy faces significant challenges 
regarding its insensitivity to pluralistic environmental values and opinions, even if in 
principle it can produce green collective decisions.
33
 One criticism concerns the 
prominent methodology used in technocratic decision-making, i.e., cost-benefit 
analysis. In decision-making, cost-benefit analysis assesses a decision alternative by 
comparing its expected costs and benefits in monetary terms; if its benefits outweigh 
the costs, then it should be chosen. Nevertheless, such an analysis assumes that 
decision-making should be based only on maximising benefits (in monetary terms). 
It overlooks, however, the importance of other values and principles in assessing 
decision alternatives. Bias towards a single value as such, i.e., efficiency, is contrary 
to the condition of pluralism (Smith, 2003).
34
 
 
Third possibility: Eco-libertarianism 
Recall that one solution to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ suggested by Hardin (1968) 
is ‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’, or eco-authoritarianism more generally. 
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 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution was closed on 1 April 2011. 
33
 See also Chapter 6 on how (eco-)technocracy and democracy may co-exist and complement each 
other in a democratic institution which boosts epistemic performance as well as retains procedural 
fairness. 
34
 As Smith (2003) argues, “according to value pluralism, efficiency is just one of a diversity of values 
that might guide policy decisions. Conditions need to be created in political institutions whereby a 
diversity of what may be incommensurable and incompatible values, goods or decision rules in 
judgments can be appealed to, and the alternative policy options that emerge assessed.” (p. 163) 
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However, Hardin also proposes resource privatisation as an alternative solution in 
which individuals are incentivised through the assignment of clearly defined property 
rights to manage their privately-owned resources and to prevent over-consumption. 
This captures partly the idea of eco-libertarianism, understood broadly as 
relying on free market mechanisms for achieving environmental ends. Contrary to 
eco-authoritarianism and eco-technocracy, eco-libertarianism does not, in the first 
place, recognise the need to make collective decisions on environmental matters 
through democratic, authoritarian or technocratic means; such decisions should, 
instead, be left to the market.
35
   
For example, through resource privatisation, decision power over the resources 
concerned is transferred from the people to the relevant owner(s) of the resources, 
rendering collective decision-making on these resources no longer necessary. 
Anderson and Leal (2001) argue for “a system of well-specified property rights to 
natural and environmental resources” in which these rights can be “held by 
individuals, corporations, non-profit environmental groups, or communal groups”. 
By so doing, “a discipline is imposed on resource users because the wealth of the 
property owner is at stake if bad decisions are made” (p. 4). They claim that “market 
processes can encourage good resource stewardship”, and that it is only “when rights 
are unclear and not well enforced that over-exploitation occurs” (Anderson and Leal, 
2003, p. 209). 
This implies that certain alternatives, namely green alternatives, will be chosen 
by the holder(s) of rights to the resources when making decisions on the 
corresponding resources. A collection of rights-holders making decisions in this 
manner can then bring about certain desirable decisions, such as green outcomes, at 
the aggregate level. An example of resource privatisation is the privatisation of land 
to the Nature Conservancy, the largest environmental group in the U.S., which 
obtains parcels of land and decides how the land should be used according to certain 
ecological evaluation standards (Anderson and Leal, pp. 4-5; Dryzek, 2005, pp. 123-
128). 
Apart from privatisation, eco-libertarianism can also take the form of 
government-regulated markets and economic incentives aimed at inducing individual 
                                                 
35
  Note that eco-libertarianism is not classified as a proposal of domain restrictions since it allows 
individuals to freely express whatever opinions over environmental issues. It is only that their 
opinions play no role in determining the final outcomes as in a decision-making setting. 
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green behaviour. Notice that collective decision-making is still not necessary; green 
outcomes at the aggregate level, if any, are possible if a collection of individuals 
decides to take up behaviour which is consistent with green alternatives. Examples 
include pollution charging (such as congestion charging in big cities), tradable 
pollution permits (such as emissions trading schemes), product charges (such as on 
petrol and diesel for transport use) and subsidies to reward environmental behaviour 
(such as ‘scrappage schemes’ for replacing inefficient vehicles) (Roberts, 2011, pp. 
210-215).
36
 
It remains an open question, however, whether resource privatisation and 
economic incentives are better than democratic decision-making at securing green 
outcomes. In principle, eco-libertarianism does not rule out the possibility of 
environmental destruction, as long as people are willing and able to pay for the rights 
and/or freedom to exercise non-green behaviour. By allowing the buying and selling 
of such rights/freedom, eco-libertarianism, at the same time, invites criticisms from 
those who view non-green behaviour (such as polluting) as inherently wrong, and 
that anything which is inherently wrong should never be exchanged in the market.
37
 
If this challenge stands, eco-libertarianism still lacks something to be desired in 
terms of its normative desirability, regardless of whether green outcomes are 
produced or not.   
 
Proposal 2: Restricting permissible decisions 
In addition to restricting the decision power of individuals, the condition of 
consensus preservation may also be relaxed by restricting permissible decisions in 
such a way that only certain types of collective outputs are produced as valid 
collective decisions. Instead of shrinking the influence of individuals’ opinions 
across the board regardless of what their opinions are, this approach allows 
individuals’ opinions to determine collective outcomes if, and only if, the aggregate 
result of these opinions is consistent with the condition of green outcomes. In other 
words, any putative democratic decisions which are non-green will be overruled.  
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 Cf. the economic incentives used to induce green opinions for endogenous domain restrictions, in 
which collective decision-making still takes place. 
37
 For example, Goodin (1994) criticises the idea of selling rights to destroy nature (such as emissions 
trading) as similar to the selling of indulgences in medieval times. In his view, environmental 
despoliation is inherently wrong which should not be indulged or recompensed by cash payments. 
Whether Goodin’s argument is sound is certainly a valuable question, but it is beyond of the scope of 
the enquiry here; I wish only to point out that it remains debatable as to whether eco-libertarianism is 
normatively appealing, even if it generates green outcomes.   
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This can take the form of introducing certain rights provisions in statue laws or 
constitutions which are consistent with environmental sustainability. These rights 
provisions deal with substantive and/or procedural environmental issues. 
 
First possibility: Substantive environmental rights 
One interpretation of substantive environmental rights is as a set of human rights to 
an adequate environment for health and well-being. Hayward (2005), for example, 
claims that these environmental human rights are morally paramount because 
“environmental harms can threaten vital human interests”, and that the lack of rights 
which stand substantively against these environmental harms “would be a detriment 
to humans comparable to that protected against by many established human rights” 
(pp. 47-48). 
In practice, the link between human rights and the environment was established 
in some environmental declarations and agreements.
38
 Environmental human rights 
were broadly conceived in the draft declaration of 27 principles of the United 
Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights and the Environment of 1994, which 
states that “all persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound 
environment” (UNESC, 1994; cited in Elliott, 2004, p. 148). Examples of these 
principles include “rights of all persons to freedom from pollution and environmental 
degradation”, “the highest attainable standard of health free from environmental 
harm” and “safe and healthy food and water adequate to their well-being” (cited in 
Hayward, 2005, pp. 29-30). 
The principles spelt out in the above declarations and agreements are, in turn, 
incorporated as constitutional environmental provisions in a number of countries.
39
 
                                                 
38
 Examples of these environmental declarations and agreements include the following (cited in Elliot, 
2004, pp. 148-149; Hayward, 2005, pp. 54-58): Principle 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment declares that people have the “fundamental rights to freedom, equality, and 
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-
being” and that they bear “a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present 
and future generations”; Article 24 of the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights states 
that “all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their 
development”; The Brundtland Report of 1987 in the World Commission on Environment and 
Development states that “all human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for 
their health and well-being”; and the 1989 Additional Protocol of the 1969 American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that “everyone shall have 
the right to live in a healthy environment …” 
39
 Examples of constitutional environmental provisions include (cited in Ekeli, 2007, pp. 380-382; 
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, pp. 275-277): Article 45 of the Constitution of Spain: Every person 
has “the right to enjoy an environment suitable for the development of the person as well as the duty 
to preserve it”; Article 110b of the Constitution of Norway: “Every person has a right to an 
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These constitutional rights to an adequate environment have also been endorsed in 
several works on environmental protection and intergenerational justice (Brandl and 
Bungert, 1992; Doeleman and Sandler, 1998; Wood, 2004; cited in Beckman, 2008, 
p. 612). The rights in question may be exercised through judicial review to overrule 
laws or policies which are in conflict with the stipulations as in these rights.
40
 
 
Second possibility: Procedural environmental rights 
Contrary to their substantive counterparts, procedural environmental rights concern 
the rights to information, rights of legal redress and rights of participation (Hayward, 
2000).
41
 These procedural rights are based on the view that civil participation in 
public affairs is necessary for environmental protection and sustainable development 
(Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009). They were conceived in Principle 10 of the 
1992 Rio Declaration:  
“Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant level … States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information 
widely available.” (Cited in Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, pp. 289-
290) 
 
Subsequently, the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
gave effect to Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration by establishing rights “to 
                                                                                                                                          
environment that is conducive to health and to natural surroundings whose productivity and diversity 
are preserved …”; Article 42 of the 1993 Russian Constitution: Every person has “the right to a 
favourable environment, reliable information about its condition and to compensate for the damage 
caused to his or her health or property by ecological violations”; Article 225 of the Constitution of 
Brazil: Every person has “the right to an ecologically balanced environment … and both the 
Government and the community shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future 
generations”, and Article 24 of the Constitution of South Africa: “Everyone has the right a. to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and b. to have the environment protected 
… through reasonable legislative and other measures …” Note that the list is not exhaustive. 
40
 Examples of such judicial review include (cited in May, 2006): Texas Independent Producers and 
Royalty Owners Association against U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in enforcing the Clean 
Water Act [410 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2005)] (N.B. this review was unsuccessful); and Ranchers 
Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America against U.S. Department of 
Agriculture in bringing a claim based on National Environmental Policy Act [415 F3.d 1078, 1103-05, 
2005 WL 1731761, at *19-*20 (9th Cir. 2005)] (N.B. this review was unsuccessful).  
41
 Eckersley (1996) further specifies these rights as including “rights to know (i.e., a right to 
environmental information …); rights to participate in the determination of environmental standards; 
rights to object to ministerial and agency environmental decisions, and rights to bring actions against 
departments, agencies, firms and individuals that fail to carry out their duties according to law” (p. 
230). 
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information, to participation in decision-making, and to access to justice in 
environmental matters” (Hayward, 2005, p. 57).  
For exercising procedural environmental rights, Eckersley (1996) supports an 
environmental bill of rights which provides citizens with a right to make sure that 
environmental quality is maintained up to the standards as set by existing 
environmental laws and regulations. An empirical example of this is the 
Environmental Bill of Rights Act enacted by the parliament of Ontario, Canada in 
February 1994. This declares that “the people of Ontario recognize the inherent value 
of the national environment” and “have a right to a healthful environment” 
(Environmental Bill of Rights Act, Bill 26, 1993; cited in Eckersley, 1996, pp. 230-
231), which constitutes the substantive aspect of environmental rights. The 
remaining part of the Act focuses on procedural environmental rights which grant to 
citizens in its province formal rights to:
42
  
 participate in ministry decisions about the environment and hold 
government accountable for these decisions; 
 access the registry for information; and 
 appeal against a ministry decision and review a law or investigate 
harm to the environment. 
 
The institutions of substantive/procedural environmental rights, particularly the 
constitutional provisions, are, nevertheless, rigid and inflexible. They are also 
vulnerable to the objection that they compromise democracy by hindering or even 
precluding democratic majorities from amending these provisions of rights in the 
future (Beckman, 2008). This raises the question of whether these provisions of 
rights can always accurately reflect varying environmental concerns across time. 
Having said that, as long as these constitutional provisions rule out all the possible 
decision alternatives which are non-green (and potentially non-green), by substantive 
environmental rights, we would be able to achieve green decision outcomes. 
 
Summary 
In sum, the condition of consensus preservation may be relaxed by either restricting 
the decision power of individuals, or restricting permissible collective decisions. The 
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 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario: http://www.eco.on.ca (accessed 15 April 2011) 
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first approach reduces the influence of individuals’ opinions on decision-making, 
whereas the second approach accepts only certain outputs of the democratic process 
as valid collective decisions. 
To implement the first approach, one may take the route of eco-
authoritarianism, eco-technocracy or eco-libertarianism. Eco-authoritarianism 
favours a prescribed (green) decision; eco-technocracy favours a (green) decision by 
experts and professionals, and eco-libertarianism favours a (green) decision as a 
result of market interactions. To implement the second approach, one may resort to 
substantive environmental rights and/or procedural environmental rights that are built 
into laws and/or constitutions. Environmental rights may be exercised through 
judicial review or on the basis of an environmental bill of rights which allows people 
to appeal against or overrule non-green collective decisions. 
 
 
1.5 How to avoid the dilemma III: Relaxing green outcomes 
 
The third approach to avoiding the dilemma of green democracy is to relax green 
outcomes. This output condition is a reasonable stipulation if we demand that the 
outcomes from the decision procedure fulfil the fundamental desideratum of 
environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, it may be unrealistic to expect a 
democratic procedure to guarantee green outcomes across different circumstances. 
As Arias-Maldonado (2007) contends, this is attributable to “the uncertainty and 
contingency which characterise political processes”, and green politics, after all, is 
not immune to uncertainty and contingency as such – “[t]he politics of nature cannot 
escape the nature of politics” (p. 246). 
There are broadly two ways in which we might relax green outcomes. The first 
would be to give up green democracy altogether, or, slightly better, to opt for a 
‘pragmatic’ form of green democracy. The second would be to weaken the 
‘deterministic’ or ‘rigid’ view of green democracy presupposed by the basic 
definition of green outcomes. The requirement that the decision procedure should 
always generate a green outcome would then be replaced by the weaker requirement 
that the decision procedure should merely have a high, or sufficiently high, 
probability of generating a green outcome. Both reformulated models of green 
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democracy can be realised as various forms of collective action in environmental 
politics as well as innovative mechanisms for environmental decision-making.
43
 
 
First possibility: Pragmatic (green) democracy 
The condition of green outcomes can be relaxed by ‘simplifying’ green democracy to 
pragmatic (green) democracy. In its simplest form, pragmatic (green) democracy 
does not assume any particular outcome, or truth, it seeks to pursue from democracy, 
for example, green outcomes.
44
 Dryzek (2005) understands this form of democracy 
as “signifying a practical, realistic orientation to the world, the opposite of starry-
eyed idealism” and a “flexible process involving many voices, and cooperation 
across a plurality of perspectives” (pp. 99-100). In other words, pragmatic (green) 
democracy focuses on its procedural quality (‘flexible process’) and does not specify 
any green decision it ought to achieve (‘starry-eyed idealism’).   
In the context of environmental decision-making, pragmatic (green) democracy 
is founded on environmental pragmatism, a philosophical position in environmental 
ethics which recognises the fact of uncertainty in all environmental decision-making. 
Light and Katz (1996) define environmental pragmatism as “the open-ended inquiry 
into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment” 
(p. 2). Weston (1996) suggests an open-ended environmental practice in which “[w]e 
do not know in advance what we will find” and there is an “opening of ‘space’ for 
interaction”, and that new environmental values can possibly be created and evolved 
(pp. 154-155).  
Saward (1993) thinks that an open-ended democratic procedure “can be 
justified rationally precisely because of the impossibility of incontrovertible proof of 
anything” (p. 76). He argues that, because uncertainty is inevitable for environmental 
issues, even environmentalists should abandon imperatives and remain flexible and 
open to constant self-interrogation. Mill (1996), at the same time, acknowledges 
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 Examples of such collective action include green political parties, environmental interest groups and 
environmental social movements, whereas mediation, consensus conferences, citizens’ juries and 
citizen initiatives/referendums are examples of the innovative mechanisms (Smith, 2001, 2003; 
Dryzek, 2005; see Chapter 4 for further discussion). 
44
 Note that it is the decision procedure, i.e., green democracy, that is pragmatic rather than the 
decision outcomes. A pragmatic decision procedure does not assume any particular decision outcomes 
(such as green outcomes), which is the aim of pragmatic (green) democracy. A pragmatic decision 
outcome is, instead, not a product from any general principle or mechanism, and it is relevant only to 
the particular context concerned. 
 43 
 
pragmatic (green) democracy as important for green political thinking, claiming that 
green political theory can ensure a green political process but not green outcomes. 
Pragmatic (green) democracy, in other words, does not assume a (non-
negotiable) eco-centric position in environmental ethics which is morally conclusive 
(Torgerson, 1999; Smith, 2003). Instead, it implies that democracy may produce 
collective decisions that are not green. There is an empirical example which can 
illustrate this point, namely the controversy, continuing year after year, over whether 
or not to drill for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska (cited in Ball, 
2006, p. 134). The views in support of drilling focus mainly on the associated 
economic benefits, whereas the opposing views are mainly concerned with the 
associated environmental damage. Meanwhile, it has been reported that over the past 
30 years every member of the democratically elected Alaska State Legislature, every 
Alaskan Congressional delegate and every Alaskan Governor has been supportive of 
drilling.
45
 
Imagine that the decision power in the above case rested on the Alaska State 
Legislature instead of the U.S. Congress as it does in reality. If it turned out that all 
the individuals in the Alaska State Legislature supported drilling, and drilling itself is 
non-green, then, by adopting a pragmatic-democratic decision procedure, the 
collective decision would be in favour of drilling, which is non-green. Thus, it is 
apparent that the condition of green outcome is violated upon retaining the 
conditions of robustness to pluralism and consensus preservation in a pragmatic-
democratic procedure. 
 
Second possibility: Probabilistic green democracy 
Unlike pragmatic (green) democracy, probabilistic green democracy modifies the 
relationship between democracy and environmentalism, not by dropping the 
condition of green outcomes altogether, but by replacing it with a weaker 
desideratum of likelihood of green outcomes. For a probabilistic green democracy, it 
is not necessary for the decision procedure always to generate green outcomes; there 
only needs to be a sufficiently high probability of achieving this. 
In other words, in probabilistic green democracy, the relationship between 
democracy and environmental sustainability is no longer conceptual, but merely 
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 Arctic Power: http://www.anwr.org (accessed 15 April 2011); see also the official website of the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: http://arctic.fws.gov/ (accessed 15 April 2011). 
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contingent. Probabilistic green democracy is justified because the decision outcomes 
that it generates, as compared to other decision procedures, track the criterion of 
environmentalism (i.e., an outcome-based justification). However, whether this is 
true often depends on the actual circumstances to which probabilistic green 
democracy is applied.  
Dobson (1996a) endorses probabilistic green democracy from a green 
perspective:  
“We presume that advocates of green values believe that they are the 
‘right’ values, and that advocates of the sustainable society believe that it 
is the ‘right’ kind of society in which to live. Such advocates, then, 
should prefer the kind of decision-making procedure which is most likely 
to come to these conclusions … greens should be committed to 
democracy as the only form of decision making that – for Millian reasons 
– will necessarily produce [these conclusions].” (p. 139; emphasis added) 
 
The ‘Millian reasons’ refers to the view of John Stuart Mill that truths are more 
likely to emerge from an open-ended decision procedure, which also justifies 
pragmatic (green) democracy (Saward, 1993, p. 76). The only difference is that 
truths are still presumed as green outcomes for probabilistic green democracy, but 
not for its pragmatic counterpart. 
Very often, this probabilistic view of green democracy is associated with some 
sort of participatory democracy or, more specifically, with democratic deliberation. 
Arias-Maldonado (2007) observes that one justification of deliberation has been 
based on the claim that green values are more likely to emerge in a deliberative 
context (p. 235-237; see also Carter, 2007, p. 56). Dryzek (1987), for example, 
asserts that deliberative democracy is more ‘ecologically rational’ than other decision 
mechanisms, in the sense that the negative feedback and coordination in the 
deliberative process draws people to identify environmental quality as a 
generalisable interest for human survival (Smith, 2003, pp. 61-63). Other 
justifications, including the moralising effect of other-regarding deliberation (e.g., 
Miller, 1992) and the enlarged mentality effect as a result of reflective deliberation 
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(e.g., Eckersley, 2000; Goodin, 2003), also attract people to considering green 
perspectives in decision-making (see also Smith, 2003, pp. 63-65).
46
 
Deliberation as such, however, can constitute, at most, a version of 
probabilistic green democracy because deliberation itself, as I have already pointed 
out in Section 1.3, cannot guarantee that green collective decisions will eventually 
be generated from the decision procedure (Goodin, 1992; Dobson, 1993; Smith, 
2003).
47
 
Whether probabilistic green democracy can be justified, as claimed, from an 
outcome-based perspective is subject to contingency. For example, consider again 
the oil drilling case in Alaska. If members in the Alaska State Legislature 
unanimously support a decision in favour of drilling, it will not be possible even to 
expect a green decision (understood narrowly as a decision to reject drilling) from a 
democratic decision mechanism here. 
Another possible challenge for probabilistic green democracy is that the 
chances of it generating green outcomes are not sufficiently high compared to other 
decision mechanisms. For instance, consider an eco-authoritarian procedure. If the 
procedure is workable in a particular context, and if there also exists a green 
alternative that can be prescribed and imposed on the decision-making process with 
certainty, probabilistic green democracy may not outperform such an eco-
authoritarian procedure from an outcome-based perspective.   
Having said that, there is empirical evidence which may support a case for 
probabilistic green democracy. For example, according to the statistics from the 
United States Energy Information Administration (2006), among the 40 countries 
which are responsible for about 90% of total world carbon emissions, there is a fairly 
strong positive correlation between democracies and reduction of carbon emissions 
rate from 2000 to 2006 (cited in Held and Fane-Hervey, 2009, pp. 6-7 and Appendix). 
Although such evidence is inconclusive, Held and Fane-Hervey (2009) acknowledge 
that democracies are preferable to authoritarianism for bringing about environmental 
sustainability (pp. 7-8). This implies that probabilistic green democracy is, to some 
extent, empirically tractable. 
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 Refer also to our discussion in Section 1.3; see also Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 7. 
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 Goodin (1992) argues that “[o]f course, people still might conceive their interests incorrectly, and 
morally there might be more to good public policy than mere interest satisfaction. So widespread, 
active public participation might not guarantee morally perfect outcomes … [although] it is quite 
likely to promote morally better ones.” (p. 128; emphasis added) 
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Summary 
In sum, the desideratum of green outcomes may be relaxed by either giving up green 
democracy altogether or weakening the deterministic view of green democracy. The 
first approach leads us to pragmatic (green) democracy, which drops the presumption 
of a particular green outcome from democracy in such a way that the democratic 
decision procedure is allowed to generate non-green collective decisions. The second 
approach, by contrast, leads us to probabilistic green democracy, which adopts a 
weakened condition in such a way that a democratic decision procedure is merely 
expected to generate green collective decisions with a high, or sufficiently high, 
probability. There are theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in support of 
these reformulated models of green democracy. 
 
 
1.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Of course, there is a sense in which what I am discussing here is simply a version of 
a well-recognised problem, namely the tension between procedural and substantive 
desiderata on democracy. Ultimately, we are faced with a perennial question in the 
study of democracy: whether a decision mechanism can be good in terms of both 
procedure and outcome. If there is no way that both of these can go hand-in-hand, 
which should prevail and why? 
The controversies over green democracy concern a similar question. As I have 
pointed out in Section 1.1, the uneasy relationship between democracy and 
environmental sustainability is not entirely new; this has been framed, in green 
political theory, as a ‘means-ends’ problem between democratic agency and 
environmental values. On this issue, Goodin (1992) recommends prioritising 
environmental values in such a way that environmental outcomes can in the end be 
guaranteed. His position, however, assumes that we take for granted the logical 
primitive in the moral system of green political theory, i.e., right things being done 
rather than right things being done in the right way. It makes green democracy, as 
argued, vulnerable to degenerating into an authoritarian procedure, such as eco-
authoritarianism, as long as environmental outcomes can be better secured by 
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authoritarianism than by democracy. This conclusion is, arguably, far from appealing 
from a democratic point of view. 
It is, therefore, worth reframing the ‘means-ends’ problem in such a way that 
we can come up with possible solutions which are more than simply a hard choice 
between democratic agency and environmental values. I hope to have shown that 
recognising the dilemma of green democracy provides a useful perspective on 
understanding the relationship between democracy and environmental sustainability. 
I also hope to have demonstrated how different escape routes from the dilemma of 
green democracy (Table 1.1) can serve as a theoretical basis for designing 
democratic institutions for environmental decision-making. 
  
 
(1) Relaxing 
robustness to 
pluralism 
(a) Restricting the domain 
exogenously 
Eco-filtering 
(b) Restricting the domain 
endogenously 
 Eco-transformation 
 Contextual congruence 
(2) Relaxing 
consensus 
preservation 
(a) Restricting the 
decision power of 
individuals 
 Eco-authoritarianism 
 Eco-technocracy 
 Eco-libertarianism 
(b) Restricting 
permissible decisions 
 Substantive environmental rights 
 Procedural environmental rights 
(3) Relaxing 
green 
outcomes 
(a) Abandoning the 
requirement of green 
outcomes 
Pragmatic (green) democracy 
(b) Weakening the 
requirement of green 
outcomes 
Probabilistic green democracy 
Table 1.1: Solutions to the dilemma of green democracy 
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CHAPTER 2 
     
RELAXING ROBUSTNESS TO PLURALISM 
 
 
In Chapter 1, I introduced a dilemma of green democracy based on a simple model of 
collective decision-making. The dilemma of green democracy suggests that there 
exists no decision procedure which simultaneously satisfies the conditions of 
robustness to pluralism, consensus preservation and green outcomes. A decision 
procedure can at most fulfil any two of these conditions. Therefore, green democracy 
is logically possible only if one of the three conditions is relaxed, which constitutes a 
minimal requirement on any democratic institution for environmental decision-
making. 
As previously argued, we may escape from the dilemma of green democracy 
by relaxing the first condition, i.e., robustness to pluralism. This can be achieved by 
restricting the domain either exogenously or endogenously. To reiterate, exogenous 
domain restrictions reject any non-green opinions from being accepted as admissible 
inputs, whereas under endogenous domain restrictions, any non-green opinions are 
not dismissed from the outset but may be transformed into green opinions by, say, 
deliberation. The latter can also take place when the decision procedure is applied to 
a context where it so happens that all opinions are green (i.e., I called this ‘contextual 
congruence’).  
In the real world, the purpose of domain restrictions is to modify the input 
condition of a democratic process so that green decision outcomes will emerge. The 
most convenient scenario would be that all individuals were already sufficiently 
green-minded. If these individuals were asked to decide democratically on 
environmental issues, green outcomes would be readily available through contextual 
congruence, and hence no adjustment would have to be made to the input condition. 
Such a scenario is possible in places where people are accustomed to a green lifestyle, 
where people are passionate about the environment, or where people are simply in 
close proximity to nature (as in the example of a beautiful Alpine village). 
However, experience teaches us that, the above scenario is generally hard to 
find. In fact, we are often faced with situations in which individuals are not 
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sufficiently or at all green-minded, with people being used to lifestyles which stress 
consumerism and materialism. If these people are asked to make environmental 
decisions democratically, green outcomes may not be secured unless we make 
adjustments to the democratic process. To obtain green decisions, we may, on the 
basis of certain normative justifications, selectively filter out non-green opinions and 
accept green opinions as the only valid inputs (i.e., ‘exogenous domain restrictions’). 
Alternatively, we may persuade individuals to revise any opinions from non-green to 
green through deliberation, education and/or publicity (i.e., ‘endogenous domain 
restrictions’). 
In this chapter, I shall ask whether domain restrictions in the form of the two 
proposals above – ‘eco-filtering’ and ‘eco-transformation’ – are desirable for 
collective environmental decision-making. More specifically, I shall examine 
whether, and if so under what conditions, eco-filtering and eco-transformation satisfy 
certain normative benchmarks of green outcomes and democratic inclusiveness. The 
conclusions are the following: (1) whether eco-filtering or eco-transformation 
produces green collective decisions depends on whether we can ensure, in the first 
place, the availability of green opinion(s); and (2) eco-filtering is less inclusive than 
eco-transformation, and how inclusive eco-transformation is depends on the 
aggregation procedure used and the type of decision agenda in question. 
My discussion is structured as follows. Section 2.1 explains the idea of relaxing 
robustness to pluralism and how this can be realised through eco-filtering or eco-
transformation. Section 2.2 discusses, from an outcome-based perspective, the 
normative desirability of both proposals. Section 2.3 offers a similar assessment from 
a constraint-based perspective. In Section 2.4, I draw some conclusions. 
 
 
2.1 Relaxing robustness to pluralism: The idea  
 
It is an empirical fact that, in the contemporary liberal context, pluralism exists in 
collective decision-making for almost all kinds of issues. Environmental issues 
appear to be no exception. As Smith (2003) points out: 
“Value conflict is at the heart of the environmental politics. Decisions 
that affect the environment are typically multi-faceted: when reasoning 
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about the non-human world, individuals and groups often find 
themselves pulled in contradictory directions, appealing to values that 
they find difficult to reconcile” (p. 1).  
 
What Smith (2003) refers to here is, specifically, pluralism in terms of values. Value 
conflict arises as a result of the existence of many different values which may be 
relevant to the decision issues in question, while these values are mutually 
incompatible and incommensurable. Two values are incompatible if they are 
inconsistent with, or contradictory to, each other, such as environmental protection 
versus environmental destruction. Two values are incommensurable if they cannot be 
reduced to another value for comparison, such as the aesthetic (or intrinsic) value of 
the environment versus the economic (or instrumental) value of the environment.  
In value pluralism, we may disagree about certain values because of the values 
themselves, or because of some other values or arguments which can be inferred 
from these values. Value pluralism is relevant to collective decision-making when it 
involves a decision on a set of incompatible or incommensurable values, say in 
deciding whether the economic value of the environment is more important than its 
aesthetic value. The primary challenge for collective environmental decision-making 
is, therefore, whether, and if so how, we can rely on democracy to deliver green 
outcomes, given the existence of pluralistic environmental values. 
To begin our discussion, let us consider the following hypothetical scenario 
which mimics the process of collective environmental decision-making in 
contemporary liberal democracies. 
The ‘Enviro Island’ scenario: ‘Enviro Island’ is a city-state with a 
system of representative democracy. All public policies proposed by the 
executive government are passed to the assembly for deliberation and 
decisions. All assembly members are elected by, and represent, citizens 
in their own constituencies. 
The assembly members are about to make a collective decision on an environmental 
issue below which has recently become more salient in many metropolises.   
In ‘Enviro Island’ drivers are used to idling their vehicles’ engines for 
air-conditioning while waiting. Several environmental groups are very 
concerned about the pollutants emitted by these idling engines, which 
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generate additional heat and cause nuisance to pedestrians. There is also 
a discourse from the medical professionals that prolonged exposure to 
these pollutants would boost the likelihood of pulmonary diseases, such 
as asthma and lung cancer. 
The government proposes to introduce a statutory ban on idling vehicle 
engines. While the environmental groups are supportive of the ban, some 
professional drivers’ associations object to the ban on the grounds that it 
would be unfair to taxi and goods vehicle drivers who often have to 
spend time waiting in cars. The proposal is passed to the assembly, and 
several of its members are going to decide whether to support or reject 
the ban.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the condition of robustness to pluralism requires that all 
individual opinions be accepted as admissible to the decision procedure. Pluralism, 
more generally, speaks of a situation in which a variety of individual opinions co-
exist, and these opinions may, at least, contradict each other and be mutually 
incompatible. This is the situation when, in the example above, all the assembly 
members are allowed to choose to either support or reject the statutory ban.
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As for the ‘robustness’ requirement, this means that the decision procedure 
should function well, not merely accidentally but robustly across all possible 
variations of individual opinions. These variations, for instance, include unanimous 
support and unanimous rejection, as well as a mixture of opinions supporting and 
rejecting the ban above. It is also reasonable to expect, additionally, that each 
individual opinion will itself be consistent, i.e., that no individual member will 
choose to support and reject the ban simultaneously. 
To reiterate the dilemma of green democracy, there exists no decision 
procedure which satisfies the conditions of robustness to pluralism, consensus 
preservation and green outcomes. Consider the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario. Suppose the 
only green decision is to support the statutory ban. If the decision procedure is robust 
to pluralism, it should accept all possible combinations of individual opinions as 
admissible, as long as each opinion is itself consistent. This appears to include the 
instance in which all the assembly members unanimously choose to reject the ban. If 
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 If these assembly members were, on the other hand, to rank their opinions in an order of preference, 
the incommensurability, instead of merely the incompatibility, of these opinions would also be a 
matter of concern. See, for instance, the plastic bag example in Chapter 5. 
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this is the case, the decision procedure should respect their unanimous choices and 
produce the collective decision to reject the ban. However, this contradicts the 
designated green decision. 
How can we circumvent the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing 
robustness to pluralism? In collective decision-making, pluralism differs in kind with 
different types of agenda. An agenda is a set of issues under consideration for a 
collective decision, which may be as simple as a choice between two alternatives or 
may also be more complex, requiring judgments on a number of propositions. To 
decide whether to support or reject the statutory ban is a choice problem. If, however, 
the members also have to decide on the underlying reasons for their choices, such an 
agenda is escalated to a judgmental problem involving several interconnected 
propositions. This will be addressed in more detail in Section 2.3. 
At the same time, pluralism also varies in level. Depending on the context, 
there may be different levels of disagreement between individual opinions. In a 
cohesive group in which individuals share similar attitudes towards an issue, they are 
likely to submit opinions which resemble each other. If all the assembly members 
share a common vision of protecting the environment, they will probably agree to 
support the ban. In this case, the level of pluralism is minimal. On the other hand, in 
a deeply-divided group, we can expect individuals to hold very different opinions, 
and their disagreements may not be easily resolved. The level of pluralism, hence, 
becomes relatively higher. An example is when the assembly members have 
mutually incompatible reasons for supporting or rejecting the ban. Therefore, the 
level of pluralism is more or less context-dependent rather than absolute. 
As the kinds and levels of pluralism vary, it is possible for a decision procedure 
to exhibit different degrees of robustness across different circumstances. Realistically, 
it is not necessary for a decision procedure, in order to be workable, always to follow 
strictly the condition of robustness to pluralism. In other words, a decision procedure 
may simply cope with the diversity of individual opinions in a particular context 
instead of all logically possible opinions. If it happens that the assembly members 
tend to make a unanimous choice regarding the statutory ban, it is sufficient for the 
decision procedure to function by handling only one kind of pluralism (i.e., choice 
problem) at its minimal level (i.e., unanimity). 
As argued, we can relax robustness to pluralism by either exogenous or 
endogenous domain restrictions. In order to restrict the domain exogenously, some 
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individual opinions are dismissed so that they are no longer admissible to the 
decision procedure. This is the eco-filtering proposal, as above. In order to restrict 
the domain endogenously, by contrast, no opinions are barred from the outset, but 
some may be transformed in such a way that they become admissible. This is the 
eco-transformation proposal.  
Alternatively, if the application of the decision procedure is limited to contexts 
where all individual opinions are already green, this is another form of endogenous 
domain restriction, i.e., contextual congruence. Such contexts may be found in places 
with sufficiently green-minded individuals, such as where people are accustomed to 
green lifestyles, where people are passionate about the environment, or where people 
are simply in close proximity to nature. We can imagine, for example, that people 
inhabiting the countryside or nature enthusiasts tend to be more conscious about the 
environment. If we are concerned about collective environmental decision-making 
only in these contexts with sufficient green opinions, we probably do not need to 
work on the input condition of the democratic process in order to obtain green 
outcomes. 
However, in the contemporary liberal context, we are usually faced with 
conflicting values in environmental decision-making, which can contribute to both 
green and non-green opinions. To ensure green outcomes from a democratic process, 
we may modify the input condition of democracy by eco-filtering or eco-
transformation. To exercise eco-filtering, we set out a standard to determine what 
inputs, if any, qualify to be admissible. For example, the standard can be as direct as 
“all inputs admitted should be in support of the statutory ban”, which is justifiable by 
certain normative or moral principles. Based on such a standard, we exclude any 
non-green opinions from consideration by voiding any votes for rejecting the 
statutory ban. What remain are, therefore, merely votes which support the ban. The 
decision outcome, in this way, will always be to support the ban, which is the green 
outcome. The dilemma of green democracy is then circumvented (though, admittedly, 
perhaps not in the most democratic way). 
On the other hand, in order to exercise eco-transformation, we may treat the 
above standard as the goal of the transformation process. As mentioned, the proposal 
can be realised through deliberation, education and/or publicity, and we can persuade 
individuals to change any non-green opinions to green opinions. Suppose all the 
assembly members originally reject the statutory ban. They then deliberate among 
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themselves and recognise that supporting the ban may be more justifiable than 
rejecting it. If, after deliberation, all the members choose to revise their opinions 
accordingly so as to support the ban, then the decision outcome will be green, which 
avoids the dilemma of green democracy. 
Figure 2.1 summarises the three kinds of domain restrictions covered above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Topology of exogenous/endogenous domain restrictions 
 
 
All in all, it is possible to avoid the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing 
robustness to pluralism. The domain of individual opinions may be restricted either 
exogenously or endogenously in such a way that the decision procedure only needs 
to handle a reduced level and kind of pluralism. Domain restrictions can be achieved 
by contextual congruence; or they can be realised through eco-filtering and eco-
transformation. While eco-filtering excludes any individual non-green opinions from 
consideration (e.g., through voiding non-green votes), in eco-transformation, a 
mechanism, such as deliberation, is in place to change any non-green opinions to 
green opinions. In order to avoid the dilemma of green democracy, both eco-filtering 
and eco-transformation should aim to produce a domain which contains only, or at 
least sufficient, green opinions.
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In the following sections, I shall focus on eco-filtering as well as eco-
transformation in which we modify the input condition of a democratic decision 
procedure in order to obtain green outcomes. I shall ask whether the two proposals 
are normatively desirable from the perspectives of procedure and outcome. 
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 As to what counts as ‘sufficient’, this will be addressed in the following sections. 
Exogenous and endogenous domain restrictions 
Exogenous  
Eco-filtering 
(e.g., voiding non-green votes) 
Endogenous 
Eco-transformation 
(e.g., deliberation; 
education; publicity)  
Contextual 
congruence 
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2.2 The desirability of relaxing robustness to pluralism: Outcome-based 
perspective 
 
To assess the normative desirability of eco-filtering and eco-transformation, it is 
necessary, first of all, to arrive at certain basic principles or benchmarks. Generally 
speaking, we may evaluate whether an idea, action or institution is normatively 
desirable from two different perspectives. These are constraint-based and outcome-
based perspectives. 
An outcome-based evaluation, as the name implies, focuses on whether the 
outcomes of the idea, action or institution concerned are desirable. By contrast, a 
constraint-based evaluation examines how the outcomes are brought about, for 
example whether the process undergone is inclusive and fair. Green democracy is 
desirable if its outcomes are green (i.e., the condition of green outcomes), and if 
these are, at the same time, generated under conditions of robustness to pluralism and 
consensus preservation. Since this possibility is overridden by the dilemma of green 
democracy, we, instead, require a desirable environmental decision procedure to 
fulfil any two of the three conditions. 
For the moment, let us concentrate on the outcome-based evaluation. Given 
that the condition of robustness to pluralism is relaxed, a desirable environmental 
decision procedure should at least satisfy the following benchmark: 
(BO) Green outcomes: The decision outcomes are green (prioritising, or 
are at least consistent with, environmental sustainability). 
 
Benchmark (BO) mirrors the condition of green outcomes in green democracy. If an 
environmental decision procedure with a restricted domain is able to deliver green 
outcomes, it fulfils benchmark (BO), and hence is desirable from the outcome-based 
perspective. For example, if, by filtering out non-green opinions, the only opinions 
which remain in the domain are all green, then benchmark (BO) is satisfied. 
Likewise, if, by deliberation, education or publicity, all the individuals are persuaded 
to revise their opinions from non-green to green, then benchmark (BO) is also 
satisfied. 
At first sight, the idea of domain restrictions entails the generation of green 
outcomes. After all, a restricted domain is supposed to contain only qualified (or 
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green) opinions. As long as the condition of consensus preservation holds, the 
decision outcomes must follow from the unanimous opinions in the domain. 
Therefore, there may be an impression that green outcomes are always obtainable by 
relaxing robustness to pluralism. 
Nevertheless, for eco-transformation, it is far from realistic to expect 
deliberation/education/publicity to deliver unanimously green opinions under all 
circumstances. Throughout the transformation process, it is up to the individuals to 
choose whether to adopt the green opinions, and thus it is entirely possible that some 
of them will remain unconvinced and insist on non-green opinions. From our 
everyday experience, it is not difficult to imagine that people will keep consuming 
plastic bags or driving private cars even after government and environmental groups 
have attempted to educate the public to do otherwise (e.g., through the media and 
other activities in the community). 
In addition, even for eco-filtering, it may be the case that there are only non-
green opinions in the domain, and that if all these non-green opinions are filtered out 
the domain becomes empty. Suppose all the assembly members, for whatever reason, 
unanimously reject the statutory ban. Then, all the votes are non-green, and if all are 
voided there will be no single (green) decision-making vote. In this case, there is still 
no way we can obtain a green outcome which supports the ban. If no green opinion is 
available in the first place, it would be impossible to generate a green outcome 
simply by eco-filtering. 
We can see that, in order for eco-filtering and eco-transformation to satisfy 
benchmark (BO), the existence of green individual opinions in the domain must be 
possible. In other words, whether we can obtain green outcomes by eco-filtering or 
eco-transformation depends crucially on whether there is/are any individual(s) 
holding the green opinion, and the latter is a pre-requisite of the former. Under what 
circumstances may this pre-requisite be present so that we can obtain green outcomes 
by eco-filtering or eco-transformation? This question is important insofar as we are 
concerned about how both proposals can ensure green outcomes from a democratic 
process. To answer this, we have to look into the specific nature of environmental 
decision-making. 
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The context of environmental decision-making 
Most environmental issues involve the provision and/or consumption of 
environmental goods. A decision to plant more trees concerns the active provision of 
environmental goods, i.e., trees, or the carbon absorption capacity of the atmosphere. 
By contrast, a decision to remove trees is an example of the active consumption of 
environmental goods, i.e., trees. On the other hand, a decision to switch off idle car 
engines concerns the passive provision of environmental goods, i.e., the reduction of 
greenhouse gases for absorption by the atmosphere, whereas a decision to let car 
engines idle is an instance of the passive consumption of environmental goods, i.e., 
the emission of greenhouse gases for absorption by the atmosphere. 
Broadly speaking, environmental goods are distinguished from other economic 
goods as being non-excludable. A good is non-excludable if it is impossible, or very 
costly, to reject individuals who do not provide the good from consuming it. Some 
environmental goods are also, at the same time, non-rivalrous. A good is non-
rivalrous if its consumption by an individual does not diminish it for consumption by 
other individuals. (Environmental) goods which are both non-excludable and non-
rivalrous are public goods, for example, natural landscape or scenery. On the other 
hand, some (environmental) goods are non-excludable but rivalrous, or common pool 
resources (Ostrom, 1990). Examples include trees in forests or the atmosphere as a 
‘sink’ for greenhouse gases. 
When deciding whether to provide an environmental good, an individual 
recognises that he/she has to bear a private cost. This can be the time and energy 
spent in planting trees or the tolerance of heat when switching off idling engines (and 
hence air-conditioners) while waiting. At the same time, the effect of having more 
trees planted or more idling engines switched off is shared among other individuals. 
In other words, there is a public benefit. Conversely, when deciding whether to 
consume an environmental good, an individual recognises that he/she can acquire a 
private benefit. This may be timber from cutting down trees or the comfort of air-
conditioning from an idling engine while waiting. However, the effect of 
deforestation or excessive greenhouse gas emissions is shared with some other 
individuals, and thus there is a public cost. 
Therefore, in order to achieve green outcomes at the collective level 
(specifically for the requirement of consensus preservation), it is necessary to have 
some individual(s) who, having considered the corresponding cost and benefit, 
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choose(s) to provide certain environmental goods. Alternatively, there must be some 
individual(s) who choose(s) not to consume certain environmental goods. The 
question is, then, whether either of the above cases will occur so that green outcomes 
are obtainable at all through eco-filtering and eco-transformation. 
 
A pessimistic response 
Olson (1965) and Hardin (1968) offer a pessimistic response. Hardin (1968) 
introduces the idea of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ as a result of individuals being 
incentivised to over-consume environmental goods or common pool resources. He 
considers a pasture open to all farmers. By grazing cows on the pasture, each farmer 
would privately benefit at no private cost. As long as the pasture can feed the number 
of cows grazed, the more the cows he/she grazes, the more private benefit each 
farmer will receive. If each farmer desires only to maximise his/her private benefit, it 
will be rational for him/her to graze as many of his/her cows on the pasture as 
possible. Therefore, each farmer will keep grazing more cows until the pasture can 
no longer feed all the cows grazed by all the farmers. The overgrazing as such is one 
instance of the tragedy of the commons, which is clearly not a green state of the 
world. 
The concept of the tragedy of the commons assumes that each farmer does not 
contribute (sufficiently) to maintaining the pasture in such a way that overgrazing is 
avoided. This is similar to the case of the emission of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere. If each individual contributes to reducing the greenhouse gases he/she 
emits, for instance, by switching off idling engines, there may not be any excessive 
emissions of these gases. The problem is that, in order to contribute to maintaining 
the common pool resources or to providing the corresponding public goods, each 
individual has to bear all the associated cost privately. 
At the same time, other individuals may share the public benefit without 
contributing any of these common pool resources or public goods. This is also 
regarded as free-riding. If each individual desires only to maximise his/her private 
benefit, it will be rational for him/her to free-ride. Olson (1965) describes this 
situation as a collective action problem, with no individual being sufficiently 
incentivised to contribute any of these common pool resources or public goods, 
which is, again, not a green state of the world. 
 59 
 
What does Olson’s and Hardin’s pessimistic response tell us about the 
possibility of eco-filtering and eco-transformation? If no individuals are ever willing 
to contribute to the provision of common pool resources or public goods under any 
circumstances, it seems unlikely that they will prefer, and vote for, any collective 
decision outcomes that require them to make such contributions. On the other hand, 
if individuals are at least sometimes willing to make contributions, then perhaps a 
fortiori they will also vote for the relevant policies. 
Consider again the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario about idling vehicles. Suppose the 
statutory ban proposal has not been put to the public, but the government is 
encouraging people in the city to voluntarily switch off idling engines. Meanwhile, 
there are a group of taxi drivers who always need to wait for passengers at an indoor 
taxi stand, and, while waiting, they idle their car engines for air-conditioning. If a 
driver thinks that he/she, together with other people, should switch off idling engines, 
then he/she is said to hold a green opinion, and he/she is bound to act accordingly. 
Here, we are interested in whether drivers will choose the green opinion on 
switching off idling car engines. If the pessimistic response is accurate, there will be 
no driver who takes up the green opinion voluntarily. Then, we can reasonably 
expect that, when these drivers are asked to make a collective decision on the 
statutory ban, no green opinions will be available in the domain. This implies that we 
are unable to obtain green outcomes by eco-filtering, since, after voiding all the non-
green votes, there will be no single vote left. Moreover, if these drivers can never be 
convinced to change their opinions from non-green to green, then we cannot obtain 
green outcomes by eco-transformation either. Will these drivers ever choose to be 
green? Such individual choices are crucial to the desirability of eco-filtering and eco-
transformation in producing green collective outcomes. 
Let us pick two drivers and examine how each of them will reason in making a 
choice about whether to switch off his/her idling engine. If both drivers switch off 
their engines, they will both benefit from the better air quality at the indoor taxi stand. 
On the other hand, they will also benefit from not switching off their engines due to 
the comfort of air-conditioning that they can continue to enjoy. Each of them will 
benefit most if he/she does not switch off his/her own engine, but the other driver 
does, since he/she will not then bear any of the cost of the better air quality. 
Conversely, each of them will benefit least if he/she switches off his/her own engine 
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but the other driver does not, since he/she will then bear all the cost of the better air 
quality. 
We may first assume, for the sake of argument, that both drivers independently 
make their choices for only a single shot. At the same time, each driver will base 
his/her choice purely on the principle of maximising private benefit. This means that 
he/she will choose to switch off (or not to switch off) his/her own engine only if this 
leads to an ‘outcome’ which maximises his/her own benefit. If they choose to switch 
off their engines, they ‘cooperate’; if they choose not to switch off their engines, they 
‘defect’. Both drivers’ choices will affect the outcome which determines the benefit 
each driver will receive, or the ‘payoffs’. Furthermore, both drivers know all the 
possible outcomes, and they understand that each of them will choose, as assumed, 
by maximising his/her own payoffs. Table 2.1 shows all the possible outcomes and 
the corresponding payoffs. 
Will the drivers cooperate? If each chooses according to the principle of 
maximising his/her private benefit, he/she will prefer outcomes which produce more 
payoffs for himself/herself. From Table 2.1, driver A can receive three units from 
Outcome (III), two units from (I), one unit from (IV), and nothing from (II). On the 
other hand, driver B can receive three units from (II), two units from (I), one unit 
from (IV), and nothing from (III). Therefore, driver A will prefer (III) to (I) to (IV) to 
(II), whereas driver B will prefer (II) to (I) to (IV) to (III).
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 Driver B 
  Cooperate Defect 
Driver A 
Cooperate 
Outcome (I) 
A: 2  
B: 2 
Outcome (II) 
A: 0  
B: 3 
Defect 
Outcome (III) 
A: 3  
B: 0 
Outcome (IV) 
A: 1 
B: 1 
 
Table 2.1: Drivers’ choices and the possible outcomes and payoffs  
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 We also assume that the preferences of both drivers satisfy the consistency requirements of 
asymmetry and transitivity. Asymmetry is satisfied if, for example, a driver who prefers (III) to (I) 
does not simultaneously prefer (I) to (III). Transitivity is satisfied if, for instance, a driver who prefers 
(III) to (I) and (I) to (IV) also prefers (III) to (IV).  
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In order to avoid the least preferred outcome, i.e., (II), driver A must not choose to 
cooperate since there is a chance that driver B will choose to defect. Similarly, if 
driver B wants to avoid the least preferred outcome, i.e., (III), he/she must not choose 
to cooperate since driver A may choose to defect. At the same time, by choosing to 
defect, driver A can at least get his/her third preference even if driver B chooses to 
defect, i.e. (IV); but driver A may also get his/her first preference when driver B 
chooses instead to cooperate. Likewise, if driver B chooses to defect, at least he/she 
can get his/her third preference from (IV), and there is a chance that he/she will get 
his/her first preference from (II). 
Since both drivers prefer the outcomes of defecting to the outcomes of 
cooperating, each of them will choose to defect regardless of what the other chooses. 
When both drivers choose to defect, the total payoffs will be two units, but this is 
smaller than the payoffs from the remaining outcomes. Outcome (IV) represents a 
situation in which no driver holds the green opinion on switching off the idling 
engines, and all benefit the least possible as a result of the worsened air quality. This 
is the celebrated prisoners’ dilemma in rational choice theory, which captures the 
essence of the tragedy of the commons or the collective action problem.
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If the above analysis is correct, then it is very unlikely that there is any 
individual who will be willing to provide, or not to consume, certain environmental 
goods. The prisoners’ dilemma illustrates that a non-cooperative outcome can arise 
when individuals independently make decisions on their own behaviour. These non-
cooperative individual decisions can be understood broadly as a form of non-green 
opinion. When it comes to making collective decisions, if all these individuals submit 
the same non-green opinions, then there will be no green opinion in the domain. In 
this case, there is no way to obtain green outcomes by filtering out non-green 
opinions; and if individuals can never be convinced to revise their opinions from 
non-green to green by deliberation, education or publicity, green outcomes cannot be 
achieved by eco-transformation either. Therefore, according to Olson’s and Hardin’s 
pessimistic response, neither eco-filtering nor eco-transformation will generally 
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 Notice, here, that such prisoners’ dilemma arises on the assumption that individual drivers 
independently make their choices for only a single shot. In this way, no drivers have the knowledge 
about what the other driver would choose based on either past choices or mutual agreement, and hence 
they cannot make their choices conditional on that of the other driver. While this assumption may not 
necessarily be in place in the real-world context, it is introduced here merely for the sake of argument. 
As a matter of fact, the prisoners’ dilemma, or the collective action problem, can be resolved through 
‘tit-for-tat’ conditional cooperation. See the discussion below, and also Olson (1965) and          
Ostrom (1990).  
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satisfy benchmark (BO), and they will thus not ensure green outcomes from a 
democratic process. 
 
An optimistic response 
While individuals may, on the grounds of maximising private benefit, tend to hold 
non-green opinions, it can be an exaggeration to say that all individuals will choose 
to do so under all circumstances. From our empirical experience, there are at least 
some instances where people will show a positive attitude towards environmental 
protection and be willing to adopt a green way of living (e.g., by adopting habits of 
recycling and energy saving). We can, therefore, postulate that green opinions are 
still possible in spite of the tragedy of the commons/collective action problem. If this 
is the case, we may be able to obtain green outcomes in collective environmental 
decision-making by eco-filtering or eco-transformation. 
From an optimistic point of view, we shall consider how individuals can be 
incentivised to submit green opinions, as well as under what conditions this will 
happen. Note from Table 2.1 that, when both drivers cooperate, each receives two 
units of payoffs, which is more than each receives when both defect (i.e., 1 unit). 
Even so, the players will not choose to cooperate because they will act according to 
the principle assumed above, i.e., each driver will choose solely on the basis of 
maximising his/her private benefit, and each knows that the other driver will also do 
so. Nevertheless, once such a principle is changed, the choices of both drivers may 
no longer be the same. 
Let us assume that each driver chooses purely on the basis of a revised 
principle of maximising not his/her private benefit but the public benefit. In other 
words, each driver will no longer prefer outcomes which maximise his/her own 
payoffs but those which maximise the total sum of payoffs for both drivers. In this 
case, both drivers will choose to cooperate because doing so results in the maximum 
total payoffs, i.e., 4 units from (I). This represents a situation in which both drivers 
will choose to switch off their idling engines, and both will benefit maximally from 
the achievement of a collective good, i.e., better air quality. Therefore, as long as 
both drivers choose according to the revised principle, both will hold the green 
opinion on switching off the idling engines.  
But when will the drivers choose according to the revised, rather than the 
original, principle? The most convenient case is that both drivers voluntarily adopt 
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the revised principle in reasoning while making their choices. This is possible when 
they are motivated by certain normative or moral values which prioritise the 
collective good over their private good. For example, if the drivers believe that they 
should not perform any actions which make other people suffer in return for their 
own personal enjoyment. Then, we can expect that they will choose whether to 
cooperate or defect according to such a normative belief. A situation like this may 
arise when communal or altruistic values are stressed, or when peoples’ choices are 
guided more or less by normative or moral values and beliefs. We can, therefore, 
postulate that people in such context would tend to hold green opinions. When they 
are asked to make collective decisions on environmental issues, it is likely that green 
opinion(s) will be available in the domain. Hence, in this context, since green 
opinions are, first of all, possible, we may obtain green outcomes by eco-filtering or 
eco-transformation. 
However, for cooperation to occur, it is not necessary for both drivers to 
choose according to the revised principle. Instead, we may adopt a very 
straightforward (negative) incentive: coercion (Olson, 1965). With coercion, the 
choices of individuals are restricted by prohibiting certain options. This mirrors what 
Hardin (1968) suggests as ‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’ in resolving the 
tragedy of the commons, in which peoples’ choices are limited and give way to 
central regulation and enforcement.
52
 To realise this, one easy approach is to allow 
drivers to choose only to cooperate but not to defect; otherwise they may be 
sanctioned. In this way, we ensure that both drivers will choose to cooperate, 
regardless of the principle on which they base their choices. An example of this is a 
law which stipulates that all idling engines must be switched off (which exists prior 
to the statutory ban proposal). 
Apart from coercion, we may adopt selective incentives so that individuals 
have a reason to choose to cooperate (Olson, 1965). On the one hand, we can 
significantly increase the (relative) cost of defection as long as others choose to 
cooperate. For example, this can be done by deducting a certain amount in payoffs 
from the driver who chooses to defect in (II) and (III). On the other hand, the driver 
who chooses to cooperate in (II) and (III) can also be rewarded with an additional 
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 Notice that Hardin’s ‘mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon’ solution to the tragedy of the 
commons can also be interpreted as restricting the decision power of citizens in collective 
environmental decision-making, i.e., eco-authoritarianism. See Chapter 3 for detail. 
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amount in payoffs. Then, both drivers will be incentivised to choose to cooperate, 
since each will have to bear a higher cost if he/she chooses to defect but the other 
driver chooses to cooperate. An example of such incentives could be initiating a 
campaign to boycott drivers who do not switch off idling engines. By applying 
selective incentives, we can expect that individuals will be more likely to cooperate, 
but it is still possible that they will choose to defect as long as they are willing and 
able to bear the corresponding cost. 
In sum, there are different ways in which we can resolve the prisoners’ 
dilemma or the tragedy of the commons/collective action problem. It may be the case 
that individuals will choose whether to cooperate or defect on the basis of a principle 
which maximises public instead of private benefit. Alternatively, they may be 
coerced into choosing to cooperate, or motivated to do so by selective incentives. 
Therefore, it is possible, or sometimes even very likely, that individual(s) will choose 
to hold a green opinion on the question of cooperating in the provision and/or 
consumption of environmental goods. As long as such green opinion(s) is/are present 
in the domain of collective decision-making, green outcomes are obtainable by eco-
filtering or eco-transformation. 
 
Implications for eco-filtering and eco-transformation 
What does the above discussion tell us about the desirability of relaxing robustness to 
pluralism from the outcome-based perspective? To reiterate, eco-filtering and eco-
transformation, in order to be desirable, should generate green decision outcomes, 
i.e., satisfying benchmark (BO). As pointed out, a minimal condition of this is that 
green opinion(s) must be available in the domain. While the pessimistic 
interpretation of the prisoners’ dilemma denies such a possibility, the optimistic 
response views the dilemma as resolvable since some individual(s) will hold the 
green opinion. In the latter case, when these individuals are to make collective 
environmental decisions, it is likely that green opinion(s) will be in place, and then 
we may adopt eco-filtering or eco-transformation in order to achieve green outcomes. 
The optimistic response, therefore, affirms the possibility of both proposals 
producing green outcomes. 
Eco-filtering requires some green opinion(s) to exist in the domain in order to 
generate a green outcome. In other words, we need to make sure that some 
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individual(s) will vote green so that there is at least a mixture of green and non-green 
votes. In this way, we may disqualify all the non-green votes and accept only the 
green vote(s) as admissible input(s). According to the optimistic response, this is 
realisable if we can induce individuals to provide, or to refrain from consuming, 
certain environmental goods. 
From a democratic point of view, the least appealing approach is to coerce 
individuals to choose to cooperate by, say, criminalising idling car engines. In 
collective decision-making, similarly, the option of rejecting the statutory ban may 
be eliminated from the beginning. As long as the only option on the ballot is to 
support the ban, and assuming that no individual abstains, eventually there will only 
be green votes. We can then ensure that eco-filtering will produce green outcomes. 
However, the trade-off is that individuals will effectively have no choice to do 
otherwise, unless they are willing and able to resist the coercion (e.g., by breaking 
the law or disobeying the rules governing decision-making). 
Another approach is to incentivise individuals to choose to cooperate. For 
example, individuals may be offered subsidies for installing ‘start-stop systems’ in 
their vehicles.
53
 Alternatively, they may also be disincentivised from choosing to 
defect, for example, through a campaign which encourages people to report and 
boycott taxi drivers who idle their engines. As in collective decision-making, 
individuals may be stigmatised by the community if they choose to reject the 
statutory ban and/or publicly commended if they choose otherwise. In either case, it 
is likely that some individual(s) will, as a response, vote green. However, the 
drawback is that there is no guarantee that these (dis)incentives will always be 
successful in bringing about green opinions. If there is no green opinion in the 
domain, even after these (dis)incentives are introduced, green outcomes still cannot 
be generated by eco-filtering.   
Now, consider eco-transformation. In contrast to eco-filtering, this does not 
have to rely on coercion or selective incentives to ensure the availability of green 
opinion(s). Instead, it transforms opinions through such mechanisms as reasoned 
debate and discussion as in deliberation, education and/or publicity. Possible 
examples include media programmes, public forums, town hall meetings, educational 
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 A start-stop system is a device which automatically shuts down and restarts the internal combustion 
engines in vehicles. It has been widely used in recent years to reduce the instances of idling car 
engines. 
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campaigns and community projects. These transformation mechanisms aim to 
provide new information and/or arguments so that individuals revise their values, 
beliefs and/or choices from non-green to green as a result of accepting these. For 
example, through information provision, individuals may begin to realise how much 
pollution they have been creating by idling their engines. Through argumentation, 
individuals may start to reflect about idling engines. Broadly speaking, education and 
publicity focus more on information provision, whereas deliberation usually involves 
both information provision and argumentation. What they share is that individuals 
remain largely free to choose whether to change their opinions after 
deliberation/education/publicity.  
Will individuals, say, after deliberation, choose to cooperate or adopt the green 
opinion? From the optimistic response to the prisoners’ dilemma, we know that an 
individual will cooperate if they choose according to the revised principle which 
maximises public, but not private, benefit, regardless of what the other individual 
chooses. This is unconditional cooperation. Alternatively, they may choose to 
cooperate if, and only if, the other individual does so as well. In this case, individuals 
do not necessarily choose according to a particular principle, but their choices are, 
instead, conditional on the choice of the other. This is conditional cooperation. 
On the one hand, deliberation can realise unconditional cooperation. It is 
widely claimed, in theory, that the public and other-regarding nature of deliberation 
motivates and encourages individuals to formulate preferences and justifications 
which focus more on collective interests than on (merely) individual benefits (Smith, 
2001; Arias-Maldonado, 2007). In particular, it is argued that, through the reason-
giving process of deliberation, individuals will acknowledge environmental 
protection as a generalisable interest which has priority over other normative values 
and principles (Dryzek, 1987; Smith, 2001) as well as taking into account the 
interests of future generations and non-human entities (Goodin, 1996; Eckersley, 
1998; Dryzek, 2000). This speaks of the ‘moralising effect’ of deliberation (Miller, 
1992), where individuals believe that what is right, i.e., holding green opinions, is 
also rational. Since each individual acts according to this independent belief, it is not 
necessary for deliberation to provide individuals with a guarantee that other 
individuals will cooperate before they choose to do the same. 
On the other hand, deliberation can also lead to conditional cooperation. It has 
been found that social interaction between individuals in a group may promote those 
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individuals’ cooperative actions (Dryzek and List, 2003). There is robust empirical 
evidence from social psychology showing that individuals, in the one-shot prisoners’ 
dilemma, tend to choose to cooperate rather than to defect after a period of 
discussion within the group (Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, 1977; Dawes, van de 
Kragt and Orbell, 1988; Dryzek, 1987). This can be explained by the fact that 
deliberation provides an interface for individuals to make multi-lateral promises that 
they will make certain choices, or act according to a certain standard of rationality, 
e.g., the ‘revised’ principle (Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell, 1990; Dryzek and List, 
2003). In this way, individuals can adopt a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy, and choose to 
cooperate, if they know that other individuals will do the same. 
While deliberation (and, similarly, education and publicity) can motivate 
individuals to change their opinions from non-green to green, whether the eco-
transformation proposal at large satisfies benchmark (BO) remains context-
dependent. This is because, even if individuals tend to choose to cooperate after the 
transformation process, it is entirely possible that they will choose to defect as long 
as they are left free to do so. In other words, there is no guarantee that 
deliberation/education/publicity will always change individual opinions from non-
green to green. If, after deliberation/education/publicity, there is still no green 
opinion in the domain, then we cannot in any way obtain green outcomes from a 
democratic process which preserves consensus. 
 
Summary 
In this section, I have considered the desirability of relaxing robustness to pluralism 
from an outcome-based perspective. Ideally, we expect the two proposals for domain 
restriction, i.e., eco-filtering and eco-transformation, to produce green outcomes 
under all circumstances (i.e., benchmark (BO)). However, it is entirely possible that 
there will be no individual holding the green opinion in the first place, and thus green 
outcomes will not be obtainable by eco-filtering or eco-transformation. It is 
necessary for some individual green opinion(s) to be already present in the domain. I 
have illustrated, based on the prisoners’ dilemma, how we can ensure the availability 
of green opinions as well as how we can realise both eco-filtering and eco-
transformation accordingly. 
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The general conclusion is that whether benchmark (BO) is satisfied for both 
proposals depends very much on circumstances. Eco-filtering is realisable whenever 
some individual(s) is/are directed to take up the green opinion, which can be 
achieved by coercion and/or selective incentives. As for eco-transformation, this is 
contingent on whether individuals can be convinced to change their opinions from 
non-green to green after deliberation/education/publicity. 
 
 
2.3 The desirability of relaxing robustness to pluralism: Constraint-based 
perspective 
 
In the previous section, I discussed, from an outcome-based perspective, whether it is 
desirable to relax robustness to pluralism. Now, I turn to assessing the conditions 
under which green outcomes, if any, are generated from an aggregation procedure 
used in eco-filtering and eco-transformation. An aggregation procedure (e.g., simple 
majority rule) is necessary in order to put together individual opinions, which are 
filtered or transformed, in a collective decision. To carry out this assessment, we 
keep the condition of consensus preservation in place, and compare how an 
aggregation procedure used in each proposal departs from certain normative, 
outcome-independent benchmark(s) regarding the input condition for a desirable 
democratic process for environmental decision-making. 
From a democratic point of view, a desirable decision procedure should, 
arguably, be in line with a certain requirement for inclusiveness. This requires that 
individuals should be able to put forward and submit to the procedure their choices 
on the decision alternatives. At the same time, for green democracy specifically, if 
the domain of individual opinions is restricted, the scope of domain restrictions 
should be kept minimal. One reasonable demand would be that, for the sake of 
generating green outcomes, no green opinions, but only non-green opinions should 
be excluded or required to be changed. In other words, we expect that a desirable 
decision procedure for environmental decision-making should attempt to satisfy the 
following condition: 
(BGI) (Green) inclusiveness: All individuals are granted the same 
opportunity to express their opinions on the decision alternatives (and 
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whilst all opinions should be accepted as admissible, no green opinions, 
in particular, may be excluded or required to be changed). 
 
Benchmark (BGI) is formulated on the basis of a prominent view that, in any 
democratic arrangements or institutions, all individual decision-makers should be 
ensured an equal and effective opportunity to express what they think about the 
decision alternatives (e.g., Dahl, 1979). We can interpret the benchmark as 
constituting three aspects. Firstly, all individuals relevant to the decision issue 
concerned should have an equal opportunity to participate in decision-making. 
Secondly, all kinds of opinions that individuals hold should be equally accepted as 
admissible to the decision procedure. Thirdly, all opinions, unless they are non-green, 
should be retained in the domain in order to maximise the level of inclusiveness. The 
third aspect is especially relevant for green democracy with domain restrictions 
where green opinions are secured in order to ensure green outcomes. 
By definition, eco-filtering implies that certain non-green opinion(s) in the 
domain will be, from the very beginning, dismissed in order to generate green 
outcomes. Thus, the second aspect of benchmark (BGI) is not satisfied. Moreover, if 
it happens that a non-green opinion exists in a particular domain, there will be at 
least a single individual who holds that opinion. When the non-green opinion is 
filtered out, this is equivalent to a situation when the individual holding that opinion 
is unable to participate in the decision-making. For example, if only Member 1 of the 
assembly rejects the statutory ban, with eco-filtering, his/her non-green vote will be 
discarded and he/she will effectively lose the power to influence the decision 
outcome along with the rest of the members. With eco-filtering, therefore, the first 
aspect of benchmark (BGI) is not satisfied either. 
As for eco-transformation, while this does not accept certain unqualified 
opinions as admissible, it does not reject any individuals from participation. This is 
because eco-transformation aims merely to change a certain number of non-green 
opinions to green opinions. Hence, there is no need to dismiss any non-green 
opinions from the outset, and individuals may still choose to hold non-green opinion 
even after deliberation/education/publicity. In other words, no individuals will be 
excluded, and they will remain free to hold any opinions and submit these for 
decision-making accordingly. Hence, eco-transformation departs less from 
benchmark (BGI) than eco-filtering. 
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If, with eco-filtering, it is unavoidable to exclude certain individuals who hold 
a non-green opinion from participating in decision-making, an aggregation procedure 
which minimises the number of such individuals is apparently more desirable. This 
depends on how the aggregation procedure in question responds to individual 
opinions. Consistent with consensus preservation, it may respond with simple 
majority rule, unanimity rule or even dictatorship.
54
 For the moment, let us focus on 
the former two responsive rules which are often regarded as democratic. 
Generally speaking, in order to obtain a green outcome, the number of 
individuals holding a non-green opinion who will have to be excluded is fewer for 
simple majority rule than for unanimity rule. It is straightforward to illustrate this. 
Suppose there are five assembly members in total, where two of them support the 
statutory ban and the other three reject it. If the decision outcome has to be green, 
simple majority rule only has to exclude two of the individuals with the non-green 
opinion. However, for unanimity rule, it must exclude all the three individuals with 
the non-green opinion. 
Therefore, with eco-filtering, simple majority rule is relatively more inclusive 
than unanimity rule, and hence the former departs less from benchmark (BGI) than 
the latter. At the same time, simple majority rule is more likely to realise eco-
transformation than unanimity rule. If unanimity rule is adopted, a green outcome is 
available only when all assembly members are convinced to take up the green 
opinion after deliberation/education/publicity; however with simple majority rule, 
green outcomes are possible whenever three, four or five members are convinced. 
We can note that, with both eco-filtering and eco-transformation, simple 
majority rule is generally more desirable than unanimity rule in the procedural sense. 
In order for eco-filtering to generate green outcomes, the decision procedure is more 
inclusive, and hence departs less from benchmark (BGI), if simple majority rule is 
used. With eco-transformation, while this departs less from benchmark (BGI) than 
eco-filtering, it is easier to realise when simple majority rule, rather than unanimity 
rule, is used. 
Nevertheless, can we conclude that eco-transformation is always more 
procedurally attractive when simple majority rule is used to aggregate individual 
opinions? This question concerns us since, by adopting eco-transformation, we want 
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to achieve green outcomes with a process or procedure which is sufficiently 
democratic, and simple majority rule is, arguably, a widely accepted democratic 
aggregation procedure. Below I suggest that the answer depends on the types of 
decision agenda in question. I illustrate this claim with a model of the discursive 
dilemma from social choice/judgment aggregation theory. The analysis, having said 
that, lies less in the formal aspect of the model than in its implications for assessing 
the procedural desirability of eco-transformation. 
 
Eco-transformation with green opinions on multiple propositions 
As touched on in Section 2.1, an agenda can be, as well as an issue of choice, in a 
more complex form which involves judgments on a number of propositions. While 
value pluralism matters for collective decisions on choices between two or more 
alternatives, it is also relevant when incompatible values form at least part of the 
supporting reasons for those choices (or conclusions). In the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario, 
suppose some assembly members hold that the environment should be protected 
(‘environmental protection’) whilst others hold that the environment may be 
destroyed (‘environmental destruction’). If they draw inferences from these values in 
choosing whether to support or reject the statutory ban, they are likely to come up 
with very different choices or conclusions. Thus, even if the decision agenda is as 
simple as whether to support or reject the ban, such a conflict of values still matters 
significantly for collective decision-making. 
There are two possible complications. First, these incompatible values may not 
only influence the choices of individuals but also be included in the decision agenda. 
In other words, the decision agenda may be more complex, comprising supporting 
reasons, a conclusion and their interconnection. Second, value pluralism may still 
exist for the supporting reasons even if there is a unanimous agreement on the 
conclusion. In other words, it is possible for all the assembly members to 
unanimously support the statutory ban while disagreeing about the supporting 
reasons. Both complications are relevant to collective decision-making on any 
controversial issue, including environmental issues which involve much complexity 
and uncertainty. 
Now, suppose there are five assembly members. All of them support the 
statutory ban (‘ban’), and would like to reach a collective decision on why they do so 
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as a justification. After some deliberation, they arrive at three different supporting 
reasons: 
(1) Idling vehicle engines wastes fuel, and we should not waste fuel 
(‘fuel’); 
(2) Idling vehicle engines causes serious air pollution, and we should 
not do anything that causes serious air pollution (‘air’); and 
(3) Idling vehicle engines generates unnecessary heat, and we should 
not do anything that generates unnecessary heat (‘heat’). 
 
They agree that any one of the three reasons is necessary and sufficient for the 
conclusion which supports the ban.
55
 In other words, if a member chooses to accept 
any one of the reasons, he/she must also support the ban. In this way, we may also 
regard all three reasons, as well as the conclusion which supports the ban, as green 
opinions. 
Consider the following case. The first member agrees with the ‘fuel’ reason, 
but not with the ‘air’ or ‘heat’ reasons. The second member holds the same opinions 
on all three reasons as the first member does. On the other hand, the third and fourth 
members believe that the ‘air’ reason is true, but the ‘fuel’ and ‘heat’ reasons are 
false. As for the fifth member, he/she accepts the ‘heat’ reason only and rejects the 
remaining two reasons. At the same time, all of them conclude that they support the 
ban. We can represent, as in Table 2.2, the above combinations of green opinions in 
terms of their judgments on the conclusion and the supporting reasons. 
From Table 2.2, each of the members accepts only one supporting reason and 
rejects the remaining two reasons. Since they agree that any one of the three reasons 
is necessary and sufficient for a conclusion which supports the ban, they also 
unanimously accept the conclusion. Note that this can be an instance of eco-
transformation where deliberation/education/publicity has been completed, and all 
members have been convinced to adopt green opinions on some of the propositions. 
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Member 
Supporting reasons Conclusion 
Fuel? Air? Heat? Ban? 
1 Yes No No Yes 
2 Yes No No Yes 
3 No Yes No Yes 
4 No Yes No Yes 
5 No No Yes Yes 
Table 2.2: Example of green opinions in terms of judgements on conclusion and    
supporting reasons 
 
How can we aggregate the above combination of green opinions into a collective 
decision? Let us set aside, for the moment, the individual opinions on the supporting 
reasons and focus only on the conclusion. Since the conclusion is accepted by all 
members, by using any aggregation procedure which preserves consensus (e.g., 
simple majority rule or unanimity rule), we can obtain a green outcome, i.e., the ban 
being collectively supported. Therefore, as long as the decision agenda is as simple 
as consisting of only the conclusion and there is a set of unanimously green opinions, 
then we can use either simple majority rule or unanimity rule to obtain a green 
outcome. 
As mentioned, for decision agendas involving a choice between two 
alternatives, simple majority rule appears to be more procedurally appealing than 
unanimity rule for eco-transformation. Our question is, then, whether this is still the 
case for more complex decision agendas which involve multiple interconnected 
propositions, such as one containing the conclusion and supporting reasons in the 
example above. 
 
A (discursive) dilemma 
If we aggregate, using simple majority rule, the combination of green opinions as in 
Table 2.2, what will be the collective outcomes? First, the conclusion will obviously 
be accepted, meaning that the group will support the ban. Second, two members (1 
and 2) accept the conclusion for the ‘fuel’ reason, whereas the three other members 
(3, 4 and 5) reject it, and hence, by simple majority rule, it is collectively rejected. 
Next, similarly, two members (3 and 4) accept the conclusion for the ‘air’ reason, 
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whilst the three other members (1, 2 and 5) reject it, and thus on these grounds also it 
should be collectively rejected. Lastly, only Member 5 accepts the conclusion for the 
‘heat’ reason, whilst the remaining four members reject it, and thus, again, it should 
be collectively rejected. Table 2.3 below summarises the results. 
 
Member 
Supporting reasons Conclusion 
Fuel? Air? Heat? Ban? 
1 Yes No No Yes 
2 Yes No No Yes 
3 No Yes No Yes 
4 No Yes No Yes 
5 No No Yes Yes 
Majority No No No Yes 
Table 2.3: Example of aggregating green opinions on multiple interconnected propositions 
using simple majority rule 
 
It is not difficult to spot a contradiction in the above collective decisions. Remember 
all the members have previously agreed that any one of the three reasons is necessary 
and sufficient for supporting the ban. Since the group rejects all the three reasons, by 
logical deduction the conclusion should be collectively rejected. At the same time, 
since all the members unanimously support the conclusion, it should be collectively 
accepted. Therefore, the collective decisions on the conclusion and supporting 
reasons are inconsistent with each other, and there arises a question about whether 
the group should support or reject the ban. This is one version of the celebrated 
discursive dilemma (Pettit, 2001; List and Pettit, 2002). Generally speaking, the 
dilemma arises whenever simple majority rule is used to aggregate individual 
judgments on agendas with multiple interconnected propositions (List, 2006).
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The dilemma above poses a hard question for eco-transformation with simple 
majority rule. It is possible that, after deliberation/education/publicity, while a 
majority, or even all, of the individuals agree on a green conclusion, they will still 
disagree over the supporting reasons which can also be green. For example, all three 
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supporting reasons above concerning ‘fuel’, ‘air’ and ‘heat’ are pro-environmental, 
and each of them is necessary and sufficient for a green conclusion, i.e., ‘ban’. When 
a member accepts any of these green reasons, the reason(s) constitute(s) part of 
his/her green opinion. Then, there arises a question about how the diversity of green 
opinions can be preserved when, after aggregation by simple majority rule, there is a 
green outcome on the conclusion but non-green outcomes on the supporting reasons 
(which are logically connected to the conclusion). Given that it is unappealing for 
eco-transformation to abandon any green outcomes, there are broadly three possible 
approaches to response to the dilemma. 
The first approach is to discard the non-green outcomes on the supporting 
reasons. In this way, the group would be able to retain the green outcome on the 
conclusion without being self-contradictory. However, this approach is not attractive 
if collective decisions on the supporting reasons are also required. One account of 
this is that, by having reasons collectivised, it becomes possible to assess and contest 
the soundness of the reasons which support the conclusion. Furthermore, when the 
group of individuals in question take actions based on the decisions, they become 
conversable in the sense that their actions/decisions can be justified by collective 
reasons (Pettit, 2001).  
Whether it is desirable to give up the collective decisions on supporting reasons 
depends on the context under which the group makes decisions. Imagine that all 
members in a group are democratically elected by their constituencies, and hence, the 
former remain accountable to the latter. In this case, the group has to back its 
decisions up with shared justifications so as to answer any challenges raised by the 
constituencies. However, if the group is in no sense held accountable to any 
constituencies, or if the constituencies care only about the group’s decisions on 
specific actions/policies but not the underlying reasons, then such requirement of 
conversability or shared justifications may not be necessary.
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The second approach is to use an alternative decision procedure. Recall that 
democratic aggregation procedures which preserve consensus include not only 
simple majority rule but also unanimity rule. When unanimity rule is used, any 
disagreement between individuals over any proposition(s) will result in the same 
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proposition(s) being left undecided. This is because, according to unanimity rule, a 
proposition is collectively accepted or rejected if, and only if, there is unanimous 
acceptance or rejection of this proposition. For example, in Table 2.3, since the five 
members disagree on the three supporting reasons and unanimously accept the 
conclusion, under unanimity rule, there are no collective decisions on the supporting 
reasons but only on the conclusion. Therefore, the collective outcome will be green, 
and there will not be any contradiction. It is proved that unanimity rule can be used 
to avoid the (discursive) dilemma above (List, 2006). However, as pointed out, this 
makes the realisation of eco-transformation more difficult in terms of generating 
green outcomes. 
The third approach is to selectively accept certain combinations of individual 
green opinions. This can be done by further restricting the domain so that a majority 
of individuals accept at least one supporting reason which is necessary and sufficient 
for the green conclusion. In other words, for eco-transformation, this aims at 
ensuring a sufficient number of green opinions not only on the conclusion but also on 
the supporting reasons. For instance, in Table 2.3, some members may be convinced, 
after deliberation/education/publicity, to accept a further supporting reason which 
they did not originally accept. This could be Member 3 changing his/her opinion on 
the ‘fuel’ reason from rejection to acceptance, or Members 3 and 4 shifting to accept 
the ‘heat’ reason instead of the ‘air’ reason, etc. In either case, there would be a 
majority acceptance of one of the supporting reasons, and hence the collective 
outcomes on all the propositions would become consistently green. 
Nevertheless, by adopting the third approach, some combinations of green 
opinions would be excluded from consideration by the decision procedure. In this 
way, after deliberation/education/publicity, individuals might have to be convinced 
to give up their original opinions even if these opinions were green. For example, if 
Members 3 and 4 are convinced to change from accepting the ‘heat’ reason to 
accepting the ‘air’ reason, their original opinion on the ‘heat’ reason will no longer 
be accepted even if it is a green opinion. In that case, eco-transformation with simple 
majority rule departs from benchmark (BGI), since it does not satisfy the third 
condition that no opinions should be abandoned as long as they are green.  
Therefore, to answer our previous question, whether eco-transformation with 
simple majority rule is procedurally desirable depends on the type of decision agenda. 
For agendas with multiple interconnected propositions, using simple majority rule for 
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aggregation may pave the way to the above (discursive) dilemma.
58
 For 
environmental decision-making, if we further transform individual opinions in order 
to avoid the dilemma, some combinations of green opinions (e.g., acceptance of 
green supporting reasons) may have to be abandoned, which departs from our 
benchmark of (green) inclusiveness (BGI). In this way, the scope of domain 
restrictions for eco-transformation can, on some occasions, be wider than simply to 
require opinions to change from non-green to green. This issue is relevant to 
collective environmental decision-making insofar as the intense value conflict on 
environmental issues may give rise to complex decision agendas and disagreements 
over not only whether but also why we should be green, whilst we expect the 
decision procedure to remain as inclusive as possible. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined how we may escape the dilemma of green 
democracy by relaxing the condition of robustness to pluralism. In Section 2.1, I 
explained how exogenous and endogenous domain restrictions may be realised as the 
eco-filtering and the eco-transformation proposals, respectively. While eco-filtering 
dismisses any non-green opinions from consideration (e.g., by voiding non-green 
votes), eco-transformation changes these opinions from non-green to green (e.g., by 
deliberation, education and/or publicity). 
In Section 2.2, I assessed the normative desirability of eco-filtering and eco-
transformation from an outcome-based perspective. I argued that each proposal is 
desirable in that sense only if it generates green decision outcomes (i.e., benchmark 
(BO)). Whether this benchmark can be fulfilled depends very much on circumstances, 
and there must, minimally, be green opinion(s) available in the domain. I have 
illustrated, using the prisoners’ dilemma in rational choice theory, how both eco-
filtering and eco-transformation are realisable once the prisoners’ dilemma is 
resolved by measures such as coercion, selective incentives or deliberation. 
In Section 2.3, I provided a similar assessment from a constraint-based 
perspective. On the basis of the (green) inclusiveness benchmark (BGI), I have 
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 See Chapter 5 for discussion on how we can determine where deliberation should stop in order to 
avoid the discursive dilemma in the subsequent aggregation. 
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discussed why eco-filtering is less inclusive than eco-transformation. In addition, 
drawing on a model of the discursive dilemma in social choice/judgment aggregation 
theory, I have shown that whether eco-transformation with simple majority rule is 
procedurally attractive depends on the type of decision agenda in question. This is 
particularly relevant to collective environmental decision-making, given the varying 
kinds and levels of pluralism involved. 
There are two overall conclusions. First, we are able to obtain green outcomes 
from a democratic process by eco-filtering or by eco-transformation, depending on 
the availability of green opinion(s) in the first place. Second, while eco-filtering is 
less inclusive than eco-transformation, the inclusiveness of the latter depends on the 
aggregation procedure used and the type of decision agenda concerned. It should be 
noted that, although I have used simple models from formal political theory, i.e., the 
prisoners’ dilemma and the discursive dilemma, to reach the above conclusions, the 
emphasis lies not so much in the models per se but their implications for both 
proposals. In Chapter 5, we shall revisit the discursive dilemma to derive further 
insights into the design of democratic institutions for environmental decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 3 
     
RELAXING CONSENSUS PRESERVATION 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I have shown that we may escape from the dilemma of green 
democracy by relaxing the condition of robustness to pluralism. This can be done by 
restricting the domains of individual opinion either exogenously or endogenously. 
Exogenous domain restrictions dismiss non-green opinions from consideration, 
whereas endogenous domain restrictions aim to change opinions from non-green to 
green (e.g., by deliberation) so that all of them are eventually admissible. As argued, 
the success of these proposals in avoiding the dilemma of green democracy depends 
very much on the availability of green opinion(s) in the domain. 
One potential problem for both kinds of domain restriction, however, is that, 
when the profiles of individual opinions are sufficiently diverse or predominantly 
non-green, a considerable number of these profiles will have to be barred or changed. 
If the domain restrictions required are perceived as ‘too restrictive’, then, for 
exogenous domain restrictions, the democratic process will become too trivial. 
Likewise, for endogenous domain restrictions by deliberation, it remains uncertain 
whether green decisions will be available since the actual deliberative outcomes are 
contingent on the empirical contexts.  
Can we get around the above triviality and uncertainty issues by taking an 
alternative escape route? In this chapter, I consider the second option – relaxing 
consensus preservation – and offer critical assessments of substantive proposals. To 
reiterate, consensus preservation demands minimal democratic responsiveness in the 
sense that a decision alternative should be chosen if all individuals support the same 
alternative. Relaxing this condition would allow for the case that even if there is a 
profile of unanimous individual choices for a non-green alternative, that non-green 
alternative is still not chosen as the collective outcome. This can be achieved by 
either restricting the decision power of individuals, for example by eco-
authoritarianism, eco-technocracy or eco-libertarianism, or by restricting permissible 
decisions, for example by substantive or procedural environmental rights. 
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In assessing each of these proposals, I shall focus on whether they are 
normatively desirable as well as practically feasible. I ask, specifically, whether they 
satisfy certain normative requirements of environmental/democratic decision-making 
and whether they are applicable in practice as feasible environmental decision-
making arrangements. The conclusions are the following: From the angle of 
participation, eco-authoritarianism, eco-technocracy and eco-libertarianism are less 
democratic than substantive and procedural environmental rights, whereas from the 
angle of producing green outcomes, eco-authoritarianism and substantive 
environmental rights are more appealing. As to whether these proposals are 
practically feasible, it depends on a number of factors which vary across different 
empirical circumstances.  
My discussion has the following structure. In Section 3.1, I explain the idea of 
relaxing consensus preservation and how this may be realised. In Section 3.2, I 
examine, in terms of procedure and outcome, the normative desirability of five 
different proposals grouped under two categories, namely exogenously restricting 
individuals’ decision power and endogenously restricting permissible collective 
decisions. In Section 3.3, I suggest a number of factors that we may consider in 
evaluating the practical applicability of these proposals. Finally, I draw some 
conclusions in Section 3.4.  
 
 
3.1 Relaxing consensus preservation: The idea 
 
While it is an empirical fact that pluralism exists at many levels in contemporary 
liberal contexts, how a decision procedure responds, or should respond, to the 
diversity of individual opinions in such a way that it is considered democratic is 
another question. In real-world decision-making, a prominent democratic procedure 
is simple majority rule, based on the generally accepted principle that the minority is 
subordinate to the majority. Dahl (2006) observes that, in theory, “[r]unning through 
the whole history of democratic theories is the identification of ‘democracy’ with … 
rule by majorities” (p. 34). 
Arguably, simple majority rule is not the only democratic procedure existing in 
theory or in practice. For example, super-majority support, such as a two-thirds 
majority, is usually required for amending national constitutions (e.g., in the U.S.) as 
 81 
 
well as for dissolving parliaments (e.g., in the U.K.). In some jurisdictions, a 
unanimous verdict is even necessary in jury trials (e.g., in the U.S. Federal Courts).
59
 
At the same time, Rousseau (1968) asserts that, although majority rule is sufficient 
for most collective decisions, there should be unanimous consent, from all members 
of the state, to the primitive social contract which establishes civil society. 
In responding to the diversity of individual opinions, what can we possibly do 
to modify the above democratic procedures in such a way that any unanimous non-
green opinions are overruled in order to circumvent the dilemma of green democracy? 
To illustrate this question, let us consider again the collective decision-making 
scenario in Chapter 2, in which the assembly members of ‘Enviro Island’ are 
deliberating and deciding on whether or not to ban idling vehicle engines. 
The condition of consensus preservation requires that, if all individuals 
unanimously agree on a single alternative, then that alternative should be collectively 
chosen. Suppose, in the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario, the decision which bans idling 
vehicle engines is green, whereas the decision which does not ban this is non-green. 
Imagine all the assembly members, for the sake of, say, preventing any potential 
industrial actions organised by the professional drivers’ associations, choose not to 
require it to ban idling vehicle engines. Their choices are also backed up by the 
mainstream public opinion that banning idling vehicle engines would be more of a 
nuisance to drivers than a benefit to the environment. 
If we use a decision procedure which satisfies consensus preservation, it will 
adopt the unanimous choice of all the assembly members, which is non-green. At the 
same time, if we also demand that the decision procedure satisfy the condition of 
robustness to pluralism, it will accept this particular unanimous profile of non-green 
choices as admissible input. It follows that the decision procedure can generate a 
collective decision which is non-green, such as in the case above, which is contrary 
to the condition of green outcomes. This is, once again, the dilemma of green 
democracy. 
How can we escape from the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing 
consensus preservation? When consensus preservation does not hold, this means that 
some unanimous choices will be overruled by the decision procedure and hence not 
adopted as the collective decision. For example, if consensus is no longer preserved, 
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 United States Courts: http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JuryService.aspx (accessed 9 
November 2011) 
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then the unanimous choice of the non-green alternative by the assembly members 
will have no effect in determining the collective decision. In that case, it is possible 
that, in the end, a green collective decision is nonetheless produced, which avoids the 
dilemma of green democracy. 
It is clear that no standard democratic procedure can overrule unanimous 
agreement in the manner described above. Under simple majority rule, if an 
alternative receives more than 50% support it will become the collective decision. 
This includes the situation when its support rises to 100%, i.e., all individuals 
unanimously choose the same alternative. By the same token, any super-majority rule 
follows the same principle of consensus preservation, except that the threshold of 
support which an alternative must pass in order to become the collective decision is 
higher than that of simple majority rule, i.e., more than 50% support is required. As 
for unanimity rule, it is not only sufficient but also necessary for an alternative to 
receive 100% support in order to be collectively chosen. Respecting consensus, 
hence, is a minimal requirement for all these democratic procedures. 
For the overruling of unanimity, we need an undemocratic (or less democratic) 
procedure. Consider sub-majority rule. This demands that collective outcomes follow 
from the alternative supported by a certain threshold minority instead of that 
supported by the majority. Let us refer to the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario again. Suppose 
there are five assembly members, and the threshold is set at 
1
/4. If there are 
respectively two and three individuals choosing the green alternative and the non-
green alternative, then the size of the minority (
2
/5) is larger than the threshold value, 
and hence the two individuals can determine what the group chooses, i.e., the green 
alternative.
60
 We can see that by sub-majority rule, the minority may reject the 
majority choice of the non-green alternative and replace it with the green alternative. 
However, even this rule respects consensus preservation. 
Next, consider dictatorship. This decision procedure demands that collective 
outcomes follow from the alternative supported by the designated single individual, 
i.e., the dictator. Suppose Member 1 is assigned to be the dictator. If he/she chooses 
the green alternative, then, despite the remaining four members choosing the non-
green alternative, the green alternative will still be collectively chosen. Conversely, if 
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 By contrast, if the numbers of individuals choosing the green alternative and the non-green 
alternative are respectively 1 and 4, then the size of the minority (
1
/5) is smaller than the threshold 
value. Hence, that single individual’s choice cannot be decisive for what the group chooses.  
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he/she chooses the non-green alternative, then, regardless of what the other four 
members choose, the collective decision will be non-green. We can note that, in the 
former case, the dictator overrules the majority choice of the non-green alternative 
and replaces it with the green alternative. However, if every member, including the 
dictator, chooses the non-green alternative, the collective outcome will be non-green. 
Therefore, even though the two decision procedures can overrule majority 
choices, this does not imply that they can also overrule unanimous choices. On the 
contrary, both sub-majority rule and dictatorship are totally consistent with 
consensus preservation. When there is a profile of unanimous choices, there is no 
distinction between the majority and the minority, so there is no sub-majority choice 
since the choices of all individuals are the same. Likewise, even for dictatorship, the 
choice of the dictator is, again, simply that of every individual. The collective 
decision, even if it follows from the choice of the dictator, it is still equivalent to the 
choices of the rest of the individuals. Therefore, dictatorship and sub-majority rule, 
similarly to democratic procedures, do not overrule unanimity.  
Given unanimous agreement on the non-green alternative, as in the ‘Enviro 
Island’ scenario, there is no way we can overrule this agreement by biasing towards 
the choice of any single individual or of the minority. Instead, we need a prescribed 
choice of the green alternative which is independent of the choices of any individuals. 
This can be achieved, as introduced in Chapter 1, through (1) exogenously restricting 
the decision power of individuals or (2) endogenously restricting permissible 
collective decisions. 
With the first approach, the decision procedure does not, from the outset, 
process, or respond to, any individual non-green inputs, even if these are admissible 
according to the condition of robustness to pluralism. In other words, even if there is 
a profile of unanimous choice of the non-green alternative, the decision procedure 
does not consider such unanimity in producing the collective outcome. Instead, the 
prescribed green alternative is imposed exogenously as the collective decision. Such 
a choice can be placed by an individual or a collective body outside the group of 
individuals by virtue of his/her/its legal/political power or professional knowledge. 
For example, the national government of a (unitary) country may, based on 
positional authority or for epistemic reasons, instruct its regional governments to ban 
idling vehicle engines, even if the members of the regional assembly decide not to do 
so. This can be achieved through eco-authoritarianism or eco-technocracy. 
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Alternatively, the first approach can be realised by dismissing collective 
decision-making altogether. This means that the group of assembly members does 
not need to make any collective decisions on the idling vehicles issue in the first 
place. Even if they have already come up with a non-green collective decision, that 
decision is not binding since it in no sense determines, but merely recommends, what 
the government should do. In this way, the government may overrule any non-green 
decision by the group of assembly members and still take action to ask drivers to 
switch off idling vehicle engines. Here, the final decision outcome is green. This can 
be achieved through eco-libertarianism. 
For the second approach, although the decision procedure transforms 
individual inputs into collective decisions, it is biased towards the green alternative. 
In more technical terms, the decision procedure is not neutral when considering the 
green and non-green alternatives. In other words, the only valid collective decisions 
are green decisions, and any unanimous non-green choices will be rejected. This can 
be achieved by building in an internal mechanism which vetoes any non-green 
consensus. Such mechanisms include, as already introduced, substantive 
environmental rights and procedural environmental rights.  
For example, if there is a constitutional provision which gives citizens 
substantive rights to a certain standard of environmental quality, the government may 
need to take action to combat the air pollution caused by the idling vehicle engines. 
In this way, the decisions which the assembly can arrive at are limited to, possibly, 
green decisions. Any non-green decisions may also be subject to judicial review and 
be deemed unconstitutional and invalidated by the judiciary. As grounded in 
procedural environmental rights, a process for objecting to and reviewing any non-
green decisions may be initiated by individuals, such as citizens, who cannot directly 
participate in the decision-making about the idling vehicles issue in the same way as 
the group of assembly members. 
Figure 3.1 summarises the five proposals covered above. 
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Figure 3.1: Topology of relaxing consensus preservation of green democracy 
 
In sum, we may avoid the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing consensus 
preservation in such a way that the decision procedure used overrules any unanimous 
agreement on non-green alternatives. Whilst ordinary democratic procedures, such as 
simple/super-majority rule and unanimity rule, do not overrule unanimity, neither do 
some undemocratic procedures, such as dictatorship and sub-majority rule. Instead, 
we need to rely on exogenously restricting the decision power of individuals (e.g., by 
eco-authoritarianism, eco-technocracy or eco-libertarianism) or endogenously 
restricting permissible decisions (e.g., by substantive environmental rights and 
procedural environmental rights). In the remaining sections of this chapter, I explore 
the normative desirability as well as the practical applicability of these five 
substantive proposals. 
 
 
3.2 The desirability of relaxing consensus preservation: Constraint-based and 
outcome-based perspectives 
 
To evaluate whether each of the above proposals is normatively desirable, it is 
essential to set out some fundamental principles or benchmarks. As pointed out in 
Chapter 2, there are at least two salient perspectives from which we may discuss the 
normative desirability of an idea, action or institution, namely constraint-based and 
outcome-based perspectives.  
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From the outcome-based perspective, to reiterate, the idea, action or institution 
in question is evaluated on the basis of what outcomes it leads to, such as whether 
green or non-green collective decisions are produced by green democracy. From the 
constraint-based perspective, such evaluation asks how the outcomes come about, 
based on certain outcome-independent (normative) criteria, such as whether green 
democracy is inclusive of, and responsive to, the plurality of individual inputs. If it is 
normatively desirable for a decision procedure to produce green decision outcomes 
while being inclusive and responsive, then green democracy can be considered 
normatively desirable in terms of both procedure and outcome.  
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the dilemma of green democracy, there exist 
limitations on how inclusive and responsive a decision procedure can be in 
generating the designated green outcomes. More precisely, no decision procedure 
may simultaneously (1) accept any possible individual inputs; (2) preserve consensus; 
and (3) always produce green outcomes. For green democracy to be possible, we 
need to relax at least one of these requirements. The first two requirements are the 
procedural conditions whilst the third requirement is the outcome condition.  
To evaluate the relaxation of a procedural condition from the constraint-based 
perspective, we keep the other procedural condition constant and compare how far 
the substantive proposals depart from certain normative benchmarks which are 
outcome-independent. For example, by relaxing consensus preservation, we assume 
that the decision procedure remains robust to pluralism and examine the relative 
divergence of its substantive proposals from some normative criterion/criteria of 
democratic responsiveness. On the other hand, in order to evaluate a procedural 
condition from the outcome-based perspective, we similarly keep the other 
procedural condition constant and assess whether its substantive proposals lead to 
outcomes which satisfy certain normative benchmark(s) for democratic outputs. For 
instance, we ask whether these proposals will generate green outcomes. 
What are the normative benchmarks for democratic responsiveness? Apart 
from the minimal criterion of consensus preservation, equality is widely considered 
essential to democracy (e.g., Dahl, 1979; Cohen, 1996; Christiano, 1996b). There are 
basically two aspects of equality in democratic responsiveness, i.e., (1) equality of 
decision power between individuals and (2) equality of treatment between decision 
alternatives. For the former aspect, the decision procedure does not show bias 
towards any individual(s) by granting them extra or exhaustive power in determining 
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the decision outcomes. For the latter aspect, the decision procedure does not show 
bias towards any alternative(s) by granting them extra or exhaustive weighting when 
they are being considered. We may interpret the relaxation of consensus preservation 
as the violation of democratic equality in one or both aspects. 
We may now specify two normative benchmarks with regard to equality in 
democratic responsiveness: 
(BR1) Equality of individuals’ decision power: All individuals are 
granted equal positive power in determining decision outcomes.
61
 
(BR2) Equality of treatment of alternatives: All alternatives are 
granted equal weighting when under consideration. 
 
In more technical terms, the first benchmark refers to the condition of anonymity, 
meaning that the decision procedure treats all individuals equally, whereas the 
second benchmark refers to the condition of neutrality, meaning that the decision 
procedure treats all alternatives equally.
62
 In practice, the two aspects of democratic 
equality are usually realised as, respectively, the principles of ‘one person one vote’ 
and ‘one vote one value’. Simple majority rule is regarded as an example of a 
democratic procedure because it satisfies the conditions of anonymity and neutrality. 
In addition, we also need a benchmark for democratic outcomes, which is 
simply the output condition of green democracy: 
(BO) Green outcomes: The decision outcomes are green (prioritising, or 
are at least consistent with, environmental sustainability).
63
 
 
With the three benchmarks in hand, we shall proceed to discuss how each proposal 
for relaxing consensus preservation is, if at all, normatively desirable in terms of 
procedure and outcome. 
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 This means that, having equal positive power, all individuals are equally decisive. 
62
 See List and Dietrich (2010) for more technical discussion. 
63
 Note that ‘green outcomes’ here refers only to the outcomes from the decision-making process, 
rather than to the outcomes of a particular policy or measure adopted after the decision-making. 
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The desirability of eco-authoritarianism 
As noted, eco-authoritarianism avoids the dilemma of green democracy by imposing 
a green alternative as decision outcome. In other words, collective decisions depend 
not on the choices of the individuals in a group but, instead, on the decision 
alternative as prescribed by an individual or a collective body outside the group. As 
the name implies, such an imposition of green outcomes is coercive regardless of 
whether the individuals in the group consent to it. This may be realised in absolutist 
or autocratic regimes where governments possess unlimited power to rule as well as 
in centralised democratic regimes where political or decision-making power is 
concentrated at a particular level of government.  
While many contemporary regimes are far from absolutist or autocratic, as 
Heilbroner (1974) and Ophuls (1977) advocate, eco-authoritarianism is still possible 
when institutions permit the exercise of decision-making power ‘from above’ within 
a hierarchy, such as from national to regional governments or from ministerial to 
bureaucratic governments. Suppose the national government is vested with the power 
to make final decisions on certain issues, such as environmental issues, for the 
regional government. Then, we can still obtain a green collective decision if the 
national government chooses to ban idling vehicle engines, even if the group of 
regional assembly members chooses not to do this. 
The case outlined above is not purely imaginary. Think of a democratic state 
which has to fulfil certain responsibilities in order to reduce energy consumption as 
specified in an international treaty or which has to respond to political pressures from 
environmental NGOs or from its own nationals to combat all forms of pollution. It 
makes sense for the national government to introduce a uniform control policy on 
pollution in order to ensure the effective and consistent resolution of various 
pollution issues across the country, provided that this is lawful under the constitution. 
At the same time, some other environmental issues, such as construction of an 
international airport and a high-speed railway, may involve the interests of more than 
one area of the state, affecting various regions as well as the state as a whole. The 
national government may, on the grounds of securing economic prosperity, centralise 
the decision-making power on such infrastructure development. All in all, the point 
is that eco-authoritarianism can be present within even a democratic regime, as long 
as the national government is willing and able to impose decisions on governments at 
the regional level under the constitutional framework. 
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Is eco-authoritarianism attractive from the outcome-based perspective? 
According to benchmark (BO), a good decision procedure is expected to bring about 
green decision outcomes. Eco-authoritarianism, by definition, means that there exists 
a green alternative to be prescribed and imposed by someone who is ‘superior’ (in 
the hierarchy) and possesses the final decision-making power. In this way, as long as 
the decision procedure only responds to that particular green alternative, the decision 
outcomes must be green.  
In the example above, for eco-authoritarianism to be present, the national 
government may have committed itself to a country-wide air pollution control policy, 
demanding that all its regional governments decide and act on air pollution matters in 
line with that policy. Likewise, eco-authoritarianism is also possible in infrastructure 
development. The national government may value the preservation of natural 
landscapes more than economic growth, and hence veto any projects, say high-speed 
railway constructions, which destroy these landscapes.     
Notice that benchmark (BO) is met if, and only if, the superior individual or 
collective body concerned does in fact submit green alternatives as decisions. If, for 
any reason, the superior individual/collective body (e.g., the national government) is 
reluctant to decide which alternative to support (e.g., unwilling to control air 
pollution), or is committed to non-green alternatives (e.g., committed to building 
environmentally-unfriendly infrastructures), then eco-authoritarianism is not present 
in these cases. 
Is eco-authoritarianism desirable in the procedural sense? According to 
benchmarks (BR1) and (BR2), a democratic procedure should treat all individuals 
and alternatives equally. It is obvious that eco-authoritarianism violates (BR1), since 
it grants all the decision-making power to the superior individual/collective body 
outside the group, whereas the individuals inside the group cannot determine 
decision outcomes.  
Suppose the group of regional assembly members continues to choose the non-
green alternative of not banning idling vehicle engines. If the national government 
supports the green alternative, according to eco-authoritarianism, the regional 
assembly has to take the green alternative as the final decision in spite of the 
unanimous choice of all members in favour of the non-green alternative. It is worth 
remarking that the eco-authoritarian procedure responds only to the choice of the 
national government but not to the choices of the regional assembly members. 
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Therefore, the regional assembly members are equal only in the sense that they are 
equally powerless in determining the decision outcomes, which remains contrary to 
(BR1). 
The answer to whether eco-authoritarianism violates (BR2) is straightforward. 
A prerequisite of eco-authoritarianism is that there must be a decision alternative 
available to be prescribed and imposed by a superior individual/collective body. 
However, an eco-authoritarian procedure only considers the alternative chosen by the 
superior individual/collective body if it is green. In other words, if it turns out that 
the alternative chosen is non-green, then it will not be imposed as the decision 
outcome. 
In other words, if the national government chooses not to ban idling vehicle 
engines, then, in accordance with eco-authoritarianism, this choice will not become a 
decision outcome which the regional assembly should accept and adopt. Therefore, 
an eco-authoritarian procedure is not neutral when considering green and non-green 
alternatives, since it imposes only the former, but not the latter, as decision outcomes. 
 
The desirability of eco-technocracy 
Similarly to eco-authoritarianism, eco-technocracy avoids the dilemma of green 
democracy by restricting the decision power of the original group of individuals 
concerned. Eco-technocracy does not, however, prescribe or impose a green 
alternative as a decision outcome. Rather, it is biased towards the choices or 
judgments of certain technocratic individuals or collective bodies, such as élites, 
experts and professionals. In other words, the decision power is either entirely or 
partially granted to these individuals or collective parties, leaving the original group 
of individuals with less, or even no, power in determining the final decision 
outcomes. Eco-technocracy can be realised by shifting the task of decision-making 
from citizens to bureaucracies, quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations 
(Quangos) or advisory commissions. These institutions are readily available in most 
contemporary democratic regimes. 
Eco-technocracy is often based on the view that the political power to rule and 
make decisions should be concentrated in the hands of élites/experts/professionals 
rather than of the ordinary masses. This may be endorsed by Plato’s classic assertion 
that only certain people (i.e., philosopher kings) possess the knowledge and 
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experience to rule, and that enlightened dictatorship (by philosopher kings) is 
justified on the grounds of their ability to produce good outcomes (in ruling a state). 
A similar advocacy of élitism is common in the contemporary context, in which 
rational rule and scientific management are emphasised. Political/decision power is 
often in fact, or should ideally be, granted to the enlightened or most privileged 
individuals or collective parties, such as people with technical/scientific knowledge 
and/or administrative skills (e.g., experts, professionals and/or bureaucracies) 
(Burnham, 1941; Weber, 1948). It is also claimed that experts and professionals are 
more likely to make correct decisions on issues involving a high level of complexity 
and uncertainty, such as environmental issues (Sunstein, 2002).
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In the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario, suppose an expert panel has been formed which 
is independent of the executive government and the group of assembly members. A 
panel like this may include environmental scientists, medical professionals and/or 
other individuals/collective bodies which possess the knowledge and experience to 
handle issues concerning air pollution/idling vehicle engines. The question of who 
should be included is, of course, debatable and possibly varies across different types 
of decision scenarios.
65
 But, regardless of the actual composition of the panel, the 
opinions or choices of the panel members, under eco-technocracy, are given more, or 
even exclusive, consideration compared with those of the assembly members. In 
other words, an eco-technocratic procedure responds mainly, or merely, to the 
opinions or choices of those technocratic individuals/collective bodies. 
How desirable is eco-technocracy from the outcome-based perspective? This, 
similarly, depends on whether an eco-technocratic procedure generates green 
outcomes (i.e., satisfying benchmark (BO)). It appears that the decision outcomes 
can be green or non-green, depending on the choices or judgments of the 
technocratic individuals/collective bodies, and there is no reason why these choices 
or judgements must always be green. Imagine a situation in which the expert panel 
judges that, since there is no significant health impact from the present level of 
vehicle exhaust, it is not necessary to ban idling engines. Meanwhile, an 
environmental protection agency may, on the basis of a series of environmental 
impact assessments, conclude that the environmental cost of constructing a new 
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 See Chapter 6 for further discussion on the epistemic performance of decision-making by 
technocrats (experts and professionals) and ordinary people. 
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 Such an expert panel may also be substituted by bureaucratic agencies or Quangos as in existing 
democratic institutions such as pollution control agencies. 
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international airport can be compensated for by its potential economic benefit; and 
hence, although the construction project is unfavourable to the environment, the 
agency may still choose to support it. In neither case do the technocratic 
individuals/collective bodies choose the green alternative as the final decision. 
One factor which affects eco-technocracy in the generation of green decision 
outcomes is how decisions are made within an expert panel. This issue is relevant as 
long as there is more than one individual/collective body involved. The simplest case 
is where a unanimous agreement on a green alternative exists among all the members 
of the panel, and hence the panel will take the green alternative as the final decision. 
The case becomes more complicated when the members of the panel disagree over 
which alternative should prevail. In this case, whether a green decision outcome is 
available depends on how many members of the panel support the green alternative, 
as well as on how the choices of these members are processed.
66
 
In addition, if eco-technocracy is intended only partially, but not entirely, to 
restrict the decision power of the original group of individuals, then it also matters 
how much weight is given to the choices of the technocratic individuals/collective 
bodies in determining the final decisions. Suppose the group of assembly members 
continues to unanimously choose the non-green alternative, whilst the expert panel 
comes up with a unanimous agreement on the green alternative. If the choices of the 
expert panel and the group of assembly members account for, respectively, 60% and 
40% of the final decision outcome, then a green outcome will be produced by using 
simple majority rule. However, if super-majority rule is used instead, then the 
relative weighting of the choices of the experts must exceed the corresponding sub-
majority threshold (e.g., 75%) in order to ensure a green outcome. 
In sum, whether eco-technocracy generates green decision outcomes, or 
satisfies benchmark (BO), depends on whether the choices of the technocratic 
individuals/collective bodies are green, which in turn depends on (1) how decisions 
are made within the technocratic individuals/collective bodies; and (2) how much 
weight is given to the choices of the individuals/collective bodies in determining the 
final decisions. 
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 For instance, if two out of three members support the green alternative, and simple majority rule is 
used, the decision outcome will be green. But if, instead, unanimity rule is used, or if two members 
support the non-green alternative, either there will be no decision outcome or the decision outcome 
will be non-green. 
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Next, let us examine whether eco-technocracy is attractive from a procedural 
perspective. First of all, an eco-technocratic procedure, under most circumstances, 
does not treat individuals in the original group equally. As in the ‘Enviro Island’ 
scenario, if the expert panel withholds all decision power, then the group of assembly 
members will not be able to determine the final decisions by any means. The 
assembly members, similarly to what happens under eco-authoritarianism, are left 
equally powerless in decision-making, which is contrary to benchmark (BR1). 
On the other hand, if some decision power is transferred to the group of 
assembly members (e.g., 40%), then the group will be able to affect the final 
decisions, and each member is equal in determining the group’s decision. In this 
sense, benchmark (BR1) is satisfied. However, the members do not share equal 
decision power with the members of the expert panel when the choices of the latter 
are given more weight, or when the size of the latter is smaller than that of the former. 
If either of these is the case, then benchmark (BR1) is not satisfied. 
Does eco-technocracy treat decision alternatives equally, or meet benchmark 
(BR2)? This depends, again, on how decisions are made within the technocratic 
group of individuals/collective bodies (and, if applicable, within the original group of 
individuals). For the expert panel possessing the decision power exclusively, if no 
particular decision alternative is favoured by the decision mechanism used within the 
panel, then benchmark (BR2) is fulfilled. For the group of assembly members 
sharing part of the decision power, if the decision mechanisms used within both the 
group of assembly members and the expert panel do not show bias towards any 
decision alternative, then (BR2) is satisfied.  
All in all, whether eco-technocracy is attractive in the procedural sense is 
highly contingent on how decision power is allocated between/among the 
technocratic individuals/collective bodies and the original group of individuals, as 
well as on how the decision mechanism used within each group responds to the 
decision alternatives. 
 
The desirability of eco-libertarianism 
The way in which eco-libertarianism avoids the dilemma of green democracy is 
distinguishable from that of eco-authoritarianism and eco-technocracy. It dismisses 
the need for collective decision-making altogether by resorting to market 
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mechanisms. Advocates of eco-libertarianism believe that green outcomes can be 
better achieved by leaving environmental issues to be decided among individuals 
themselves, but not at the collective level. This is often based on the neo-liberal view 
which regards market mechanisms as delivering maximum efficiency (e.g., Hayek, 
1948; Friedman, 1962). Eco-libertarianism can be realised in liberal-capitalistic 
regimes by means, as introduced in Chapter 1, of resource privatisation, government-
regulated markets and/or other economic incentives. 
Consider again the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario. Suppose that it is generally not 
unlawful for individuals to idle vehicle engines. One possible version of eco-
libertarianism takes the form of resource privatisation by assigning individual 
property rights. Imagine that the roads and streets do not initially belong to anybody. 
Any individuals such as drivers are free to pollute by idling the engines of their 
vehicles. Now, suppose property rights within a certain area of roads and streets are 
assigned to a taxi operator. This area also covers some residential and commercial 
buildings that may be affected by any vehicle exhaust from idling engines. 
In this case, the persons affected and/or the government may negotiate directly 
with the taxi operator if the latter allows its drivers to idle engines on the roads and 
streets it owns. This may involve ‘paying off’ the taxi operator, e.g., with money, for 
asking its drivers to switch off idling engines. The exact nature and size of the pay-
off is determined through bargaining between both parties. If, eventually, they reach 
an agreement whereby the idling engines are switched off in return for a certain pay-
off, then a green outcome will be achieved without going through the process of 
collective decision-making. 
The above version of eco-libertarianism is grounded on the celebrated Coase 
theorem (Coase, 1960). One interpretation of the theorem is that, if there are no 
transaction costs, the assignment of individual property rights leads to bargaining 
between parties which produces an efficient outcome. For instance, if no cost (e.g., 
time cost) is involved for the residents/government and the taxi operator to bargain 
with each other, or to establish contracts upon reaching agreement, then, according to 
the Coase theorem, both parties will pursue bargaining in order to reach an efficient, 
or Pareto-optimal, outcome. This outcome represents a situation in which neither 
party can become better off without making the other party worse off. 
Apart from by resource privatisation, eco-libertarianism can also be realised in 
government-regulated markets. One possible approach is to adopt economic 
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incentives to induce individuals to be green (e.g., adopting green opinions) such that 
green outcomes will emerge. On the one hand, the government may auction off 
tradable permits which grant rights to pollute up to a certain level within a designated 
area. For instance, the government may define the maximum level of air pollution in 
a certain area of roads and streets, and sell a pollution permit to any 
individual/collective body which is willing and able to bid for it. The permit is 
transferable thereafter through market exchange, and it is lawful to idle vehicle 
engines only if in possession of the permit. If any driver wishes to idle his/her 
vehicle engine, he/she has to bid for the pollution permit. Likewise, if any residents 
wish the idling engines to be switched off, they may also purchase the permit and 
then choose not to use it. 
On the other hand, the government may introduce pollution taxes which leave 
individuals with the freedom to determine whether, as well as how much, to pollute. 
For example, the government charges a premium, by the concentration of pollutants 
from vehicle exhaust, for idling vehicle engines. It is lawful to idle vehicle engines 
only if such a premium is paid. If any driver wishes to idle his/her vehicle engine, 
he/she must pay this pollution tax. 
Is eco-libertarianism attractive from the outcome-based perspective? Consider 
the assignment of individual property rights. It is evident that the (decision) 
outcomes from bargaining at the individual level are not always green. Suppose, 
conversely, that property rights in a certain area of roads and streets are assigned to 
some person(s) affected or to the government. In this case, if a taxi operator desires 
its driver to enjoy air-conditioning while waiting for customers, it may be 
incentivised to pay the affected person(s)/government compensation in return for 
being allowed to idle the engines of its vehicles. If the latter party accepts any such 
offer, the idling vehicles issue will probably remain. This (decision) outcome from 
bargaining is non-green, and in this context, benchmark (BO) is violated. 
Of course, the affected person(s)/government may choose not to cooperate with 
the taxi operator in the first place. However, if they fail to reach any agreement from 
bargaining, they may need to resort to other mechanisms, such as mediation or the 
filing of a lawsuit. The outcomes from these alternative mechanisms may not be 
green either. For example, it is entirely possible that, when the case is taken to court, 
the taxi operator will be found innocent as not having violated any property rights by 
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letting its drivers idle their engines. If this is the case, then the (decision) outcome is 
not green, and this is contrary to benchmark (BO). 
Another possibility would be that both parties are able to reach an agreement, 
but the (decision) outcome is still non-green or only partially green. Suppose the 
property rights in an area of roads and streets are, as above, owned by the affected 
person(s)/government. While the taxi operator may be willing and able to 
compromise, it may make a counterproposal to limit the number of months and hours 
that drivers may idle their engines (e.g., only during daytime in summer). The 
affected person(s)/government may find the ‘compromise proposal’ acceptable, 
although less preferable. If this is the result of the bargaining, the taxi operator is, 
strictly speaking, still polluting, which may be perceived as a partially green or even 
a non-green outcome. If so, then benchmark (BO) is not satisfied either. 
Similarly, green outcomes are in no sense guaranteed by using economic 
incentives. As discussed in Chapter 2, whether the individuals will be induced to be 
green depends crucially on how they respond to the incentives. It is possible that the 
taxi operator may no longer allow its drivers to idle their engines upon realising that 
the cost of purchasing the pollution permit or paying the pollution tax is higher than 
the benefit of idling vehicle engines. However, if the owner is still willing and able to 
buy the permit or pay the premium in order to pollute, the idling vehicles issue will 
probably remain. In the latter case, the (decision) outcome is non-green, which does 
not fulfil benchmark (BO). 
In sum, under eco-libertarianism, whether the (decision) outcomes are green 
depends on the results of interactions in the market. With resource privatisation, both 
parties may or may not reach an agreement through bargaining, and if they do not, 
green outcomes will be contingent on the outcomes of some alternative resolution 
mechanisms. If, on the other hand, the parties are able to reach an agreement, green 
outcomes will still be contingent on what they have agreed on, which may be green, 
partially green or non-green. With other economic incentives, green outcomes are 
obtainable only if the polluting individuals/collective bodies are no longer willing or 
able to purchase pollution permits and/or pay pollution taxes. 
As to whether eco-libertarianism is attractive in a procedural sense, the answer 
varies with different versions. With resource privatisation, it merely involves a 
limited number of parties, namely the holder(s) and the violator(s) of the property 
rights concerned, and excludes the participation of other parties. For example, 
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suppose that property rights of roads and streets belong to the government, and the 
government deals directly with the taxi operator or drivers. Then, even if there are 
residents or pedestrians affected by the idling vehicle engines, they may have no 
power to influence the bargaining outcomes. This violates benchmark (BR1). 
On the other hand, with government-regulated markets, individuals/collective 
bodies with more financial resources are more able to influence the outcomes than 
those who have fewer. With tradable pollution permits, individuals/collective bodies 
with more money are more likely to purchase the permits and decide thereafter 
whether or not to pollute. With pollution taxes, likewise, those with greater financial 
resources are more able to afford the premium, and hence have more power in 
determining whether or not the (decision) outcome is green. Here, benchmark (BR1) 
is not satisfied either. 
What about benchmark (BR2)? With resource privatisation, this does not 
necessarily favour any particular alternative, since the (decision) outcomes are 
contingent on the bargaining outcomes. The bargaining process itself does not in any 
sense imply that the (decision) outcomes must always be green, partially green or 
non-green. Hence, benchmark (BR2) is satisfied. However, with government-
regulated markets, any economic incentives adopted are intended to induce green 
choices and behaviour by increasing the cost of non-green choices/behaviour. In 
other words, individuals/collective bodies will find it more costly to be non-green 
than green. Therefore, these incentives, intentionally, do not treat green and non-
green alternatives equally, which is contrary to benchmark (BR2). 
 
The desirability of substantive environmental rights 
The first three proposals for relaxing consensus preservation bring about green 
outcomes by exogenously restricting the decision power of the original group of 
individuals. The remaining two proposals, in contrast, take a different approach by 
endogenously restricting permissible decisions. This means that the choices of any 
individuals are not dismissed from the decision procedure in the first place, but 
certain unanimous agreements at the collective level may be struck down in the end. 
As introduced in Chapter 1, one possibility in this context is to establish 
substantive environmental rights. This is usually based on the view that all humans 
are entitled to certain environmental conditions which are fundamental to their well-
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being and should not be seized (e.g., Hayward, 2005). More broadly, these 
fundamental and inalienable rights, or natural rights, should be protected against any 
possibility of being compromised or sacrificed in the face of a democratic majority. 
In contemporary liberal democracies, substantive environmental rights can be 
established by building these into national constitutions, so that any unanimous 
agreement which violates such constitutional provisions will be overruled by judicial 
review. 
Substantive environmental rights refer to the substantive elements protected by 
the corresponding constitutional provisions. From one perspective, environmental 
rights may outlaw actions or arrangements which threaten the survival of certain 
individuals, such as depriving them of the supply of safe food, clean water and/or 
fresh air. From another perspective, these rights may go further to rule out any 
actions or arrangements which are contrary to the well-being of individuals, such as 
pollution or failure to preserve ecological diversity. Depending on the circumstances 
in different jurisdictions, the list of substantive elements covered by environmental 
rights varies. Moreover, these substantive rights may be stipulated in constitutions as 
general principles or in more specific terms. 
Can substantive environmental rights ensure that decision outcomes are always 
green, as stipulated by benchmark (BO)? To achieve green outcomes, substantive 
environmental rights, as constitutional provisions, need to provide a clear indication 
that the green alternative, instead of the non-green alternative, should be adopted 
across different environmental decision issues. This will depend on what substantive 
elements are recognised as environmental rights in the first instance.  
If substantive environmental rights are interpreted minimally as only the 
forbidding of actions or arrangements which deprive people of the basic necessities 
for survival, then we cannot reasonably expect the corresponding constitutional 
provisions to rule out any unanimous non-green agreement which is irrelevant to 
such deprivation. In the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario, even if the assembly members 
unanimously agree not to ban idling vehicle engines, this agreement, arguably, does 
not threaten the survival of the residents and pedestrians at the basic level. According 
to this minimal interpretation of substantive environmental rights, therefore, not all 
unanimous non-green agreements will be overruled and substituted by green 
alternatives. In other words, substantive environmental rights can co-exist with a 
non-green consensus, and hence the former cannot guarantee green outcomes. 
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On the other hand, substantive environmental rights may also be interpreted in 
a thicker sense as forbidding actions or arrangements which threaten both human 
survival and human well-being. In this case, any unanimous non-green agreement 
which contributes to such threat will be ruled out by the corresponding constitutional 
provisions. This may expand the scope of restriction of non-green outcomes. 
However, whether such a thicker notion of substantive environmental rights will 
always produce green outcomes still depends on how ‘well-being’ is understood. 
Imagine that, in a judicial review, the court reaches the following verdict: 
Although idling vehicle engines create nuisance for the nearby residents 
and pedestrians, there is no sufficient scientific/medical evidence that the 
vehicle exhaust from idling engines brings about significant health 
impact on people. On this ground, the taxi operator, for example, has not 
infringed the well-being of the residents and pedestrians, and hence it 
may lawfully allow its drivers to idle their engines. 
 
This verdict makes sense insofar as the presence of ‘significant health impact’, as 
proven by ‘sufficient scientific/medical evidence’, is necessary for any infringement 
of people’s well-being. If we regard this verdict as possible in a judicial review, then 
substantive environmental rights may not always overturn a non-green consensus and 
generate green decision outcomes, and in this case, benchmark (BO) is not satisfied. 
From the procedural perspective, it is apparent that, by definition, substantive 
environmental rights, regardless of how thin or thick this notion is, overrule certain 
unanimous non-green agreements. Therefore, they are not neutral when considering 
all alternatives, which violates benchmark (BR2). However, this may not always be 
the case. As discussed, since, depending on the coverage of these rights, some non-
green consensuses may not be overruled, it is possible for substantive environmental 
rights to be neutral in the context of green and non-green alternatives. If substantive 
environmental rights only rule out a unanimous agreement which threatens people’s 
survival, then such rights do not dismiss any unanimous agreement which, albeit 
non-green, does not threaten people’s survival. Hence, substantive environmental 
rights can be neutral in the context of green and non-green alternatives, given that the 
non-green alternative is not dismissed from the outset.  
As to whether substantive environmental rights treat all individuals equally, or 
satisfy benchmark (BR1), this depends on the decision procedure into which these 
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rights are incorporated. In principle, only unanimous agreements at the collective 
level, not individual choices, may be overruled by these rights. Strictly speaking, the 
notion of substantive rights does not stipulate whose choices should be given more 
weight or whether all should have the same weight. This is, instead, stipulated by the 
decision procedure used.  
For example, simple majority rule assigns equal weight to all individual 
choices, and the same is true of other democratic procedures such as super-majority 
rule and unanimity rule. If substantive environmental rights are incorporated into any 
of these procedures, then all individuals are treated equally according to benchmark 
(BR1). If, on the other hand, dictatorship or oligarchic rule is used instead, then the 
choices of a single individual (i.e., the dictator) or of a small group of individuals 
(i.e., the oligarchy) are considered exclusively or given more weight in 
consideration.
67
 As long as these choices are not ruled out by substantive 
environmental rights, they will determine decision outcomes. In the latter case, the 
decision power of individuals is in no sense equal, which violates benchmark (BR1). 
 
The desirability of procedural environmental rights 
Similarly to substantive environmental rights, procedural environmental rights strike 
down any unanimous agreement which violates the elements as protected by the 
corresponding constitutional provisions. They differ, however, in the way that 
procedural environmental rights focus, instead of on substantive environmental 
issues, on the participation of people in making collective environmental decisions. 
In other words, procedural environmental rights restrict the permissible decisions 
about how environmental decisions should be made rather than whether these 
decisions should be green or non-green. For example, any unanimous agreements on 
forbidding people’s participation in environmental decision-making will be overruled. 
Such rights of participation are often based on the view that ‘what touches all should 
be decided by all’68 and environmental issues affect the interests of all humans (and 
even future humans and non-human entities). 
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 Recall that both dictatorship and oligarchic rule satisfy the condition of consensus preservation. 
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 Justinian, Codex, 5.59.5.2. The original sentence is in Latin, i.e., quod omnes similiter tangit ab 
omnibus comprobetur. Cited by Ball (2006), pp. 136-137. See also List and Koenig-Archibugi (2010), 
footnote 12. 
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Having said this, procedural environmental rights are also relevant to 
producing green decision outcomes. This is because these procedural rights offer 
people an opportunity to influence decision outcomes by either participating directly 
in the decision-making process or striking down any unanimous non-green 
agreement by other individuals. For instance, even if the assembly members arrive at 
a non-green consensus which does not ban idling vehicle engines, other citizens such 
as the nearby residents and pedestrians affected, once granted certain procedural 
environmental rights, may attempt to strike down such a consensus. This can be done 
by the following routes: (1) Adopting another decision procedure which includes the 
affected citizens; or (2) filing a judicial review against the non-green consensus of 
the assembly members. For route (2) to be possible, some relevant constitutional 
provisions based on substantive environmental rights are also required. 
How attractive are procedural environmental rights? From an outcome-based 
perspective, benchmark (BO) is not always satisfied since they do not appear to 
guarantee green collective outcomes. With route (1), the right to participate in 
decision-making does not imply a right to impose an alternative decision outcome. 
After all, whether an alternative can become the decision outcome depends crucially 
on how many individuals support that alternative and how these ‘supportive’ votes 
are counted by the decision procedure. For instance, while some affected citizens 
may hope for a green outcome from another decision-making process, it is entirely 
possible that, eventually, they will still arrive at a non-green outcome which is 
equivalent to the earlier unanimous agreement of the assembly members. This can be 
the case when, for example, the majority of affected citizens support the non-green 
alternative. As for route (2), green outcomes are also not guaranteed by a process of 
judicial review based on substantive environmental rights, following the same 
argument as in the previous subsection. 
From the procedural perspective, whether procedural environmental rights treat 
all alternatives equally, as stipulated by benchmark (BR2) depends on the decision 
alternatives in question. If there is/are certain decision alternative(s) on the agenda 
which infringe(s) people’s right to participate in environmental decision-making, 
then such alternative(s) will be dismissed by procedural environmental rights, and 
hence not all alternatives will be given equal weight when under consideration. In 
this case, benchmark (BR2) is not satisfied. If, on the other hand, no decision 
alternatives on the agenda imply such an infringement of participatory rights, as in 
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the case of the green and non-green alternatives in the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario, then 
procedural environmental rights per se are not biased towards any particular 
alternatives. In this case, whether benchmark (BR2) is satisfied depends on whether 
the decision procedure used treats all alternatives equally (e.g., simple majority rule). 
As to whether procedural environmental rights, as stipulated by benchmark 
(BR1), treat all individuals equally, the answer for route (2) is positive since all 
individuals possess an equal right to review any unanimous non-green agreements. 
For example, if route (2) is adopted, procedural environmental rights will equally 
entitle all affected citizens to file a judicial review against any non-green consensus 
reached by the assembly members. On the other hand, the answer for route (1) 
depends, again, on the decision procedure used. Even if all individuals are entitled to 
participate in decision-making, this does not imply that all their choices are 
considered equally. Imagine that all affected citizens decide on the idling vehicles 
issue by a separate referendum, but one of these citizens is chosen as the dictator, and 
dictatorship is adopted as the decision procedure. In this way, if a dictatorial 
procedure is used, then procedural environmental rights will not satisfy benchmark 
(BR1). Nevertheless, this result can be reversed if the decision procedure used grants 
equal power to all individuals, as with simple majority rule. 
 
Summary 
So far, I have considered the five substantive proposals for relaxing consensus 
preservation. These proposals can be used to overrule any unanimous agreement on 
alternatives which are inconsistent with the condition of green outcomes. They either 
exogenously restrict the decision power of individuals or endogenously restrict 
permissible decisions. I have evaluated the normative desirability of each proposal 
based on three benchmarks which are necessary for green democracy, namely the 
procedural conditions of equality of individuals’ decision power (BR1) and equality 
of treatment of alternatives (BR2), as well as the output condition of green outcomes 
(BO). Strictly speaking, in order to determine whether each proposal can satisfy 
these benchmarks, we need to consider together some other factors of dependence. 
A more general picture is that, by adopting eco-authoritarianism, eco-
technocracy or eco-libertarianism, benchmark (BR1) cannot be satisfied in any case, 
whereas by adopting substantive/procedural environmental rights, benchmark (BR1) 
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may still be satisfied, depending on the decision procedure used. From the angle of 
participation, restricting permissible decisions is more democratic than restricting the 
decision power of individuals. On the other hand, from the angle of generating green 
outcomes, eco-authoritarianism and substantive environmental rights are more 
attractive, since they can satisfy benchmark (BO) if there is a green alternative to be 
prescribed and imposed as decision outcome (with eco-authoritarianism) or all 
possible decision alternatives that are (potentially) non-green are ruled out by the 
corresponding constitutional provisions (with substantive environmental rights).  
 
 
3.3 The practical applicability of relaxing consensus preservation 
 
From a purely theoretical perspective, all the above proposals are logically possible 
since having relaxed consensus preservation, they are consistent with the remaining 
two conditions for green democracy, i.e., robustness to pluralism and green outcomes. 
Nevertheless, not all proposals which are workable or appealing in theory are equally 
attractive or even feasible in practice. In this section, I briefly discuss the practical 
applicability of these proposals. I identify a number of factors which affect whether, 
and if so how, each proposal may be realised in real-world collective environmental 
decision-making. 
Following Bardach (2009), I specify three criteria which are commonly used to 
evaluate the practicability of proposals for public policy and political arrangements: 
(C1) Legality: The proposal operates in accordance with constitutional 
and statutory laws. 
(C2) Political acceptability: The proposal receives wide and intense 
support, but meets with narrow and mild opposition (if any). 
(C3) Implementability: The proposal can be implemented with minimal 
administrative cost and few adverse side-effects.  
 
Criterion (C1) is the most fundamental, in the sense that no political arrangements 
(or more specifically, decision arrangements) may violate constitutional or statutory 
laws. Otherwise, either these arrangements cannot be realised in the first place or the 
legal validity of decision outcomes from these arrangements is likely to be 
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challenged. Criterion (C2), similarly, is essential to any feasible decision 
arrangements. After all, if people do not support or even oppose these arrangements, 
it is likely that they also will not accept the corresponding decision outcomes as 
legitimate, which in turn threatens the stability of the arrangements themselves. 
At the same time, criterion (C3) concerns ease of implementation, which also 
determines the practicability of decision arrangements. Consider a decision 
arrangement that may be too costly to operate (e.g., a referendum for every single 
decision issue), or that, once operated, has immense undesirable side-effects (e.g., 
widespread corrupt and illegal conduct of elections). In either case, it is unlikely that 
the arrangement will be widely supported by politicians or by people in general. 
Below I discuss how each of these criteria illuminates conditions that affect the 
practical applicability of the five substantive proposals for relaxing consensus 
preservation. 
 
Legality 
A feasible decision arrangement must be, first of all, legal. A minimal constraint of 
legality is that the decision arrangement must not, in principle, violate the 
constitutional and statutory laws of a particular jurisdiction. A more demanding 
constraint may require certain constitutional or statutory laws which grant authority 
to individuals/collective bodies to administer and operate the decision arrangement. 
The first constraint ensures that the decision arrangement is legally valid, while the 
second constraint ensures that the decision arrangement can be realised substantively. 
Consider the two proposals for restricting permissible decisions. Presumably, if 
substantive/procedural environmental rights are stipulated as constitutional 
provisions, these provisions will not contradict other constitutional or statutory laws 
(or even if they contradict the statutory laws, the former will still prevail). This 
satisfies the first constraint. If, on the other hand, substantive/procedural 
environmental rights are merely alleged to be a kind of natural or human right 
without being recognised as legal prescriptions, there is still a chance that these rights 
may be incompatible with the existing constitutional or statutory laws. If this is the 
case, the first constraint may not be satisfied. 
As for realising substantive/procedural environmental rights, it is crucial that 
there exists a mechanism/institution which can overrule any decision outcomes that 
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breach these environmental rights. The process of judicial review by the judiciary 
appears to be an example of such a mechanism/institution. In most contemporary 
liberal democracies, the power of the judiciary to strike down unconstitutional 
political actions or arrangements (e.g., decision outcomes) is built on the principle of 
judicial independence. Judicial independence means that the judicial branch of 
government is strictly separated from the other branches, and the judicial decision-
making process is not subject to any influence from these other branches of 
government. Therefore, in order for environmental rights to be exercised through 
judicial review, it is necessary for the constitution to grant the judiciary the 
corresponding power and recognise the principle of judicial independence. This 
constitutes a necessary condition for satisfying the second constraint. 
Next, consider the first two proposals for restricting the decision power of 
individuals, i.e., eco-authoritarianism and eco-technocracy. Eco-authoritarianism 
prescribes and imposes green alternatives as decision outcomes, and one prerequisite 
is that there must be at least an individual/collective body to carry out such a task. In 
an autocratic regime this may be done by a dictator; and in a centralised democratic 
regime the national government may be responsible. In regimes where 
constitutionalism is observed, it is necessary that there exist relevant 
constitutional/statutory laws specifying how, where and to what extent the dictators 
or national governments may exercise the authority to prescribe and impose green 
decision outcomes. This is in order to fulfil the second constraint. More 
fundamentally, there must be no constitutional/statutory laws which forbid the 
rejection of any consensus reached in earlier decision-making processes. This is in 
order to satisfy the first constraint. 
Eco-technocracy concentrates decision power over environmental issues 
(entirely) on certain technocratic individuals and/or collective bodies, such as elites, 
experts or professionals. As an eco-technocratic procedure is biased towards the 
choices of these technocratic parties, similarly, in order for the first constraint to be 
satisfied, there must not be any legal provisions which prohibit the overruling of any 
earlier unanimous agreement reached. In addition, in order to satisfy the second 
constraint, there must also be relevant laws which grant these technocratic 
individuals and/or collective bodies more, or even exhaustive, power in a separate 
decision-making process. 
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Finally, with eco-libertarianism, since this leaves environmental decision-
making to individuals in the market, the constitution, in the first place, has to 
stipulate that the regime in question will operate an economic system which does not 
preclude free commercial exchange of environmental goods, which by and large will 
mean a capitalistic system. This is in order to satisfy the first constraint. Furthermore, 
for privatisation of resources to take place, there must be statutory laws which 
specify how individual property rights are to be acquired, transferred and enforced. 
This makes possible the assignment of clear property rights, which is a precondition 
of the Coase theorem which justifies eco-libertarianism (as mentioned above). With 
government-regulated markets and economic incentives, there must be laws and 
regulations underpinning the corresponding measures, such as relevant traffic 
regulations to back up congestion charging. This is in order to satisfy the second 
constraint.  
Note that the legality criterion is not restricted to constitutional and statutory 
laws in political regimes. Arguably, collective decision-making (on environmental 
issues) may also take place within private groups or organisations. For example, 
there are usually constitutions in registered companies, non-profit-making 
organisations and even in some smaller organisations in civil society. In addition, 
there are often boards of directors/governors/trustees that oversee activities in these 
groups/organisations. Subject to a similar legality constraint, it is also possible to 
adopt any of the five proposals within these groups/organisations. For example, the 
boards of directors/governors/trustees may, for the protection of 
substantive/procedural environmental rights, act like a judiciary and review any 
unanimous agreement which is contrary to those rights. These boards may also 
prescribe and impose green decision outcomes (as in eco-authoritarianism), 
concentrate decision power in the hands of a separate group of experts (as in eco-
technocracy), or leave it up to the members of the group/organisation to make 
decisions at individual level (as in eco-libertarianism). All these actions are, however, 
conditional on compliance with what is stipulated in the constitutions.  
                            
Political acceptability 
On top of legality, a feasible decision arrangement must also be politically acceptable. 
Very often, it is even a pre-requisite that any proposal for political arrangements or 
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public policy must secure sufficient support from legislators, political parties, interest 
groups and the general public before it can be passed as law. In other words, 
satisfying the political acceptability criterion is often necessary in order to satisfy the 
legality criterion. Even if an unwelcome proposal already exists as law, there may be 
immense political resistance, say from civil society, which hampers its 
implementation or even reduces the overall popularity of a government. 
Political acceptability can be measured by two indicators: first, the scope and 
intensity of political support, and, second, the scope and intensity of political 
opposition.
69
 One understanding of ‘scope’ is the number of political actors (such as 
political parties, interest groups and citizens), while ‘intensity’ may refer to the level 
of support exhibited in the attitudes and behaviour of these political actors. Under 
most circumstances, the wider and more intense the support, the more politically 
acceptable the proposal. On the other hand, the narrower and milder the opposition, 
the more politically acceptable the proposal. As a general principle, therefore, a 
politically feasible decision arrangement must receive wide and intense political 
support as well as meeting narrow and mild political opposition.  
Consider the three proposals for restricting the decision power of individuals. If 
the original group of individuals is no longer able to determine decision outcomes, 
these individuals may constitute one major source of opposition. If this original 
group is relatively small in size, such as the assembly members in the ‘Enviro Island’ 
scenario, we can expect the opposition to be relatively narrow. But if the original 
group is as large as all the citizens of the city-state, the opposition will probably be 
wider. At the same time, if the original group is cohesive, its members may share a 
more or less similar attitude of opposition to any proposals which reduce their 
decision power. We may, then, expect the opposition to be more intense. In contrast, 
if the group is more loosely connected, then the intensity of opposition may be less. 
Therefore, in order to minimise the degree of opposition, one possibility is to limit 
the application of the three proposals to smaller and/or less cohesive groups. 
We may also devise strategies to boost political support for the three proposals. 
The possible sources of support vary between different proposals. With eco- 
authoritarianism, this may be applied to dictators (in autocratic regimes) or national 
governments (in centralised democratic regimes) whose decisions are welcomed by 
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 See also Bardach (2009), p. 34. Note that Bardach sees the two indicators as necessary conditions, 
rather than measurement standards, for political acceptability. 
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individuals. These may be heads of governments with sufficiently high popularity, 
leaders with outstanding charisma or dictators with authority based on tradition.
70
 
When the task of prescribing and imposing green decisions is performed by these 
well-received individuals/collective bodies, it is more likely that individuals will 
accept the eco-authoritarian procedure because of their affinity with these 
individuals/collective bodies. 
With eco-technocracy, likewise, we can increase the chances of acceptance by 
applying this to technocratic individuals and/or collective bodies with sufficiently 
high credibility. This means that they are trusted by virtue of their competence (e.g., 
professional knowledge and experience) to make environmental decisions on behalf 
of others. An expert panel with members from highly-educated and/or well-respected 
backgrounds is an example. These individuals/collective bodies may also need to 
ensure transparency in their decision-making process and to back up their decisions 
with concrete evidence and sound arguments. In this case, individuals may become 
more convinced about the credibility of an eco-technocratic procedure as a whole.
71
  
With eco-libertarianism, a major source of support originates not from any 
popular or credible individuals or collective bodies, but from a discourse maintaining 
that environmental issues are better handled at individual level (i.e., in the market). 
There is a higher chance of such a discourse existing in regimes with a laissez-faire 
capitalist economy and groups/organisations with laissez-faire style of leadership. If 
these regimes or groups/organisations are stable, presumably their citizens or 
members will accept, at least tacitly, such a principle that the government or 
collective should not interfere with their affairs unless these cannot be dealt with by 
the individuals themselves. If people in these regimes or groups/organisations 
understand that environmental issues can be sorted out simply through market 
mechanisms, there is a good chance that they will not see making collective 
decisions on these issues as always necessary. This idea is sometimes described as 
the subsidiarity principle (e.g., Gosepath, 2005). 
Next, consider the remaining two proposals which restrict permissible 
decisions. Since substantive/procedural environmental rights preclude certain 
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 See also Weber’s (1948) distinction between three types of authority (or legitimate exercise of 
power), i.e., traditional, charismatic and legal-rational authority.  
71
 Of course, this also depends crucially on whether they value the credibility of decision outcomes 
from these, despite credible technocratic parties. For an alternative collaborative model engaging both 
‘experts’ and ‘ordinary people’, see our discussion in Chapter 6.  
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alternatives from becoming decision outcomes, a major source of opposition may 
originate from individuals and/or collective bodies that support these ‘forbidden’ 
alternatives. Possibly, in the case of most non-green alternatives ruled out by 
substantive environmental rights, some individuals/collective bodies may have 
interests in these. For example, the conservation view of environmental protection is 
often in conflict with economic development, and parties who have business interests 
in such development may resist the idea of making non-green collective decisions 
unconstitutional in all circumstances.  
With procedural environmental rights, a similar resistance may come from 
individuals/collective bodies with power to influence government decisions, such as 
through lobbying. These privileged parties may not welcome the idea of widened 
democratic participation, as ensured by procedural environmental rights, since this 
reduces their original power of (environmental) decision-making. To minimise 
oppositions, therefore, we may limit the applications of substantive/procedural 
environmental rights to contexts where individuals/collective bodies, at least in 
general, value both economic development and environmental protection/ 
sustainability, and where government is not biased towards the interests of certain 
individuals/collective bodies in making collective decisions. 
On the other hand, to increase the chances of political support for 
substantive/procedural environmental rights, we may focus on contexts in which the 
values of rights, as well as of democracy and/or environmental sustainability, are 
widely observed and accepted. Generally speaking, the first two values can readily 
be revealed in many contemporary liberal-democratic regimes/societies. For 
regimes/societies which are less shaped by liberal individualism, but rather, say, by 
Asian or Confucian values of social harmony and respect for authority, as in the 
Oriental world, it is less likely that notions of right and democracy are as welcome. 
With environmental sustainability, this value is more likely to exist in 
regimes/societies where there are mature green political parties, environmental 
NGOs and/or robust social norms which incentivise environmentally responsible 
attitudes and behaviour. Broadly speaking, these are more common within developed 
than developing countries. In order, then, to maximise political support for 
substantive/procedural environmental rights, it is preferable to restrict their 
application to liberal-democratic and developed regimes/societies.  
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Implementability                      
Finally, a feasible decision arrangement must be implementable. There are a variety 
of standards which determine whether a proposal for political arrangements or public 
policy is implementable, but two of these are, arguably, particularly important. The 
first standard concerns the administrative cost involved. It is sensible to assume that 
the lower the cost, the more implementable the proposal. The second standard 
concerns the possible negative side-effects which may come with the intended 
positive outcomes of the proposal. It makes sense, again, to postulate that the fewer 
or less serious the negative side-effects, the more implementable the proposal. Let 
me suggest some very preliminary observations on this. 
Consider the first two proposals for restricting individuals’ decision power. 
With eco-authoritarianism, green collective decisions are readily available as long as 
there is an individual/collective body which prescribes and imposes green 
alternatives as decision outcomes. If this is carried out by a single individual, e.g., a 
dictator, then what is required is usually only endorsement by that individual, and 
hence the administrative cost is relatively trivial. If, on the other hand, this is realised 
by a collective body, such as a national government, there may be administrative 
costs involved for bureaucratic procedures and internal co-ordination, notably 
meetings and paperwork. At the same time, with eco-technocracy, a similar kind of 
administrative cost is unavoidable for co-ordination purposes within technocratic 
groups/organisations, such as expert panels. Furthermore, there may be an additional 
cost for appointing experts, professionals and administrative staff. 
A notably undesirable side-effect of eco-authoritarianism is the possibility of 
abuse and corruption. Since there is an individual/collective body with complete 
power over what alternatives to prescribe and impose as collective decisions, there is 
a risk that that individual/collective body will accept benefits from, and biases 
towards, the interests of certain parties who prefer non-green outcomes and will, as a 
result, prescribe and impose non-green alternatives as decision outcomes. This is 
likely to invite criticism of the soundness of the procedure as well as the outcomes. 
With eco-technocracy, similarly, it is possible that people will challenge the 
soundness of the choices made by ‘technocrats’, especially if they decide without 
substantive evidence and convincing arguments. A more complicated issue is that 
even these experts and professionals may remain deeply divided among themselves 
and may not be able to reach any decisions at all. 
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As for eco-libertarianism, since environmental decision-making is here left to 
individuals in the market, there is no administrative cost involved as in other 
collective decision-making scenarios such as voting, co-ordination and/or certain 
personnel appointments. However, spending is still necessary in order to maintain the 
existing framework for free market exchanges. For example, with resource 
privatisation, it must be ensured, at least, that the institution which assigns and 
enforces individual property rights works properly across time. As for government-
regulated markets and economic incentives, further administrative costs appear to be 
expected for the devising and realisation of the corresponding regulatory/incentive 
measures. 
One major side-effect of eco-libertarianism is the possible negative externality 
resulting from non-green individual choices. As discussed, under resource 
privatisation, holders of property rights are free to choose non-green alternatives as 
long as they are willing and able to bear the corresponding costs. Likewise, even if 
economic incentives are in place, people may still not be motivated to choose green 
alternatives, especially when these incentives are perceived as trivial. In such a case, 
we may arrive at a situation where, in the absence of any collective decision-making 
arrangement, some people have to bear the cost of the persisting environmental 
problems whilst remaining powerless to resolve these problems. 
Finally, consider the remaining proposals for substantive/procedural 
environmental rights. One obvious administrative cost is that of turning these rights 
into constitutional provisions, which includes all the resources spent on the 
corresponding legislative process. Further administrative expenditure goes on the 
institution, e.g., the judiciary, which is responsible for enforcing these rights so that 
any unconstitutional consensus/collective decisions are struck down in, say, the 
process of judiciary review. Realising procedural environmental rights also implies a 
possible cost for devising and maintaining channels to enable more democratic 
participation in environmental decision-making. 
A major negative side-effect of substantive/procedural environmental rights 
concerns their inflexibility. These rights, once constitutionalised, impose inviolable 
constraints on the outcomes (and even the procedures) in all environmental decision 
scenarios. While such inviolable constraints can ensure a certain standard of 
environmental quality and/or democratic participation, as time passes, circumstances 
will change and these constraints may no longer be responsive to new issues and 
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concerns. One example is when people’s perception of well-being, as protected by 
current environmental rights, alters. In this case, it becomes necessary to amend or 
supersede these ‘out-dated’ provisions, but, given the rather inflexible nature of 
constitutional laws, it is unclear how likely it is that the task can be completed, if at 
all, within a reasonable time-frame. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have considered the second escape route from the dilemma of green 
democracy, i.e., relaxing consensus preservation. In Section 3.1, I briefly illustrated, 
in more general terms, how unanimous agreements may be overruled through five 
substantive proposals, i.e., eco-authoritarianism, eco-technocracy, eco-libertarianism, 
substantive environmental rights as well as procedural environmental rights.  
My core discussion was presented in Section 3.2. Based on the three normative 
benchmarks of green democracy, I have examined the desirability of the five 
substantive proposals from both constraint-based and outcome-based perspectives. 
The general conclusion is as follows: from the angle of participation, eco-
authoritarianism, eco-technocracy and eco-libertarianism, which restrict the decision 
power of individuals, are less democratic than substantive/procedural environmental 
rights, which restrict permissible decisions. By contrast, from the angle of producing 
green outcomes, eco-authoritarianism and substantive environmental rights are 
relatively more attractive.  
In addition, I have asked in Section 3.3 whether these five proposals are 
practically feasible. Based on three practicability criteria, I have outlined how we 
may approach this question by considering their legality, political acceptability and 
implementability. My finding is that whether these proposals are workable in 
practice depends on a number of factors which vary across different empirical 
circumstances. It should be borne in mind, however, that the issue of practical 
applicability is very complex and context-dependent, and my observations are in no 
sense intended to be exhaustive or definitive. I hope, instead, to offer a starting point 
for systematically exploring how we may realise these proposals, which are not only 
conceptually interesting but also practically relevant. 
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CHAPTER 4 
     
RELAXING GREEN OUTCOMES 
 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I demonstrated that the dilemma of green democracy may be 
avoided by relaxing the conditions of robustness to pluralism and consensus 
preservation. By relaxing robustness to pluralism, we restrict the domain of 
admissible inputs to the decision procedure in such a way that any non-green 
opinions are dismissed at the outset (i.e., exogenous domain restrictions) or 
transformed into green opinions through mechanisms such as deliberation (i.e., 
endogenous domain restrictions).
72
 By relaxing consensus preservation, we overrule 
any unanimous agreement on non-green alternatives through either exogenously 
restricting the decision power of individuals (e.g., eco-authoritarianism, eco-
technocracy or eco-libertarianism) or endogenously restricting permissible collective 
decisions (e.g., substantive/procedural environmental rights).  
However, not all of the above approaches can always guarantee the generation 
of green outcomes. To recapitulate, with endogenous domain restriction, green 
decisions are very much dependent on whether the transformation mechanism used 
can successfully change opinions from non-green to green. With eco-technocracy, 
eco-libertarianism and procedural environmental rights, green decisions also depend 
on whether the relevant individuals/collective bodies choose the green alternative in 
the first instance. Therefore, even if these approaches can in principle circumvent the 
dilemma of green democracy, green decisions are still in practice subject to 
contingencies.   
In addition, while some other approaches are relatively certain to ensure green 
outcomes, they fall short of being procedurally desirable. With exogenous domain 
restriction, the dismissal of non-green opinions from being admitted to the decision-
making process renders democracy trivial. With eco-authoritarianism and substantive 
environmental rights, these are often considered less democratic or undemocratic 
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 Note, again, that the latter can also take place when the decision procedure is applied into a context 
where it so happens that all opinions are green, which is contextual congruence. See Chapters 1 and 2 
for more discussion. 
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since they are biased towards a particular decision alternative, i.e., they are not 
neutral when considering different alternatives. In other words, guaranteeing green 
outcomes through these approaches comes with a price, which hampers their 
procedural attractiveness. This tension is, in fact, the essence of the dilemma of green 
democracy: the tension between democratic procedures and green outcomes.   
Given the practical uncertainty and the procedural cost of guaranteeing green 
decisions, is there an alternative approach which avoids the dilemma of green 
democracy? In this chapter, I shall consider the relaxation of green outcomes – the 
last condition of green democracy. As introduced in Chapter 1, this means that the 
decision procedure does not deliver green outcomes all the time, and that these can 
be achieved by adopting a pragmatic or a probabilistic form of green democracy. 
Pragmatic (green) democracy does not presume that decision outcomes from 
democracy must be green; and probabilistic green democracy requires only that the 
decision procedure should tend to, rather than will always, generate green outcomes.  
I shall focus on whether pragmatic (green) democracy and probabilistic green 
democracy are normatively desirable as well as practically feasible. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, probabilistic green democracy is often associated with certain deliberative 
arrangements which may boost the likelihood of green outcomes. Examples include a 
number of innovative mechanisms for collective (environmental) decision-making, 
such as mediation, policy dialogues, consensus conferences, public consultation, 
public enquiries, citizens’ juries and citizen initiatives/referendums (Smith, 2001, 
2003; Dryzek, 2005). At the same time, pragmatic (green) democracy may also be 
realised through these innovative mechanisms, although they do not necessarily 
generate green outcomes. More generally, this also covers various forms of collective 
action in the political arena, such as those of green political parties, environmental 
interest groups and environmental social movements. On the basis of how decisions 
are achieved through these democratic processes, I shall ask how we can assess the 
normative desirability and the practical applicability of pragmatic/probabilistic 
(green) democracy. 
My discussion is structured as follows. In Section 4.1, I explain the idea of 
relaxing green outcomes and illustrate how pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy can be realised in practice. In Section 4.2, I examine, from a constraint-
based perspective, the normative desirability of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy realised as four different models of collective action/mechanisms. In 
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Section 4.3, I consider the idea of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy more 
generally and provide another similar assessment from an outcome-based perspective. 
In Section 4.4, I draw some conclusions. 
 
 
4.1 Relaxing green outcomes: The idea 
 
It is arguable that a wide range of opinions do exist in a pluralistic context, and that 
any decision procedure which does not preserve consensus is undemocratic, but it 
does not follow that there is no decision procedure which can both be responsive to 
pluralism and respect unanimity. Consider a situation in which all individuals vote 
for some option x, and that the decision procedure has to accept any unanimous 
profile of non-green choices as admissible inputs. As long as x is an admissible 
decision output, the procedure can then simply choose x as the collective decision. 
Generally, such a procedure can be either democratic (e.g., unanimity rule, super-
majority rule or simple majority rule) or undemocratic (e.g., sub-majority rule, 
oligarchic rule or dictatorship). 
For rational decision-making, it may be desirable, however, to deem at least 
some decision outputs to be inadmissible. One minimal demand is that inconsistent 
outputs should be disallowed. For example, if the output is a set of accepted 
propositions containing mutually contradictory alternatives such as A and not-A – 
meaning that A is simultaneously chosen and not chosen – then it is considered 
inconsistent and hence rejected. Other possible cases of inconsistency include non-
transitive rankings of alternatives (e.g., A is preferred to B, B is preferred to C, and C 
is preferred to A) and combinations of mutually conflicting judgments on 
propositions (e.g., D is true, ‘if D then E’ is true, and E is false). A further reasonable 
demand is that any incomplete decisions should be rejected. For instance, if the 
decision agenda has n alternatives to be ranked or propositions to be judged, and if 
the number of alternatives ranked or propositions judged is fewer than n, then, 
similarly, the output is considered incomplete and thus rejected.  
In what ways can we resolve the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing the 
condition of green outcomes? Let us consider again the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario in 
which its assembly members are deliberating and deciding on whether or not to ban 
idling vehicle engines. The condition of green outcomes requires, quite simply, that 
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the decision procedure should generate green outcomes under all circumstances. 
Suppose, again, a decision whereby the assembly supports the ban is green, whilst 
the decision whereby the assembly rejects the ban is non-green. Consider the case 
where all the assembly members choose the latter alternative.  
In its original formulation, green democracy is a decision procedure which 
satisfies the conditions of robustness to pluralism, consensus preservation as well as 
green outcomes. If we use green democracy in collective decision-making in the 
example above, then, by virtue of its robustness to pluralism, this will accept the 
unanimous profile of non-green choices by the assembly members as admissible 
inputs, i.e., rejecting the ban. Moreover, by virtue of consensus preservation, it will 
adopt such a unanimous non-green choice as the collective choice. In this case, a 
non-green collective decision will be produced, which contradicts the condition of 
green outcomes. This is, once more, the dilemma of green democracy. 
It appears that we can avoid the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing green 
outcomes. This can easily be achieved, as introduced in Chapter 1, by abandoning 
altogether the demand that the decision procedure should always generate green 
outcomes. In this way, green democracy is reduced to pragmatic (green) democracy. 
It is pragmatic in the sense that the decision procedure only ensures the production of 
collective decisions for practical problem solving, but does not seek to pursue any 
particular decision outcomes, such as green outcomes.
73
 In other words, there is no 
stipulation regarding what the decision outcomes should always be, say whether they 
should be green or non-green. Therefore, a non-green decision, as in the above 
example, is entirely valid, and the dilemma of green democracy is bypassed. 
While pragmatic (green) democracy is a sufficient and straightforward 
approach to relaxing green outcomes, it is far from necessary. To escape the dilemma 
of green democracy, what we minimally need is to exempt the requirement for green 
outcomes from the special case under which there is a unanimous choice of the non-
green alternative. That is to say, the decision procedure will be allowed in this 
special case to generate a non-green outcome, and the three conditions of green 
democracy will become mutually consistent. In order to achieve this, we can 
reformulate green democracy in such a way that the decision procedure is likely to 
produce, rather than always producing, green outcomes. This is probabilistic green 
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 Recall that it is the decision procedure, i.e., green democracy, that is pragmatic rather than the 
decision outcomes. See footnote 44 in Chapter 1. 
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democracy, where the likelihood of green outcomes is measured and expressed in 
numerical values between 0 and 1 (inclusive), with 0 and 1 denoting, respectively, 
the absence of chance and the absolute certainty of the generation of green outcomes. 
In one sense, both reformulated models of green democracy can be understood 
as relaxing the likelihood of green outcomes to an extent which is less than absolute 
certainty. For pragmatic (green) democracy, there is no specific requirement with 
regard to the likelihood of the decision outcomes generated being green, and hence, 
depending on the context of decision-making, the probability of green outcomes can 
lie anywhere between 0 and 1 (inclusive). With probabilistic green democracy, one 
understanding is that the decision procedure should ensure that green outcomes are 
more likely to be produced than non-green outcomes. As long as there are only green 
and non-green alternatives on the agenda, and a decision is required, the probability 
of green outcomes should be greater than 0.5 (and smaller than or equal to 1). 
Nevertheless, the exact decision procedure for pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy should not be determined purely on the basis of how likely it is to 
generate green outcomes. Since both models of green democracy are reformulated by 
relaxing only the condition of green outcomes, we should expect the decision 
procedure to at least satisfy the conditions of robustness to pluralism and consensus 
preservation. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, any decision procedure without 
domain restriction is robust to pluralism, and any procedure which does not overrule 
unanimous choices preserves consensus. A number of decision procedures, ranging 
from unanimity rule to simple majority rule and even dictatorship, fulfil both these 
conditions, provided that they do not restrict the domain of individual inputs.  
Evidently, dictatorship is undemocratic even though it satisfies the condition of 
consensus preservation. In some circumstances, however, dictatorship can be 
appealing in terms of generating green outcomes. Imagine that there are five 
assembly members in the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario.  Member 1 is very concerned 
about the air quality, and he/she will support the ban on idling vehicle engines. 
Meanwhile, the remaining four members are more sympathetic to the concerns of 
professional drivers, and they will have no hesitation in rejecting the ban. Then, the 
collective decision is more likely to be green if Member 1 becomes a dictator 
empowered to make a decision for the group than if all the five members make the 
decision together by simple majority rule or unanimity rule. The highest probability 
of green outcomes, in this case, is reached by a dictatorial, rather than a democratic, 
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procedure which only has to respond to a single green input (assuming the dictator’s 
input is green). This poses a challenge in the selection of decision procedure for 
probabilistic green democracy. 
From the perspective of producing green outcomes, in order to justify using a 
democratic decision procedure instead of dictatorship for probabilistic green 
democracy, we must find ways to boost the likelihood of green outcomes 
democratically. One approach, as discussed in Chapter 2, is to restrict the domain 
endogenously by deliberation, and as long as there are a sufficient number of 
individuals arriving at green opinions after deliberation, it is likely that a green 
outcome will be reached in a democratic manner. For instance, with simple majority 
rule, if, after deliberation, at least three out of five members are convinced to support 
the ban, then this is enough to produce a green decision. On the other hand, with 
super-majority rule (with a threshold of 
3
/4) and unanimity rule, a green decision is 
possible only if there are, respectively, four and five members who, after deliberation, 
reach an opinion against the proposal.
74
  
In practice, there are a number of innovative mechanisms for environmental 
decision-making which rely significantly on deliberation (Smith, 2001, 2003; Dryzek, 
2005; see Section 4.2). It has been found that, in some empirical cases, deliberation 
contributes, in such a participatory form of democracy, to more ecologically 
informed decision outcomes (Smith, 2001).
75
 In broad terms, these deliberative 
arrangements can be classified according to the forms of decision outcome they seek 
to achieve. For some, consensus is expected by the end of deliberation, whereas for 
others, consensus as such is not required. Mediation (or, more generally, alternative 
dispute resolution), consensus conferences and citizens’ juries are examples of the 
former category, whilst public consultation, public inquiries, deliberative opinion 
polls and citizens’ initiatives/referendums belong to the latter category.76 
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 Note that deliberation is not necessary for the required likelihood of green outcomes. In some 
contexts, green outcomes are likely because there is wide or even unanimous acceptance of green 
opinions at the outset. This represents a case of contextual congruence, one possibility for endogenous 
domain restriction as introduced in Chapters 1 and 2. 
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 Examples include deliberative opinion polls run by public utilities in Texas, United States, as well 
as citizens’ jury experiments on the creation of wetlands in the Fens, United Kingdom, and waste 
management in Hertfordshire, United Kingdom. The deliberative outcomes in these cases are 
perceived as more ecologically friendly (see Smith, 2001, p. 83 for details). 
76
 For an overview of these deliberative mechanisms, see Smith (2001), pp. 77-89 and Dryzek (2005), 
pp. 100-108. See also Section 4.2.    
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Whenever deliberation is intended to deliver consensus, collective decisions 
are made in a manner which corresponds to unanimity rule in aggregation. Mediation, 
for example, is intended to reach, in the end, a resolution to conflict which is agreed 
upon by all involved individuals or collective parties. Likewise, with consensus 
conferences and citizens’ juries, by the end of deliberation, all individuals involved 
must, as a group, come up with verdicts plus a series of recommendations on certain 
policy issues. With all the above mechanisms, if there is no separate (voting) 
procedure other than deliberation for resolving disagreement, then, as long as there is 
any single individual who does not accept the opinion(s) of the remaining 
individual(s) after deliberation, there will be no collective decision.  
On the other hand, when consensus is not expected from deliberation, 
collective decisions can be achieved by certain means subsequent to deliberation.
77
 
For instance, public consultation allows citizens to access and comment on policy 
issues proposed by government, whilst government may not take any of these 
comments into account when making final policy decisions. Similarly, public 
inquiries enable citizens to make depositions and arguments on certain policy 
proposals in a public forum setting, but the power to draw conclusions is vested in 
the inquiry panel members. In contrast, with initiatives/referendums, citizens may 
both deliberate and vote directly on certain policy issues, thus reaching collective 
decisions together. 
If probabilistic green democracy is intended to deliver collective decisions by 
all deliberating individuals involved as a group, then, from the list of the above, the 
most relevant deliberative arrangements are initiatives/referendums. As to how 
collective decisions are reached after deliberation, this depends on the specific 
decision procedure used for the aggregation stage of initiatives/referendums. Simple 
majority rule is, arguably, the most prominent democratic aggregation procedure. 
No matter which of the above deliberative arrangements is adopted, the key 
point is that probabilistic green democracy may be incorporated into deliberative 
arrangements in order to boost the likelihood of green outcomes. The decision 
procedure is equivalent to unanimity rule if deliberation aims to deliver consensus, 
whereas simple majority rule is commonly used when aggregation follows 
                                                 
77
 It may also be that not all deliberating individuals have the power to determine any collective 
decisions, as in the case of deliberative opinion polls where only individual opinions are collected 
after deliberation (see Fishkin, 1991; 1995). 
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deliberation. On the other hand, since pragmatic (green) democracy does not have to 
meet any particular target with respect to the likelihood of green outcomes, 
deliberation is not required at all, and either simple majority rule or unanimity rule 
may be used as the decision procedure. 
It is worth noting that, in real-world environmental politics, 
pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy may also take the forms of other types of 
collective action, from direct actions such as those of environmental social 
movements to more representative mechanisms involving green political parties as 
well as environmental interest groups. In these cases, the decision-making processes 
are more complex, and depend on how decisions are reached within and between 
different parties/groups. That said, the decision procedures used are still expected to 
satisfy the conditions as identified for the innovative mechanisms above.  
In sum, we may avoid the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing the 
condition of green outcomes, which means that we renounce the requirement that 
green democracy should generate green outcomes under all circumstances. This can 
be achieved by pragmatic (green) democracy, which does not require any specific 
decision outcomes, such as green outcomes, to be produced. Alternatively, we may 
adopt probabilistic green democracy, which only requires a sufficiently high 
probability of generating green outcomes. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I 
shall explore the normative desirability of both reformulated models of green 
democracy from the perspectives of procedure and outcome. 
 
 
4.2 The desirability of relaxing green outcomes: Constraint-based perspective 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 3, we may discuss the normative desirability of an idea, 
action or institution from two perspectives, i.e., constraint-based and outcome-based 
perspectives. To reiterate, from an outcome-based perspective, we evaluate the idea, 
action or institution concerned on the basis of what outcomes it leads to, whilst from 
a constraint-based perspective, we evaluate, instead, how those outcomes emerge on 
the basis of some outcome-independent (normative) criteria. 
In order to evaluate from an outcome-based perspective whether it is desirable 
to relax the condition of green outcomes, we keep the conditions of robustness to 
pluralism and consensus preservation constant and assess whether each reformulated 
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model of green democracy satisfies certain requirements for the likelihood of green 
outcomes. We can specify the following benchmark: 
(BGO) Likelihood of green outcomes: The probability of green 
outcomes being produced is greater than 0.5 (though typically below 1).  
 
We may also assess the desirability of relaxing green outcomes from a constraint-
based perspective. To do this, we first formulate some outcome-independent 
benchmarks that a democratic decision procedure should satisfy. Then, we examine 
whether each of the reformulated models of green democracy satisfies these 
procedural benchmarks. Arguably, a minimally democratic decision procedure 
should meet the demands of robustness to pluralism and consensus preservation as 
specified for green democracy. By relaxing only green outcomes in order to 
circumvent the dilemma of green democracy, both the above conditions are taken as 
constant. 
Nevertheless, we may also escape the dilemma of green democracy by relaxing 
more than just the condition of green outcomes. For probabilistic green democracy, 
for instance, (endogenous) domain restrictions may take place in such a way that the 
decision outcomes are more likely to be green, such as by deliberation or contextual 
congruence. Whenever the domain of inputs is restricted exogenously or 
endogenously, the condition of robustness to pluralism is no longer fulfilled. By 
contrast, pragmatic (green) democracy demands only the relaxation of green 
outcomes. In this sense, probabilistic green democracy with a restricted domain is 
less procedurally attractive than pragmatic (green) democracy in terms of the 
diversity of inputs accepted. 
But is pragmatic (green) democracy or probabilistic green democracy 
procedurally attractive in a general sense? Consider two minimal conditions which 
we can reasonably expect any democratic decision procedures to satisfy: 
(BR) Anonymity: All individuals have the same power in determining 
decision outcomes.
78
 
                                                 
78
 This mirrors benchmark (BR1) as described in Chapter 3. Note that super-majority rule also 
satisfies the requirement of anonymity. 
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(BI) Inclusiveness: All individuals are granted the same opportunity to 
express their opinions on decision alternatives. 
 
Note that the inclusiveness condition is less demanding than the condition of 
robustness to pluralism. For the latter, individual opinions are taken as given and 
fixed, and all such opinions, as long as they are logically possible, should be 
accepted as admissible to the decision procedure. For the former, however, 
individual opinions are changeable, as long as the individuals concerned are willing 
to change their opinions and express them accordingly. Under the inclusiveness 
constraint, the domains of individual inputs may either remain unrestricted or be 
restricted endogenously. Therefore, even if endogenous domain restriction is in place, 
probabilistic green democracy can still satisfy the inclusiveness condition.  
As mentioned in Section 4.1, pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy may 
be realised in the form of certain deliberative mechanisms (e.g., citizens’ juries or 
referendums) or forms of collective action. The former mechanisms open up 
opportunities for citizens to participate in making decisions on environmental as well 
as other collective issues. These are instances of direct or participatory democracy in 
which there is direct and persistent citizen participation in collective decision-making. 
Another example of direct democracy is participation in social movements which 
aim to achieve certain social goals through planned political actions such as 
campaigns, public demonstrations or even illegal protests. These movements are 
common in environmental politics, and include the environmental justice movement 
in the U.S. as well as a number of nature conservation and anti-nuclear power 
movements in Western Europe. 
These environmental social movements very often involve environmental 
interest groups, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE), Earth First!, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the like. Some of these groups possess 
sufficient resources to exert influence on environmental policy making by, for 
example, lobbying politicians and civil servants, offering consultative services to 
governments and filing judicial reviews. With strategies or actions such as these, 
most citizens are not directly engaged in devising or implementing them, except 
when they become core members of these groups possessing the corresponding 
authority. We regard such political influence by environmental interest groups as a 
process of indirect democracy. 
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At the same time, (green) political parties are also crucial actors in 
environmental politics. In Western liberal democracies, there are existing green 
parties which successfully seek government power as a means of achieving their 
visions of environmental sustainability, notably Die Grünen in Germany as well as 
Groen! and Ecolo in Belgium. Even in countries where green parties are less popular, 
it is not unusual for mainstream political parties to incorporate environmental 
concerns into their political agenda. For example, environmental protection has been 
stressed in the party manifestos of the Liberal Democrats (U.K.) for the past 20 years 
(Carter, 2007). 
We may, from here, classify the above mechanisms/forms of collective action 
into two categories of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy. Indirect (green) 
democracy includes any political actions by, or processes involving, (green) political 
parties and environmental interest groups. Direct or participatory (green) democracy 
covers environmental social movements as well as a list of innovative mechanisms 
which, more generally, enhance democratic participation (see Figure 4.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 4.1: Topology of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy 
 
The desirability of indirect democracy I: (Green) political parties 
In a contemporary liberal democracy, a straightforward approach to pursuing green 
collective decisions is to secure power in either the executive or the legislative 
government. This can be achieved by (green) political parties winning political office 
through elections, where members of each of these parties share similar beliefs and 
preferences defined as green. Once seats have been secured by members of a party, 
they are able to express green opinions on the political agenda and to take part in 
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determining decision outcomes accordingly.
79
 Very often, these green opinions are 
representative in the sense that they are in line with the views and interests of the 
relevant party as well as its voters. Whether these opinions are eventually adopted 
depends on whether they are collectively accepted by members of the cabinet or of 
assembly.
80
 
It appears that the presence of such parties within government does not in any 
sense guarantee green decision outcomes. Rather, this depends on a number of 
contextual factors, including the popularity of green opinions as well as the relative 
political strength of parties holding such green opinions. Imagine, in the ‘Enviro 
Island’ scenario, that one of the five assembly members belongs to a green party and 
expresses a green opinion which supports the ban on idling vehicle engines. Suppose 
the rest of the assembly members are not affiliated to green parties, while most of 
their constituencies strongly support the ban. Then, it is probable that such a green 
opinion will also be adopted by the remaining four assembly members regardless of 
their party affiliations. In this case, following the condition of consensus preservation, 
it is true that a green outcome is likely. 
However, there is another possibility. Suppose most constituencies are 
convinced to oppose the ban. For assembly members with no green party affiliation, 
given that their decisions are based on opinions of their respective constituencies, it 
is similarly likely that they will reject the ban. For the remaining assembly member, 
his/her decision is less straightforward if the green party he/she belongs to is 
supportive of the ban. Facing such a dilemma, the assembly member may still reject 
the ban by negotiating with or even withdrawing from his/her party. He/she may 
alternatively choose to abstain. In either case, a non-green outcome (i.e., rejecting the 
ban), in accordance with consensus preservation, is highly possible. 
While a green public opinion is crucial in order for green party representatives 
in government to maintain a green position, this does not necessarily bring about a 
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 Note that the collective environmental decision-making concerned here takes place in the executive/ 
legislative government, which is not to be confused with the internal decision-making within (green) 
political parties.  
80
 There are plenty of examples of such indirect forms of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy in 
the real world (Carter, 2007; Doyle and McEachern, 2008). Die Grünen in Germany are considered 
one of the strongest green political parties. They successfully entered the federal parliament in 1983, 
and persistently achieved high electoral performance in three consecutive federal elections from 1994 
to 2002. In addition, between 1998 and 2005, they formed a coalition government with another 
mainstream political party, the Social Democrats (SPD). The last two decades also saw green political 
parties winning parliamentary seats and/or taking part in coalition governments in Belgium, Finland, 
France and Sweden, as well as in non-European democratic countries like Australia and New Zealand. 
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green collective decision. To generate such a decision, the green party/parties 
concerned also has/have to be sufficiently strong relative to other political parties. 
One condition is that there must be a large proportion of green party representatives 
elected as members of the cabinet/assembly. For example, a cabinet is formed solely 
of members from one or more green parties or a majority of seats in the assembly are 
secured by green party representatives. If the cabinet/assembly is composed in this 
way, then it is sensible to project that green parties are strong enough to bring about 
green decisions in the political process.
81
 
Is indirect democracy, in which green political parties play a role, attractive in 
the procedural sense? According to benchmark (BI), pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy is desirable only if all individuals are equal in terms of having the 
opportunity to express their opinions on the decision alternatives. Here, the 
‘individuals’ may mean either political representatives in the cabinet/assembly or the 
constituencies who elect these political representatives. If it is the former 
interpretation, benchmark (BI) is satisfied as long as the cabinet/assembly does not 
grant more opportunity to any political representatives, on the basis of their party 
affiliations, for expressing opinions in the political process. 
Now, consider the latter interpretation. In many representative democracies 
with a fair and transparent electoral system, most citizens have the right to select, in 
elections, candidates from their respective constituencies to become political 
representatives, such as assembly members. Insofar as each citizen votes in 
accordance with certain formal procedures, his/her choice on the ballot will be 
considered valid and accepted as admissible. 
However, a possible limitation is that individual citizens may have little 
influence on which candidates run in the election in their constituencies or what 
political issues are a focus of the election campaign. Without the power of agenda 
setting, citizens are constrained in terms of their choice of candidates to vote for. For 
instance, if a citizen desires to vote for a candidate from a green political party, but 
there is no such candidate running in the citizen’s constituency, he/she will not be 
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 Even if green parties do not succeed in controlling the cabinet/assembly, they may still be able to 
influence the collective decisions of these bodies in some other ways. For instance, green parties can 
line up with certain influential individuals or groups, through political exchange of benefits or other 
means, in order to exert pressure on the cabinet/assembly to adopt green opinions. However, there is 
no guarantee that, by using such a strategy, green parties will succeed in turning collective decisions 
into green ones. It is, after all, possible that the assembly members will remain unyielding in terms of 
accepting any green opinions. 
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able to express this opinion on the ballot. Similarly, if a citizen wants to vote for a 
candidate from a party with a narrow focus on environmental problems, but the 
parties to which all candidates are affiliated adopt a broad focus on a variety of social 
issues, his/her opinion can in no way be reflected on the ballot. Therefore, under 
these circumstances, benchmark (BI) is not entirely satisfied. 
Next, consider benchmark (BR) which stipulates that individuals should share 
equal power in determining decision outcomes. Whether the indirect form of 
pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy satisfies this benchmark depends on what 
is considered a decision outcome. If this refers solely to the result of an election, as 
long as the electoral system is designed so that all citizens’ votes have equal weight 
(e.g., simple majority rule), then benchmark (BR) is fulfilled. This is because all 
individual citizens are able to determine equally, with their vote, which candidate(s) 
should become their political representatives in the government. On the other hand, if 
this refers specifically to policy outcomes from the political process, it is apparent 
that the elected political representatives in the cabinet/assembly and individuals who 
are also members of a (green) party possess more power than other 
representatives/citizens in deciding whether the collective outcomes are green. This 
is because the former individuals can influence collective decisions on an issue-to-
issue basis through the political process as well as by lobbying government officials, 
party members and/or other politicians. 
All in all, whether the implementation of an indirect form of 
pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy by (green) political parties is desirable is 
contingent on circumstances. Whilst green decisions may be generated as a result of 
these (green) parties exerting influence in the political process, this can in no sense 
be guaranteed. It can be the case that such indirect democracy is inclusive of all 
individual opinions and grants all individual political representatives/citizens equal 
decision-making power, i.e., satisfying benchmarks (BI) and (BR). However, this is 
also restricted by the tendency for citizens to lack agenda-setting power in elections 
as well as for individuals, be they citizens in general or members of a (green) party, 
not to all have equal power to determine decision outcomes. 
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The desirability of indirect democracy II: Environmental interest groups 
While (green) political parties aim to pursue green collective decisions by winning 
political office, environmental interest groups seek the same goal by exercising 
influence from outside the executive/legislative government. Usually, these interest 
groups have a specific issue focus on the environment and formulate and advocate 
green opinions on behalf of individuals who share similar interests, values and 
principles of environmental protection. In this way, individual citizens do not directly 
participate, but may rely on these interest groups to make collective environmental 
decisions. Ultimately, these groups strive to create an impact on the political process 
in order to bring about green outcomes.
82
 
83
 
As in the case of (green) political parties, the sheer fact that these 
environmental interest groups are present does not bring about green collective 
decisions in the government.
84
 Broadly speaking, there are two strategies which these 
groups may adopt in order to bring about green outcomes, namely (1) political 
negotiations or lobbying; and (2) protests, confrontations or disruptions. The first 
strategy is mainly steered by members of environmental groups where citizens in 
general are not directly involved. The second strategy, on the other hand, may also 
cover direct action/participation by citizens who are not members of any 
environmental groups. In the context of the pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy discussed in this section, I refer to groups adopting the first strategy.
85
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 These impacts include setting political agendas on the environment, advocating green opinions in 
the decision-making process, as well as achieving substantive green outcomes with pro- 
environmental policies and institutional arrangement. See Carter (2007), p. 165; Kriesi et al. (1995), 
pp. 209-212; and van der Heijden (1999), pp. 202-203.  
83
 There are a number of environmental interest groups operating in real-world pragmatic/probabilistic 
(green) democracy. Examples include non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the international 
level – Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) – which 
were created in the 1960s/1970s. Some other national groups are also on the list, such as the Sierra 
Club and the Environmental Defense Fund in the U.S. and the Wildlife Trusts and the Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in the U.K. They have existed for more than half a century, and in 
particular, the history of the Sierra Club dates back to 1892. In addition, since the 1980s, radical 
grassroots groups have also emerged, including Earth First! and the Campaign to Protect Rural 
England. Nowadays, these environmental interest groups play a significant role in collective 
environmental decision-making in most liberal democracies (Carter, 2007; Doyle and McEachern, 
2008). 
84
 Again, note that the collective environmental decision-making concerned here takes place in the 
executive/legislative government, which is not to be confused with the internal decision-making 
within environmental interest groups. 
85
 Environmental groups which adopt the second strategy are, rather, crucial actors in a direct form of 
pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy, which will be addressed in the following sub-section on 
environmental social movements. 
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If, in indirect democracy, environmental interest groups are expected to 
negotiate or lobby as part of the political process, what they can achieve from 
negotiations or lobbying is crucial to the generation of green outcomes. Consider 
again the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario. Imagine that there exists an environmental NGO 
which campaigns against idling vehicle engines. Its membership consists mainly of 
the citizens of ‘Enviro Island’ who also contribute most of its funding by donations. 
The NGO is concerned about what the assembly will decide on the proposal, enters 
into dialogue with the assembly members and attempts to persuade all of them to 
support the ban on idling vehicle engines. If the NGO is successful in such 
negotiation/lobbying, then the ban will probably be accepted collectively by the 
assembly members, resulting in a green outcome. 
Under what circumstances may we expect the NGO to succeed in such a 
negotiation/lobbying? There are at least two possibilities. First, the NGO may have 
strong public support. This may be the case, in the above example, when its 
membership is large and covers a significant number of citizens of ‘Enviro Island’. A 
membership base as such is, to a certain extent, an indicator of public opinion on the 
proposal, and it is likely that the assembly members will be incentivised to adopt the 
same opinion since they are accountable and answerable to their constituencies. Such 
political support may be boosted by the NGO educating the community on the 
detriment of idling vehicle engines and/or by media coverage of citizens’ and NGO’s 
support to the ban. 
Second, there may be only relatively little political resistance to the green 
opinion of the NGO. This is possible if the NGO is able to minimise the intensity or 
the effects of any opposing opinions. For instance, the NGO may establish personal 
and/or institutional connections to political parties to which the assembly members 
are affiliated. If it happens that any assembly members appear unlikely to support the 
ban, the NGO may have the aid of the parties (particularly leaders in hierarchical 
parties) in pressurising these assembly members to change their opinions. Another 
example would be if the NGO manages to win over any other individuals or groups 
holding the contrary opinion (e.g., professional drivers’ associations) who are 
lobbying the assembly members to reject the ban. This may happen if the NGO 
argues successfully against opposing individuals/groups so that the assembly 
members come to believe that the opinion of the latter is undesirable (or less 
desirable). 
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There does not appear to be any guarantee that environmental interest groups, 
such as (green) political parties, will necessarily be able to achieve green outcomes 
from the political process. For both possibilities above, the pre-requisite is that the 
NGO in question can gain sufficient support either from stakeholders among the 
general public or from individuals/groups with the power to determine decision 
outcomes. It is perfectly possible, however, for these pre-requisites not to be met. For 
example, most citizens may not identify with the values and principles of the NGO, 
or they may specifically reject the green opinion it advocates. It may also be the case 
that the rival interest groups are relatively stronger than the NGO in terms of 
financial resources and political relations with the assembly members/political 
parties. Either of these may jeopardise the chances of the NGO bringing about the 
green outcome. 
While the indirect form of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy (in which 
environmental interest groups take a role) cannot ensure the generation of green 
outcomes, how appealing is it, if at all, from the procedural perspective? We can 
offer an assessment based on the benchmarks of inclusiveness (BI) and anonymity 
(BR). 
As in any arrangements for indirect democracy, collective decisions are made 
by political representatives on behalf of individual citizens. Broadly speaking, 
citizens may participate, though in a very limited sense, in decision-making by 
voting for certain candidates during periodic elections. At the same time, citizens 
may also exert influence on the political process by financing environmental interest 
groups and/or becoming members.
86
 In this way, whether an individual citizen can 
put forward his/her opinion in such a process depends, to a considerable extent, on 
whether he/she is related to an environmental interest group as a member and/or 
donor. 
It is obvious, however, that not all individual citizens have equal incentives, 
time or resources to join groups and play an active role in them. Moreover, even if 
some citizens are able to contribute financially to these groups, the impact they can 
make is likely to be less significant than that made by government and transnational 
corporations/organisations which can supply large sums in funding and sponsorship. 
As a result, the opinions of ‘non-member’ citizens may not be as salient as, and 
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 Note that individual citizens may also exert influence on political parties by becoming party 
members and/or financing the parties.  
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hence less influential than, the opinions of ‘member’ citizens. Likewise, the opinions 
of individual citizens with fewer donations may also be marginalised by those of 
government/corporate donors. Benchmark (BI) is, therefore, in general not satisfied. 
Now, consider benchmark (BR). This concerns the relative decision-making 
power of different interest groups (including non-environmental groups), or how 
these groups exert influence in the political process at large.
87
 In most liberal 
democracies, particularly when the decision issue concerned is controversial, 
different interest groups will be asking for different orientations of the decision 
outcome which are in line with their own values and beliefs. In the example above, 
an environmental NGO may co-exist with other groups which hold a non-green 
opinion. To some extent, whether a group can succeed in getting its opinion adopted 
as the collective decision depends on its relative political strength. If a group has 
more financial resources, a better relationship with government and/or more public 
support in general, it is also likely to possess more power to determine decision 
outcomes, compared with other groups. In this case, individuals in different groups 
do not have equal power to determine collective decisions in the political process. If 
so, then benchmark (BR) is not satisfied. 
In conclusion, the desirability of the indirect form of pragmatic/probabilistic 
(green) democracy (in which environmental interest groups take a role) is context-
dependent. As in the case of (green) political parties, there is no guarantee that green 
opinions will always be adopted as collective decisions. To see whether an 
environmental interest group can succeed in securing green decision outcomes, we 
may further ask whether it receives sufficient public support or whether political 
resistance to the green opinion is relatively small. Such indirect democracy does not 
generally satisfy benchmark (BI), given the tendency of citizens to have unequal 
incentives, time and resources to exert influence in these interest groups. On the 
other hand, whether benchmark (BR) is satisfied depends on how decision-making 
power is shared between individuals between different groups. 
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 Note that benchmark (BR) also concerns the relative decision-making power of individuals within 
an environmental interest group. However, this is, as mentioned, beyond the scope of our discussion. 
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The desirability of direct/participatory democracy I: Environmental social 
movements 
As pointed out, in contemporary liberal democracies the role of environmental 
interest groups is far from limited to political negotiations or lobbying. Very often 
they are also involved in various environmental social movements. A social 
movement involves a kind of political action intentionally committed by a collection 
of individuals who are loosely connected by some shared values, beliefs and 
aspirations in pursuit of a social goal. Instead of relying on the institution of 
indirect/representative democracy, they pursue the social goal through direct action, 
such as boycotts, protests, demonstrations or disruptions, which may also include 
law-breaking activities. Such direct action may be co-ordinated and assisted by 
interest groups and other formal or informal groups/organisations, particularly in the 
case of those which have radical political agendas and advocate political activism. 
For environmental social movements, the social goal is environmental protection (or 
green collective decisions in general), and environmental interest groups are often 
seen to take part in these.
88
 
In what ways can environmental social movements bring about green collective 
decisions? Consider the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario again. Suppose there is a list of 
actors who support the ban on idling vehicle engines, which may include some green 
political parties, environmental interest groups, as well as individual citizens and 
activists. We can imagine at least the following types of direct action.  
First, there may be passive resistance where, say, several parties/groups jointly 
issue a statement supporting the ban, or initiate a petition for citizens to sign and 
express their demand for the ban. Second, the resistance may also be less passive but 
mild, such as some parties/groups/activists starting a campaign to boycott taxi drivers 
who idle their car engines. Third, there can be more proactive non-violent resistance, 
in which parties/groups/activists mobilise citizens to attend protests or 
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 There are many instances of environmental social movements in the real world (Carter, 2007; Doyle 
and McEachern, 2008). One of the most remarkable examples is the environmental justice movement 
which emerged during the 1980s in the U.S. with some grassroots environmental groups (e.g., the 
Centre for Health, Environment and Justice), demanding solutions to environmental problems which 
would also address issues of social justice regarding class, poverty, gender and race. Another example 
in the U.S. is the eight-year Cove/Mallard forest campaign begun in 1992, which involved a number 
of environmental groups such as Earth First! and the Sierra Club in campaigning to prevent the forest 
from being removed for roads and logging. In the U.K., Earth First! was also one of the 250-300 
active groups in the anti-roads movement during the 1980s and 1990s, where the movement itself 
campaigned against the massive development of road networks. Today, these environmental social 
movements constitute an essential element of environmental politics in many liberal democracies. 
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demonstrations to voice their objections to idling vehicle engines either in a peaceful 
way or even with disruptions and violence.
89
  An environmental social movement 
may adopt one or more of the above forms of direct action. 
It is apparent that pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy involving 
environmental social movements does not produce green collective decisions under 
all circumstances. The generation of green outcomes depends on the impact which 
the movements create on the political process, which is, to some extent, a matter of 
the size and intensity of the movements. Roughly speaking, the more 
individuals/groups participate in a movement to express an opinion, the more likely it 
is that this will be perceived as public opinion and hence adopted as the collective 
decision. Similarly, a movement where all actors share a unified political theme and 
demand tends to arouse the awareness of the government and the rest of the public 
more easily. For example, a demonstration with a good number of citizens and a 
unified issue focus in favour of supporting the ban on idling vehicle engines is likely 
to make the green opinion more salient in the political process. 
Nevertheless, a movement of a significant size and intensity does not in any 
sense guarantee the collective decision it is demanding. For instance, even if there is 
a remarkable number of citizens mobilised to protest and make a unified claim 
against idling vehicle engines, the assembly may still have all sorts of incentives to 
dismiss it from consideration. This can be the case when the assembly members are 
affiliated to, or have close relationships with, political parties and/or 
interest/professional groups, such as certain professional drivers’ associations, which 
reject the ban on idling vehicle engines. In other words, the protestors’ anti-pollution 
demand may well be marginalised by the private interests of the political 
representatives and other stakeholders. In that case, it is hard to tell whether the 
movement would generate any impact leading to a green outcome. 
Is such a form of direct democracy procedurally attractive? Consider 
benchmark (BI). In social movements, in order to have their opinions expressed, an 
individual must first be able to participate. In principle, every individual citizen is 
free to carry out any direct action, so long as they are informed of such an 
opportunity and have sufficient time and other resources. However, for some types of 
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 The disruptions and violence may involve activists blockading, destroying property or even taking 
their officials hostage. While the disagreement over the idling vehicle engines issue, as in the ‘Enviro 
Island’ scenario, may not be sufficiently intense to arouse such disruptions/violence, these forms of 
direction action are often noticed in the debate over nuclear energy policy. 
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direct action, not all citizens are willing to participate. For example, we can 
reasonably postulate that, even if all citizens strongly hold the green opinion in 
favour of supporting the ban, they are likely to differ as to the means by which they 
prefer to express that opinion. Whilst some may accept only petition signing or 
boycotts, but object to any protest or demonstration, others may take an opposite 
view. If there is such a divergence in terms of the choice of direct action and if not all 
choices can be accommodated simultaneously, then some individuals may still lack 
the appropriate channels for expressing their opinions. In this case, benchmark (BI) 
is not satisfied. 
Besides, there is the question of whether the issue focus of the movement 
covers the variety of opinions which citizens may want to express. For instance, there 
may be a demonstration in which all citizens are willing and able to participate, but 
its central theme demanding, say, the rejection of idling vehicle engines, may be too 
narrow or general to reflect accurately the opinion of every resident. Whilst the 
opinions of some residents may coincide with the central theme, others may hold 
opposite or hybrid views – they may reject an across-the-board ban as such; or they 
may support the ban only if it grants exemptions to a certain number of taxi drivers. 
In the former case, they have no reason to attend the demonstration, whereas in the 
latter case, they may find it difficult to put forward their opinion precisely, given the 
overwhelming theme of the demonstration. If either case occurs, then not all 
individual opinions can be expressed equally, which hinders the fulfilment of 
benchmark (BI). 
Let us turn to benchmark (BR). It is obvious that, if the decision outcomes refer 
to collective decisions from the political process, then decision-making power does 
not generally rest with any individuals/groups in the social movements, but with 
some other individuals/groups that these movements aim to influence. In our 
scenario, it is the assembly members, rather than the green parties, environmental 
interest groups or individual citizens, who exclusively hold the power to make the 
final decision about whether or not to support the ban. In this view, the assembly 
members and the citizens are not equal in determining the decision outcomes, and 
hence benchmark (BR) is not satisfied. 
However, does this mean that, apart from the assembly members, all other 
individuals/groups are equal because none of them may determine directly the 
decision outcomes? This is true only if it is impossible for any of these 
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individuals/groups to influence the assembly members in any way. Otherwise, these 
individuals/groups may still be unequal, because different individuals/groups may 
differ in terms of their influence on decision outcomes. For example, some citizens, 
as pointed out, may hold a non-green or hybrid opinion, which hinders them from 
joining the movement advocating the strictly green opinion. They may then initiate 
separate movements, or make use of other channels, to express their divergent 
opinions to the assembly members as well as to the rest of the public. Amongst these 
camps, each constitutes its own networks and resources which may generate unequal 
impact on the assembly members’ decision. In other words, it is possible that some 
citizens, due to the stronger camp they are in, will possess more decision-making 
power than other residents. If this is the case, then benchmark (BR) remains 
unsatisfied. 
In summary, whether the direct form of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy (in which environmental social movements take a role) is desirable is 
dependent on contexts. While it is possible that, by participating directly in these 
movements, individuals/groups will be able to exert influence in the political process 
and bring about green collective decisions, there is no guarantee that this will be the 
case. The generation of green outcomes, rather, depends on the political impact 
which the movements create. At the same time, the inclusiveness benchmark (BI) is 
not fulfilled, unless the movement concerned covers all kinds of direct action that 
individuals wish to take as well as all kinds of opinions that they wish to express. 
The anonymity benchmark (BR) is not generally satisfied if there are different camps 
with varying degrees of strength in terms of influencing the decision-making process. 
 
The desirability of direct/participatory democracy II: Innovative mechanisms 
Apart from carrying out direct action as in environmental social movements, 
individual citizens may also participate directly in pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy through certain innovative mechanisms. As briefly touched on in Section 
4.1, a number of deliberative mechanisms are in practice available for collective 
environmental decision-making. In particular, consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, 
deliberative opinion polls and initiatives/referendums are examples of innovative 
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mechanisms for democratic decision-making.
90
 These mechanisms are innovative in 
the sense that they are designed specifically to boost the scope and level of citizen 
participation in the political process, which goes beyond the traditional forms of 
democracy as exemplified by periodic elections and public consultations (Smith, 
2009). With such innovative mechanisms, it becomes possible for individual citizens 
to pursue green collective decisions without carrying out direct action or relying on 
(green) political parties and environmental interest groups.
91
 
Under what circumstances may we expect green outcomes to emerge from any 
of these innovative mechanisms? This depends on the specific decision procedure 
used. As discussed in Section 4.1, collective decisions may be reached by 
deliberation alone or by deliberation plus aggregation. The former requires a 
universal consensus among the individuals involved, which is equivalent to 
unanimity rule. In other words, green collective decisions are available if, and only if, 
all individuals unanimously agree on a green opinion. This applies to most generic 
instances of consensus conferences and citizens’ juries where deliberation is the only 
procedure for resolving disagreement.  
With initiatives/referendums, on the other hand, green outcomes are produced 
as long as the green opinions available for post-deliberation aggregation are 
sufficient to pass the threshold of the aggregation procedure. If the aggregation 
procedure is simple majority rule, then what is required for green collective decisions 
is support for green opinions by more than 50% of individuals. But as the 
aggregation procedure becomes more stringent, such thresholds will increase 
accordingly (e.g., for unanimity rule the threshold is 100%). 
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 Although mediation (or alternative dispute resolution) is also an example of such innovative 
mechanisms, it involves directly only a small number of representatives rather than the general 
citizens. Hence, I deliberatively omit this from our discussion below. 
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 There are many empirical examples where citizens have participated in making environmental 
decisions through these innovative mechanisms (Smith, 2001). Since the 1980s, consensus 
conferences have been seen in Denmark, the Netherlands and the U.K. on various scientific and 
technological issues, including genetic engineering and radioactive waste management (see also Joss 
and Durant, 1995; Palmer, 1999). Besides, citizens’ juries have also been held, since the 1970s, in 
Germany, the U.S. and the U.K. on environment-related policy, such as energy, land-use and waste 
management issues (see also Stewart et al., 1994; Smith and Wales, 1999; Kuper, 1997). Furthermore, 
there have been a number of deliberative opinion polls held in Australia, the U.S. and the U.K., with 
some of these touching on the planning of energy resources (see also Fishkin, 1995). As for 
initiatives/referendums, these have been widely used by environmentalists in Switzerland, since the 
1970s, to place environmental issues on the political agenda (see also Kobach, 1994). These 
innovative mechanisms are very often accompanied by a process of deliberation (see also discussion 
of probabilistic green democracy in Section 4.1). 
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It is straightforward to see why none of these innovative mechanisms can 
guarantee green collective decisions. Suppose, in the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario, some 
citizens put forward an initiative to solicit the opinions of the public regarding the 
ban on idling vehicle engines. The citizens are then asked, in the ensuing referendum, 
to express their opinions in ballots, and the votes will be counted using simple 
majority rule. A green outcome, therefore, depends on whether more than 50% of the 
votes are for supporting the ban, which, in turn, depends on the number of 
individuals holding the green opinion. Arguably, such a ‘number’ varies in different 
circumstances, and we can at least imagine a case where a majority of citizens 
choose to reject the ban on the grounds of its nuisance brought about to drivers. Such 
a possibility also applies to the rest of the innovative mechanisms. 
Even if we assume that an overwhelming majority of voters will choose to 
reject the proposal, it is still possible that the collective decision will, in the end, not 
be green. This is because the outcomes from referendums (and other innovative 
mechanisms) do not necessarily become the collective decisions from the political 
process. If a decision mechanism is binding, then it is a legal requirement for the 
corresponding results to be respected and adopted as the final collective decisions. 
By contrast, if a decision mechanism is non-binding or advisory, then it is up to the 
government and other political actors to interpret the results and judge what 
implications they should have for collective decisions. In other words, when the 
referendum, as in the above example, is non-binding, its green outcome may 
eventually be turned into a non-green outcome. For instance, the assembly members 
may ignore the majority opinion in favour of supporting the ban and choose to adopt 
the opposite opinion. Therefore, unless a decision mechanism is binding, even if its 
outcome is green we cannot guarantee a green collective decision in the end. 
How attractive are these innovative mechanisms in the procedural sense? First, 
consider the inclusiveness benchmark (BI). To ensure that all individuals share the 
same opportunity to express their opinions, it is necessary for them to be given an 
equal opportunity to participate in these decision-making mechanisms. However, for 
some kinds of innovative mechanisms, there is a natural restriction in terms of the 
number of people who may participate. For example, a typical consensus conference 
or citizens’ jury involves 12 to 25 individuals, whereas the number for a deliberative 
opinion poll rises to between 200 and 466 individuals (Smith, 2001). For 
initiatives/referendums, this is less significant, and it is often possible to engage a 
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much larger number of participants. As long as the number of individuals who want 
to participate exceeds the maximum number of participants allowed, some 
individuals will have to be excluded from such an opportunity to express their 
opinions. For instance, if thousands of individuals intend to participate, benchmark 
(BI) does not hold, in this context, for consensus conferences, citizens’ juries or 
deliberative opinion polls.
92
 
Another aspect of benchmark (BI) concerns whether different individual 
opinions are equally admissible to the decision-making process. This very much 
depends on the decision procedures used in these innovative mechanisms. As pointed 
out, any decision procedure, including simple majority rule and unanimity rule, 
which does not discard any possible individual opinions is inclusive in this sense. 
Note, though, that even if deliberation is in place where some opinions are 
transformed, or the domain of inputs is restricted endogenously, this is inclusive in 
the way that all individuals are still able to get their opinions (revised or not) 
accepted as admissible for decision-making. Therefore, benchmark (BI) can be 
satisfied for all these innovative mechanisms including those with deliberative 
arrangements, depending on the decision procedures used.
93
 
Similarly, the fulfilment of benchmark (BR) is also a matter of the decision 
procedures used in these innovative mechanisms. An anonymity requirement is 
implied in many democratic decision procedures, including simple majority rule, 
super-majority rule and unanimity rule. In this way, for consensus conferences and 
citizens’ juries, if collective decisions are made by deliberation in a manner which 
corresponds to unanimity rule, then all individuals are presumed to have the same 
decision-making power, which satisfies benchmark (BR). Likewise, for initiatives/ 
referendums, if, eventually, collective decisions are obtained by an aggregation 
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 At the same time, there is another issue concerning the selection methods of these innovative 
mechanisms. For consensus conferences, volunteers are recruited through advertisements and written 
applications which will then be selected based on socio-demographic criteria. This implies that only 
citizens who are willing and able to spend time submitting their applications will have an opportunity 
to be selected. This could mean a disadvantage to those with higher time cost and those who are less 
literate. For citizens’ juries and deliberative opinion polls, citizens are selected on a random basis, but 
the selected citizens are free to choose whether or not to eventually participate. This means that some 
citizens (i.e., those randomly selected), through accepting and/or rejecting the invitations to citizens’ 
juries/deliberative opinion polls, have the power to influence the remaining citizens’ opportunity to 
participate (see Smith, 2001).      
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 Note that this is not applicable to deliberative opinion polls since there are no collective decisions 
made.   
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procedure which counts all individuals’ votes equally, then benchmark (BR) is 
fulfilled.
94
                           
Thus, pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy, apart from by environmental 
social movements, may also be realised by a number of innovative mechanisms, 
including consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, deliberative opinion polls, as well 
as initiatives and referendums. There is no guarantee of green collective decisions, 
but rather these depend on certain contextual factors, such as the number of 
individuals holding green opinions, the decision procedures used and whether the 
outcomes from the mechanisms are binding. As to whether these mechanisms are 
inclusive (i.e., benchmark (BI)), this depends on whether they can accommodate all 
the individuals who wish to participate. The decision procedures used are, at the 
same time, crucial for determining whether the innovative mechanisms are inclusive 
of different types of individual opinions (i.e., benchmark (BI)) and whether all 
individuals have equal decision-making power (i.e., benchmark (BR)). 
 
Summary 
So far we have surveyed four different models of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy. Whilst collective environmental decision-making may be left in the 
hands of political representatives, (green) political parties and environmental interest 
groups as in indirect/representative democracy, citizens may also participate directly 
in environmental social movements and through innovative mechanisms. Broadly 
speaking, none of these forms of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy can 
guarantee green collective decisions, and their procedural desirability depends very 
much on factors that vary in different circumstances. 
 
 
4.3 The desirability of relaxing green outcomes: Outcome-based perspective 
 
In the previous section, we examined the desirability of relaxing green outcomes 
from a procedural perspective. More specifically, we evaluated the procedural 
attractiveness of pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy on the basis of two 
procedural criteria (i.e., inclusiveness (BI) and anonymity (BR)). Both criteria are 
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outcome-independent, which means that the substantive outcomes of a decision 
procedure have no effect on the formulation of these criteria, and these criteria will 
not be used to evaluate the decision outcomes.  
In this section, I offer an outcome-based assessment of both reformulated 
models of green democracy using an epistemic framework for democracy. In order to 
determine whether a decision procedure is desirable from an outcome-based 
perspective, we need first to assume that there is an independent criterion for 
assessing a correct or good outcome, which can be labelled as the ‘truth’. A decision 
outcome, for instance, can be good if it maximises the total utility of the individuals 
involved; or it can be correct if it is morally desirable. As to what precise criterion of 
correctness or goodness should be used, this varies in different contexts. 
For pragmatic (green) democracy, the truth is not set as green, since green 
outcomes are not presumed to be always correct. This is particularly the case when 
there are controversies over which decision alternative/outcome is green.
 
It remains 
unclear, for instance, whether a decision to abandon nuclear power, as advocated by 
many environmental interest groups and movements, is strictly green, because the 
lack of nuclear power supply may imply more air pollution and energy crisis to 
follow as a result of using more fossil fuels instead. Probabilistic green democracy, 
by contrast, although green outcomes are no longer necessary, still requires decision 
outcomes to be more likely than not to be green. Here, the truth for probabilistic 
green democracy can be set as green. 
A decision procedure is desirable from an outcome-based perspective if it is 
good at producing decision outcomes which correspond to the truth. This is 
sometimes regarded as ‘tracking the truth’. In this way, pragmatic (green) democracy 
is desirable if it tracks the truth, or is good at generating correct decision outcomes. 
On the other hand, probabilistic green democracy is desirable if it is good at 
generating green decision outcomes, or ‘tracks the green outcomes’.    
Refer to the ‘Enviro Island’ scenario again. Suppose we know that there is a 
correct decision, or truth, which can be either ‘to support the ban’ (B) or ‘to reject the 
ban’ (not-B). For pragmatic (green) democracy to be desirable, it should be good at 
producing either B or not-B as the decision outcome, depending on which of these 
represents the truth. For probabilistic green democracy to be desirable, it should track 
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B if B is the green outcome; and likewise, it should track not-B if not-B is the green 
outcome.
95
 
 First, consider pragmatic (green) democracy. Let us regard each of the 
assembly members as ‘competent’ if, and only if, he/she reaches a decision in the 
following ways: (1) he/she is more likely to accept B than not-B if, and only if, B is 
the truth; and (2) he/she is more likely to accept not-B than B if, and only if, not-B is 
the truth. If a member is competent in this sense, he/she is more likely than not to 
make a correct individual decision. When all members in the group are, at least 
roughly, equally competent in this sense, the first benchmark of truth-tracking, 
namely competence (BT1), is satisfied. 
At the same time, if all members in the group make their own decisions 
independently of the others, then the second benchmark of truth-tacking, 
independence (BT2) is also satisfied. Both benchmarks are necessary components of 
the following theorem: 
Condorcet’s jury theorem: Assuming competence (BT1) and 
independence (BT2), and that all individuals truthfully express their 
opinions as to what the correct decision is, a collective decision by 
simple majority rule is more likely to be correct than a decision made by 
any single individual, and the probability of a correct majority decision 
approaches certainty as the number of individuals increases (Condorcet, 
1785; Grofman, Owen and Feld, 1983). 
  
This theorem will be discussed more extensively in Chapters 6 and 7. Here, the key 
message is that pragmatic (green) democracy with simple majority rule is more likely 
than not to generate correct decisions or to track the truth only if benchmarks (BT1) 
and (BT2) are met. In other words, according to Condorcet’s jury theorem, it is 
necessary for benchmarks (BT1) and (BT2) to be satisfied in order for pragmatic 
(green) democracy (with simple majority rule) to track the truth, or to be desirable 
from an outcome-based perspective. It appears that whether these conditions can be 
fulfilled depends on the contexts to which pragmatic (green) democracy is applied. 
This dependence as such also carries implications for desirability in practice, which 
will be examined in the following subsection. 
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 Let us assume, for the moment, that supporting the ban is not necessarily the green decision, whilst 
rejecting the ban is not necessarily the non-green decision. 
 141 
 
Now, consider probabilistic green democracy. This differs from pragmatic 
(green) democracy in the way that it specifies a specific value of likelihood or 
probability of green decision outcomes. Assuming that we know which decision 
outcome is green, for probabilistic green democracy, the green decision is equivalent 
to the correct decision or the truth as in pragmatic (green) democracy. As suggested 
in Section 4.1, one formulation of this demand is that the probability of green 
outcomes should be greater than 0.5 (while smaller than or equal to 1). 
We can make use of Condorcet’s jury theorem for evaluating probabilistic 
green democracy by substituting ‘green outcomes’ for ‘truth’. We regard an 
assembly member as ‘competent’ if, and only if, he/she decides in the following 
manner: (1) he/she is more likely to accept B than not-B if, and only if, B is the green 
decision; and (2) he/she is more likely to accept not-B than B if, and only if, not-B is 
the green decision. If all assembly members in the group are roughly equally 
‘competent’ in this sense (i.e., in tracking the green outcomes), then the competence 
benchmark (BT1) is satisfied. Likewise, if all individual decisions are made 
independently from those of other individuals, then the independence benchmark 
(BT2) is also satisfied. 
To boost the likelihood of green outcomes, as mentioned in Section 4.1, 
deliberation may be incorporated into probabilistic green democracy, and the 
decision mechanism used may consist simply of deliberation or of deliberation plus 
aggregation. In the former case, the decision procedure used is equivalent to 
unanimity rule, and green outcomes are produced if, and only if, all individuals 
accept the green alternative as their individual decision. 
For probabilistic green democracy with deliberation only, the probability of 
green outcomes is greater than 0.5 if, and only if, the following conditions hold: (1) 
the probability of each individual accepting the green alternative as his/her individual 
decision, p(G), is greater than 0.5, i.e., benchmark (BT1); and (2) since a decision 
procedure with deliberation only mirrors unanimity rule, [p(G)]
n
 is greater than 0.5 
(where n is the number of individuals). We can note that, as the number of 
individuals increases, the value of p(G) has to be boosted in order to satisfy the latter 
condition. Therefore, if p(G) is constant, then the greater the number of individuals, 
the less likely the latter condition is to be satisfied. This shows that probabilistic 
green democracy with deliberation only is not generally desirable from an outcome-
based perspective (see also Chapter 7). 
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On the other hand, in the latter case, where aggregation follows deliberation, 
probabilistic green democracy is accompanied by an aggregation procedure such as 
simple majority rule. Since one understanding of such probabilistic green democracy 
requires that the probability of green outcomes should be greater than 0.5, from 
Condorcet’s jury theorem we infer that such a requirement is satisfied only if both 
benchmarks (BT1) and (BT2) are satisfied. In other words, similarly to the case of 
pragmatic (green) democracy, it is necessary for benchmarks (BT1) and (BT2) to be 
satisfied in order for probabilistic (green) democracy (with simple majority rule) to 
be desirable from an outcome-based perspective, or more precisely, to track the 
green outcomes. 
From the discussion above, when simple majority rule is used, both 
benchmarks are necessary conditions for either reformulated model of green 
democracy to be desirable from an outcome-based perspective. Below, I briefly 
suggest how we can make sense of the practical applicability of 
pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy with simple majority rule on the basis of 
these two benchmarks. 
 
Implications for practical applicability 
According to Condorcet’s jury theorem, pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy 
with simple majority rule is desirable because it is more likely than not that the 
correct or green decision will be produced. This is conditional on both benchmarks 
(BT1) and (BT2) being satisfied, as well as on all individuals expressing their 
opinions truthfully. In other words, in order to realise pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy which achieves the desired decision outcomes, we must ensure that the 
above benchmarks are satisfied in practice. This, again, depends on contextual 
factors, and I highlight several issues below for consideration. 
The first issue to consider is whether all the individuals concerned express 
truthfully their opinions about what the correct or green decision is. This requirement 
is more likely to be met when individuals do not have any strategic incentive for 
hiding their genuine opinions. For example, if the assembly members in the ‘Enviro 
Island’ scenario have no intention of controlling the final decision of the group, it is 
less likely that they will manipulate the decision outcome by expressing opinions 
which diverge from those which they originally saw as correct or green. On the other 
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hand, if the assembly members desire an alternative final decision, e.g., ‘to reject the 
ban’, they may be incentivised to still reject the ban. This can be so even if they have 
identified the other alternative, i.e., ‘to support the ban’, as the correct or green 
decision. If this is the case, their competence is not reflected in their actual individual 
decisions. 
The next issue to consider concerns the competence benchmark (BT1). This 
benchmark assumes that all individuals are more likely than not to accept the correct 
or green alternative as their individual decisions, in which the value of the 
corresponding probability is greater than 0.5 (and smaller than or equal to 1). In 
some cases, however, some individual(s) may be more competent than others in 
identifying the correct or green decision. For instance, it is possible for experts and 
professionals to be able to determine certain scientific matters connected to the 
policy issues on the basis of scientific evidence and method. At the same time, it is 
also possible for environmental activists and the citizens affected to be more 
conscious about the environmental implications of various policy issues, and hence 
more capable of deciding from the green perspective. If there is such an individual or 
group of individuals with exceptional competence, and if he/she is assigned as the 
dictator or they are assigned as the oligarchs, pragmatic/probabilistic (green) 
democracy with simple majority rule may not track the truth or generate green 
outcomes as effectively as dictatorship or oligarchy. 
The final issue to consider concerns the independence benchmark (BT2). This 
benchmark assumes that all individuals make their decisions independently of which 
decision alternative is correct or green. Under this assumption, individuals are not 
expected, at least, to directly adopt the decisions of others as their own decisions. In 
any decision-making process, however, whenever individuals are allowed to interact 
with each other, there is a chance that they will simply follow the decisions of some 
others in the group. If this happens, then benchmark (BT2) no longer holds. 
The issue above is particularly relevant to probabilistic green democracy with 
deliberative arrangements when individuals are, after deliberation, unable to 
formulate their own opinions but simply adopt those of others. For example, if one of 
the assembly members becomes the opinion leader in the assembly throughout the 
deliberation, whilst the remaining members are reluctant to form their own opinions, 
they may be tempted to adopt the leader’s opinion in the end.  
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On the other hand, even for pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy without 
deliberation, individuals may also follow the views of opinion leaders outside the 
group in making their own decisions or may be influenced by information cascades. 
For instance, the assembly members may perceive that the opinions of professional 
drivers are more accurate than all other opinions, and believe that the correct 
decision is not to support the ban on idling vehicle engines. Likewise, the assembly 
members may also trust that the opinions of environmental activists must always be 
green, and believe that ‘to support the ban’ is the green decision. Although it is 
possible that these decisions will still reflect the correct or green decisions, they will 
no longer be attributed to the competence of all assembly members, but rather to 
that/those of the opinion leader(s) inside or outside the group (Dietrich and List, 
2004). In this case, pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy with simple majority 
rule is not necessarily more desirable than dictatorship/oligarchy (e.g., by these 
opinion leaders) in terms of producing collective or green collective decisions. 
Thus, from an outcome-based perspective, the desirability of pragmatic/ 
probabilistic (green) democracy in the sense of truth-tracking and the generation of 
green outcomes depends on whether benchmarks (BT1) and (BT2), i.e., competence 
and independence respectively, are fulfilled. If both benchmarks are met, and all 
individuals express their opinions truthfully, then, in accordance with Condorcet’s 
jury theorem, pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy with simple majority rule is 
more likely to produce collective or green decisions than other undemocratic 
decision procedures such as dictatorship. As to whether both modified versions of 
green democracy are practically applicable, this depends on whether these 
benchmarks of Condorcet’s jury theorem are fulfilled, which, of course, varies in 
different circumstances. 
 
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have considered the last escape route from the dilemma of green 
democracy, i.e., relaxing green outcomes. In Section 4.1, I briefly illustrated how the 
condition of green outcomes can be relaxed by reformulating green democracy as 
pragmatic (green) democracy and probabilistic green democracy. I also suggested 
how pragmatic/probabilistic democracy can be realised in practice as an institutional 
 145 
 
model for collective (environmental) decision-making, such as in mediation, 
consensus conferences and initiatives/referendums. 
In Section 4.2, I examined, from a constraint-based perspective, whether 
pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy is normatively desirable by considering 
four possible models, i.e., (green) political parties and environmental interest groups 
as in indirect democracy as well as environmental social movements and innovative 
mechanisms as in direct/participatory democracy. I demonstrated why green 
collective decisions cannot be guaranteed with any of these models. As to whether 
they are procedurally appealing in terms of satisfying the benchmarks of 
inclusiveness (BI) and anonymity (BR), broadly speaking, this very much depends 
on circumstances. 
In Section 4.3, I offered a similar assessment of the desirability of pragmatic/ 
probabilistic (green) democracy from an outcome-based perspective. Using 
Condorcet’s jury theorem, I showed how pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy 
with simple majority rule can be desirable, if it satisfies two benchmarks of 
competence (BT1) and independence (BT2), and the individuals concerned express 
their opinions truthfully. Only if all these (or functionally similar) conditions are 
satisfied is pragmatic/probabilistic (green) democracy with simple majority rule more 
likely to generate correct or green decisions. Moreover, whether both reformulated 
models of green democracy are practically applicable depends on whether the above 
conditions are realised in practice. 
It is worth remarking that, in Chapters 2 to 4, I introduced a number of ideas 
which are highly relevant to the construction of democratic institutions for 
environmental decision-making, and these will be discussed in further detail in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis. They include deliberation and aggregation as a 
single decision procedure (Chapter 5), the problem of the discursive dilemma or 
majoritarian inconsistency (Chapters 5 and 6), technocratic decision-making 
(Chapter 6), as well as Condorcet’s jury theorem (Chapters 6 and 7). While I do not 
intend to claim that relaxing green outcomes is the best escape route from the 
dilemma of green democracy, I shall take pragmatic (green) democracy as a sample 
starting point in order to illustrate, using the above ideas, how we may substantively 
design environmental-democratic institutions. 
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DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
 147 
 
In the first part of the thesis, I have demonstrated a dilemma for green democracy 
(Chapter 1), identified three possible escape routes and assessed their respective 
procedural and outcome-based qualities (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). The dilemma is that 
there exists no decision procedure satisfying the three stipulated conditions of green 
democracy, i.e., robustness to pluralism, consensus preservation and green outcomes. 
To circumvent the dilemma, at least one of the conditions must be relaxed, and this is 
achievable by adopting any of the three escape routes (where each route itself 
corresponds to an entire family of possible approaches). The major lesson is that 
green democracy is logically possible only if the dilemma is avoided. This is 
regarded as a minimal benchmark for building environmental-democratic institutions. 
In this second part of the thesis, I examine several substantive issues associated 
with building environmental-democratic institutions which meet the minimal 
benchmark. In Chapter 5, I discuss how the normative goals of deliberation and the 
discursive dilemma constrain the input condition of a deliberative-democratic 
institution. I suggest that the requirements of post-deliberation consensus have to be 
defined in a way that avoids the discursive dilemma. In the subsequent two chapters, 
I give two examples of how interdisciplinary enquiries can supplement political 
theory in designing better environmental-democratic institutions. In Chapter 6, I 
illustrate how we can reconcile the tension between two prominent positions in 
environmental decision-making, i.e., technocracy and democracy, by borrowing a 
concept drawn from cognitive science, computer science and sociology: distributed 
cognition. This suggests how the responsiveness condition of the institution can be 
modified so as to make such a reconciliation possible. In Chapter 7, finally, I turn to 
the theory of cognitive dissonance, drawn from psychology, and focus on the output 
condition of the institution. The theory illuminates insights into designing 
practicable democratic institutions for collective (environmental) decision-making. 
Each of these three chapters (5-7) addresses a stand-alone issue connected to 
the dilemma of green democracy (Chapter 1). While these issues can be addressed 
independently, they all concern some of the fundamental questions in both 
democracy and environmental decision-making. The discursive dilemma in Chapters 
5 and 6 sets out the logical constraints of (deliberative-) democratic institutions and 
illustrates the necessary trade-offs between several desiderata for democracy. The 
tension between technocracy (or epistemic quality) and democracy (or procedural 
fairness) in Chapter 6 underpins the perennial debate on how scientific and 
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technological matters in society should be decided. The idea of cognitive dissonance 
in Chapter 7 also echoes the experiences of many people in deciding whether or not 
to change their habits for a certain good, such as driving less for a better environment.        
The arguments in all three chapters are based on the assumption that the 
condition of green outcomes is relaxed (Chapter 4). Moreover, deliberation is 
considered an ingredient of democratic institutions not because of its function of 
domain restrictions in circumventing the dilemma, but because of its procedural and 
epistemic values in (environmental-) democratic decision-making. Chapter 5 focuses 
on the procedural aspect of deliberative decision-making. Chapter 6 deals with both 
the procedural and epistemic aspects of a ‘distributed’ decision procedure (which can 
comprise both deliberation and aggregation). Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the 
epistemic aspect of deliberative decisions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
     
THE DISCURSIVE DILEMMA AND 
NORMATIVE DELIBERATIVE ENDS 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I have demonstrated that the input domain of green democracy can be 
endogenously restricted through deliberation in such a way that the dilemma of green 
democracy is avoided. This, however, depends on the complexity of the decision 
agenda, i.e., the set of issues under consideration for a collective decision. For 
agendas which are more complex because they involve judgments on multiple 
interconnected propositions, we are faced with a potential problem of inconsistent 
collective outcomes when simple majority rule is used as the decision procedure. 
This problem – the discursive dilemma – can be avoided by accepting only certain 
sets of individual opinions, although some combinations of green opinions may be 
rejected as a result, making the decision procedure less inclusive. Is the discursive 
dilemma restricted to decision procedures requiring green or particular outcomes? 
Can we get around the discursive dilemma by relaxing the condition of green 
outcomes? What broader lessons can we learn in constructing an institution with 
arrangements of both deliberation and aggregation? 
This chapter is concerned with a practical issue of institutionalising 
deliberative democracy, namely the issue of what should determine the target 
outcome, as well as the end, of a deliberative process. Ideally, deliberation terminates 
‘naturally’ once a universal consensus on an agenda is reached. Think about a three-
member selection committee deliberating on which of three candidates should 
receive a job offer. If all committee members can eventually agree on a particular 
option at a particular time, deliberation may simply end at that time. But if the 
members’ opinions are so diverse that they may not be able to reach a single 
agreement, the answer will become less straightforward. 
Theoretically, deliberation can last forever or until universal agreement on 
everything on the agenda is reached. However, this is far from feasible in certain 
circumstances when the agendas are more complex, the number of decision-makers 
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increases and/or time and resources are limited. Realistically, in making 
environmental as well as other collective decisions, we need a standard in order to 
stipulate the goal, as well as the cut-off point, of deliberation. What is this standard? 
Why is it relevant to the discursive dilemma? How can we make use of it in 
institutionalising deliberative democracy?  
I address the above questions in four sections. In the first section, I address 
why deliberation alone is not a sufficient condition for institutionalising decision-
making, and why it has to be supplemented by aggregation, forming an institution 
characterised by ‘deliberation-then-aggregation’ (DTA). In the second section, I 
explain the two normative ends of deliberation proposed by Dryzek and Niemeyer 
(2006/2007), i.e., meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality, and establish two 
theses to represent the claims of each. In the third section, I argue that, for DTA 
institutions, these two theses are incorrect because the two normative ends may 
produce profiles of post-deliberation opinions for subsequent aggregation which lead 
to the discursive dilemma. This can be regarded as the deliberative cut-off problem. 
In the fourth section, I discuss a solution to the deliberative cut-off problem by 
reformulating the notion of meta-consensus in a way less general and more precise 
than that suggested by Dryzek and Niemeyer. In the fifth section, I draw some 
conclusions. 
 
 
5.1 Institutionalising deliberative democracy 
 
First, consider two hypothetical examples: 
The plastic bag example: A small citizens’ jury consisting of three 
individuals has to decide what to recommend to its government in order 
to reduce the consumption of plastic bags in retail stores. The group 
receives three proposals, i.e., to educate (PE), to tax (PT), and to ban (PB), 
and is asked to rank these proposals in an order of preference. What will 
happen if this is tackled through deliberative democracy?   
The airport example: The government proposes to build a third runway 
at an airport. Five members of the board of an activist group, based in a 
district nearby, are deciding whether or not to campaign against the 
proposal. Apart from the decision outcome, i.e., to campaign (C) or not to 
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campaign (not-C), they also aim to identify, for the group, reasons for 
supporting the agreed outcome, to be used in preparing the relevant press 
release. How can deliberative democracy deliver both the decision and 
the supporting reasons? 
 
Each of these examples involves a different type of decision problem. In the plastic 
bag example, the group has to place several alternatives in an overall order of 
preference. In the airport example, the group has to formulate judgments in the form 
of accepting or rejecting a set of propositions which represent both the outcome and 
the supporting reasons as well as their mutual relationship. In other words, the nature 
of the agendas in the two examples differs in the sense that the plastic bag example 
is a problem of ranking several alternatives, whilst the airport example is a problem 
of judging several propositions. 
Deliberative democracy consists, concretely, of two key elements, i.e., 
deliberation and democracy. Cohen (2007) says that “deliberation, generically 
understood, is about weighing the reasons relevant to that decision with a view to 
making a decision on the basis of that weighing” (p. 219), and “democracy is a way 
of making binding, collective decisions” (p. 219). Accordingly, deliberative 
democracy in both the above examples may involve something like what follows.  
In the plastic bag example, deliberation takes place among the three individuals 
on some relevant reasons, such as whether PE is preferable to PT, PT to PB, and PE to 
PB, as well as on a collective decision on placing the three proposals in a particular 
order of preference. Likewise, in the airport example, there is deliberation among the 
five individuals on certain relevant reasons. These may include: (1) whether building 
a third runway at the airport causes serious pollution; (2) whether the group should 
campaign against any policy that causes serious pollution; and (3) whether the group 
should campaign against building a third runway at the airport. 
As a decision-making procedure, deliberative democracy should possess the 
following generic properties (Figure 5.1; see also Cohen, 1989; Elster, 1998; Estlund, 
1993): 
Input condition: It is inclusive of all individual opinions. 
Responsiveness condition: All individual opinions are equal in terms of 
determining the decisions through a well-reasoned process. 
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Output condition: It aims at achieving rational consensus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Deliberative democracy as a decision-making procedure 
 
Let us take the airport example as an illustration. The input condition is fulfilled if, 
and only if, all the opinions of all five individuals are accepted as admissible to the 
procedure. The responsiveness condition is satisfied if, and only if, all five 
individuals participate equally in a deliberation process which comprises well-
reasoned dialogues, and that no single one of them has more or less power in 
influencing the final decision outcome. The output condition is met if, and only if, 
some form of rational agreement is reached among the five individuals with 
reference to a certain standard of rationality. A decision-making procedure is said to 
be deliberative-democratic if it fulfills all three conditions. 
It is reasonable to expect a satisfactory deliberative-democratic institution to be 
able to deal, at least, with the two kinds of agendas in the plastic bag and airport 
examples. Hartz-Karp and Briand (2009) broadly define the institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy as “incorporating deliberative activities into the legally-
constituted political decision-making structures and processes of a community or 
society” (p. 128). In other words, to institutionalise deliberative democracy means 
building, within the given legal, political and societal framework, an institution 
which comprises a deliberative-democratic procedure for collective decision-making 
across various kinds of agenda, including problems of ranking and of judgment, as in 
my two examples.   
 
Deliberation: Sufficient for decision-making? 
Is deliberation an adequate institution for the desired kind of decision-making? This 
depends on whether the deliberative-democratic procedure always, under varying 
Individual opinions 
Rational consensus 
Well-reasoned process Deliberative- 
democratic 
procedure 
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circumstances, generates outcomes which correspond to, or lead to, collective 
decisions. Elster (1986) affirms the likelihood of this: 
“The core of [deliberative democracy] … is that rather than aggregating 
or filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view 
to changing them by public debate and confrontation. There would not be 
any need for an aggregation mechanism, since a rational discussion 
would tend to produce unanimous preferences.” (p. 112) 
 
In Elster’s view, deliberation makes a separate aggregative procedure redundant. 
This is because, throughout the process of deliberation, individual opinions are 
considered to be transformed in such a way that they are likely to converge and 
become identical in the end. For instance, Elster would predict that, in the plastic bag 
example, after deliberation, the three individuals will agree on the same order of 
preference regardless of how diverse their opinions may be beforehand, and this 
agreed order of preference will then serve as the collective decision. The availability 
of such unanimous post-deliberation preferences, or universal consensus, makes 
deliberative democracy a possible stand-alone decision-making procedure. 
However, there are at least two problems with Elster’s position. The first 
problem is a practical one: depending on the level of disagreement between different 
individual opinions, the universal consensus required for a decision may be 
unachievable after deliberation. This is especially the case given the empirical fact of 
pluralism in contemporary liberal states: there are immense disagreements over not 
only the explicit choices we make, but also the underlying beliefs and values we hold 
in justifying these choices. It is not difficult to imagine, when deliberation takes 
place in practice, a situation in which a set of diverse values, beliefs and choices held 
by a group of individuals does not converge even after a significant period of 
deliberation.  
If opinions are deeply divided, there is no guarantee that deliberation will be 
able to unify them into the single opinion necessary for a decision. For example, in 
the plastic bag example, it is perfectly possible that even after deliberation Individual 
1 will prefer PE to PT to PB, Individual 2 will prefer PT to PB to PE, and Individual 3 
will prefer PB to PE to PT. In this way, there will be no unanimous agreement on 
preferences with regard to PE and PT, PT and PB, or PE and PB. If a universal 
consensus is necessary for a decision, there will be no collective decision placing the 
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three proposals in an order of preference, and the agenda will be left undecided. This 
is attributable to the unanimity decision rule used in deliberation. As van Mill (1996) 
argues: 
“Supra majority rules that demand unanimity, or close to it, can greatly 
favour the status quo. This is particularly a problem for discourse 
theorists because the demand for consensus is very restrictive and greatly 
favours the possibility of non-decisions … we also have to recognize that 
as long as power remains equally distributed we are unlikely to reach 
consensus.”  (p. 750)  
 
Van Mill’s assertion that, given the equal consideration of individual opinions in 
deliberative democracy (i.e., the responsiveness condition), a (universal) consensus is 
unlikely to be achieved may have been overstated. This depends heavily on 
circumstantial factors such as the size of the group and the complexity of the agenda 
as well as the (initial) level of discrepancy between individual opinions. A more 
plausible claim is that, given the responsiveness condition, such universal consensus 
cannot be guaranteed. Even when the size of the group is as small as two, the agenda 
as simple as a problem of choice between two alternatives and the level of 
discrepancy as low as disagreement between two alternatives, it is still possible for 
no universal consensus to be attained after deliberation. This, again, depends on 
circumstances. But in any case, as Cohen (1989) argues, “even under ideal conditions 
there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming” (p. 23; emphasis 
added).     
Is the ‘no guarantee’ issue too trivial to worry about? There are two responses 
to this question. First, there is empirical evidence that group deliberation does not 
always induce universal consensus on preferences (List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, 
2000). This means that unavailability of universal consensus does exist in real-world 
deliberation. Second, a deliberative-democratic institution is meant to be applicable 
to a wide range of decision-making scenarios. If an institution allows the possibility 
of non-decisions, it is flawed in the sense that it fails to deliver (efficiently) its 
function as a decision-making procedure. Good institutional design requires us to 
take this bug into account and address it wherever feasible. 
The second problem with Elster’s view is a normative one: deliberation as a 
decision procedure leads to an undesirable consequence of path dependency. Goodin 
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(2008) argues that “… conversations, seen as serial processes with dynamic updating, 
can easily be path dependent” (p. 114). Deliberation is a serial process in which 
individuals articulate their opinions one by one and are expected to listen to others’ 
opinions and respond. According to Goodin, dynamic updating is involved in such a 
serial process when individuals revise their opinions while deliberation is going on. 
For example, in the airport example, suppose Member 1 is the first to speak, 
followed by Members 2, 3... Before raising his/her opinion, Member 2 has to listen to 
Member 1’s opinion, Member 3 has to listen to Member 2’s opinion, and so on. In 
this way, Member 2 may update his/her opinion after listening to that of Member 1, 
Member 3 may do the same after listening to the opinions of Members 1 and 2, and 
so on. What does this have to do with path dependency, and why is it problematic?  
Goodin (2008) lists four characteristics of a path-dependent process. First, it is 
unpredictable because many outcomes are possible due to the significant effect and 
partial randomness of earlier events. In the airport example, the opinion of Member 1 
may shape that of Member 2, the opinions of Members 1 and 2 may shape that of 
Member 3, etc. The opinions of the earlier speakers can lead the later speakers to 
formulate very different opinions from their initial ones. But this depends on whether 
or not the later speakers actually revise their opinions after listening to those of the 
earlier speakers. This results in many possible combinations of individual opinions 
after deliberation, and it is therefore hard to predict the opinion of the group. 
Second, a path-dependent process is an inflexible one in which it becomes 
harder to change the path as the process goes on. In the airport example, supposing 
that Member 1 has focused his/her opinion on an issue with which Member 2 
disagrees, Member 2 can shift to discussing another issue by dismissing the issue 
which Member 1 has raised. But if we imagine that Members 2, 3 and 4 all agree 
with discussing the issue which Member 1 has raised, we can then conjecture that it 
will become more difficult for Member 5 to turn the issue around than it was for 
Member 2 in the previous case. This precludes the group from revising its opinion 
with ease in light of any new information.   
The third feature is non-ergodicity, which means that small, accidental events 
cannot be ignored and affect future choices. Suppose, in the airport example, 
Member 1 formulates his/her opinion entirely by tossing a coin, and other individuals 
may not be aware of this. As long as Member 1’s opinion is not dismissed by any 
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individuals in subsequent deliberation, this randomly formed opinion will be fed into 
the deliberative process and may eventually heavily influence the collective opinion. 
Finally, a path-dependent process may be an inefficient one when the outcome 
of the path taken may generate lower utilities than that of the alternative path not 
taken. Suppose again, in the airport example, that Member 1’s opinion is based on a 
purely normative assessment of C, and every individual’s opinion follows this, then 
it is possible that the opinion of the group will eventually be restricted to this line of 
reasoning. However, the group may be better off focusing, instead, on the feasibility 
aspect of C and following the ‘normative assessment’ path may be less efficient. 
Goodin echoes Pierson’s (2000) claim that deliberation is a process “in which 
sequencing is critical. Earlier events matter much more than later ones, and hence 
different sequences may produce different outcomes” (p. 253; cited in Goodin, 2008, 
p. 112), and hence that it is “fundamentally arbitrary” (Goodin, 2008, p. 114). This is 
arbitrary because deliberative decisions hinge on an irrelevant factor of sequencing. 
The opinion of the group, as in the airport example, may be reversed if, instead, 
Member 5 becomes the first speaker, followed by Member 4 and then Member 3, and 
so on. Unless there is a separate justification for a particular sequencing to be 
adopted, the effect of any kind of sequencing should be regarded as arbitrary. Such 
arbitrariness thus weakens the normative foundation for collective decision-making 
solely by deliberation. 
 
Beyond deliberation? 
Given the nature of deliberation as a serial process with dynamic updating, what can 
possibly be done to eliminate or minimise the effect of path dependency? Goodin 
(2008) suggests the rule of ‘first talk, then vote’, which distinguishes deliberation 
from decision-making, and where the latter function is served by aggregation once 
deliberation has been completed. I regard an institutional arrangement adopting such 
a rule for decision-making as ‘deliberation-then-aggregation’ (DTA).  
A DTA institution, as Goodin would agree, overcomes the problem of path 
dependency by replacing dynamic updating with periodic updating at the moment of 
decision-making. Let me explain this. In dynamic updating, as mentioned, 
individuals revise their opinions as deliberation proceeds. By contrast, in periodic 
updating, individuals “just file away information as it comes in, and only update 
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[their] beliefs on the basis of everything in the file at one particular point in time” 
(Goodin, 2008, p. 111). This means that individuals do not have to revise their 
opinions immediately during the process of deliberation. 
How can periodic updating be achieved in deliberative democracy? If 
deliberation is not intended as the means of reaching decisions, according to Goodin, 
individuals will experience less temptation to revise their opinions on the spot, but 
will be able to do so after all others’ opinions have been expressed. For instance, in 
the airport example, if a decision need not be made during deliberation, the five 
individuals will have time to examine all the opinions together and make revisions to 
their own opinions wherever appropriate. It no longer matters whether Member 1 
speaks first, since anyone who comes after the first in the sequence can articulate 
his/her opinion without considering that/those of the previous speaker(s). The five 
individuals can wait until the end of the deliberation to revise their opinions. 
Arguably, aggregation, following deliberation, is a suitable mechanism for 
decision-making. Since aggregation is a process where everyone submits his/her vote 
at the same time, periodic rather than dynamic updating is taking place during this 
stage of decision-making (Goodin, 2008, p. 110). The influence of path dependence 
on decision-making is therefore minimised, if not entirely removed, since sequencing 
now plays a less significant role in determining collective decisions. This is why a 
DTA institution, consisting of separate processes of deliberation and aggregation, 
can relieve the problem of path dependency, and hence serve as a more desirable 
alternative to sheer deliberation.
96
 
For decision-making by deliberative democracy, DTA is necessary, plausible 
and feasible. It is necessary because a decision is still expected even if no universal 
consensus is available after deliberation, which is, as discussed, perfectly possible. 
At the same time, DTA is plausible for two reasons. First, the two approaches to 
decision-making, i.e., aggregation and deliberation, are consistent with each other, 
and have been widely regarded as complementary rather than contradictory (see Dahl 
and Lindblom, 1953; Miller, 1992; Knight and Johnson, 1994; Dryzek and List, 
2003). Second, deliberation before aggregation, as Goodin (2008) argues, is valuable 
because it expands the range of possible options on the agenda. Lastly, DTA is also 
                                                 
96
 A prominent voting or aggregation procedure for a DTA institution as such, which should be at least 
in line with the democratic quality of deliberative democracy, is simple majority rule (see Cohen, 
1989, p. 23). 
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feasible. As research into democratic innovations has shown, there are several 
institutional design options for DTA, including deliberative opinion polls, citizens’ 
juries and initiatives/referendums, etc. (see Smith, 2001, 2003, 2009; see also 
Chapter 4).  
In sum, institutionalising deliberative democracy in the form of DTA is both 
possible and desirable. Deliberation is distinguished from decision-making, and the 
function of decision-making is served by a post-deliberation aggregation mechanism. 
In this way, not only is the effect of path dependence reduced (a normative concern), 
but the availability of collective decisions is also ensured (a practical concern).      
 
 
5.2 The normative ends of deliberation 
 
If a DTA institution consists of deliberation and post-deliberation aggregation, then 
what should the former achieve before proceeding to the latter? Or, what should be 
the ‘cut-off’ point of deliberation? Theoretically, deliberation can last forever or until 
it terminates ‘naturally’ at a certain point, which may be due to the attainment of 
universal consensus on an agenda, to time constraints on deliberation or to voluntary 
dismissal of deliberation as agreed by the deliberators, etc.  
For the purpose of institutional design, it is essential to spell out a generalisable 
and justifiable benchmark for identifying the cut-off point of deliberation. However, 
a benchmark set simply at the ‘natural termination’ of deliberation does not make 
much sense for institutional design across more than one type of agenda and under 
varying circumstances, since the point at which deliberation actually ends in such a 
‘natural’ manner is highly context-dependent. More importantly, it is unrealistic, as 
discussed, to expect deliberation to deliver universal consensus all the time. If it is 
perfectly possible that no universal consensus can be achievable from deliberation, 
such a benchmark is necessary for a DTA institution. What can this benchmark be? 
Dryzek (2000), in his earlier work on deliberative democracy, acknowledges 
that “in a pluralistic world, consensus is unattainable, unnecessary and undesirable”, 
and that it is “more feasible and attractive [to expect from deliberation,] workable 
agreements in which participants agree on a course of action, but for different 
reasons” (p. 170). In Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006), drawing on List (2002b), this 
idea of ‘workable agreements’ is further developed as a ‘meta-consensus’ which can 
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serve as a basis for resolving the possible tension between pluralism and consensus 
in deliberation. In Dryzek and Niemeyer (2007), meta-consensus is recommended, 
alongside ‘inter-subjective rationality’, as a normative end of deliberation.  
Meta-consensus is the ‘meta’ counterpart of consensus. In the context of 
deliberation, demanding meta-consensus means that it is sufficient for deliberation to 
produce “agreement about the nature of the issue at hand, not necessarily on the 
actual outcome” (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2007, pp. 500, 502-506). Dryzek and 
Niemeyer (2006; see also 2007) distinguish between three kinds of meta-consensus, 
i.e., normative meta-consensus, epistemic meta-consensus and preference meta-
consensus, which represent the ‘meta’ counterparts of normative, epistemic and 
preference consensus respectively.  
Normative meta-consensus does not seek, as does normative consensus, 
“agreement regarding values driving the decision process” (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 
2006, p. 638), but only “agreement on recognition of the legitimacy of a value” (p. 
639). Similarly, epistemic meta-consensus does not seek, as in epistemic consensus, 
“agreement about how particular actions map onto values in cause and effect terms” 
(p. 638), but only “agreement on the credibility of disputed beliefs, and on their 
relevance to the norms that define the issue at hand” (p. 640). Likewise, preference 
meta-consensus does not seek “agreement about what should be done” (p. 638), but 
merely “agreement on the nature of disputed choices across alternatives” (p. 641).  
Inter-subjective rationality refers to a deliberative form of rationality, in both 
individual and collective choice, underpinned by a formal link between two sets of 
elements, i.e., (1) values and beliefs and (2) preferences (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2007, 
p. 506). To achieve inter-subjective rationality, “any pair of deliberators with similar 
subjective positions – in that they agree on values and beliefs – ought also to agree 
on preferences [while] conversely, if they disagree on values and beliefs, they are 
reasonably expected to disagree on actions” (p. 507). In other words, inter-subjective 
rationality demands that both individual opinions and collective decisions on values, 
beliefs and preferences should be consistent in order to meet the deliberative 
rationality requirement. Besides, if any two individual opinions on values and beliefs 
converge, these opinions should also converge on preferences.  
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An illustrative example 
Let me further illustrate meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality using the 
airport example. Suppose the group considers, through deliberation in the first 
instance, whether or not to campaign against the third runway proposal. There are 
reasoned discussions between the five members, in which all participate equally, and 
all their views are treated as equally admissible as long as they are consistent. 
Initially, individual opinions are diverse. While they disagree over the conclusion as 
to whether or not to campaign against the proposal, they also disagree over the 
supporting reasons. They hold different values about what normative standards they 
should use for assessment and possess different beliefs about whether the proposal 
satisfies or violates the above described normative standards. After some deliberation, 
however, their disagreements are narrowed. Although they disagree over both the 
conclusion and the supporting reasons, they agree, for the purpose of decision-
making, to set up an agenda with the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: We should campaign against any policy which causes 
severe noise pollution (V). 
Proposition 2: The third runway proposal causes severe noise pollution 
(B). 
Proposition 3: We should campaign against the third runway proposal 
(C). 
Proposition 4: We should campaign against the third runway proposal if, 
and only if, we should campaign against any policy which causes severe 
noise pollution and the third runway proposal causes severe noise 
pollution, i.e., C if and only if (V and B). 
 
In deciding whether or not to campaign against the third runway proposal, the group, 
in this instance, agrees on the issue dimension that it should consider as in V, B and C 
if and only if (V and B), i.e., noise pollution is severe. This means that the group will 
focus on this specific issue in subsequent decision-making instead of digging into 
other subjects such as the economic benefits, as argued by the aviation industry, or 
the benefits of any alternative proposals. This agreement on a single issue dimension 
for decision-making is one example of meta-consensus, or more precisely preference 
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meta-consensus, at least in the relatively informal sense defined by Dryzek and 
Niemeyer. 
As for the contents of the noise pollution issue, C is a proposition of preference 
or choice which represents the conclusion on whether or not to campaign against the 
third runway proposal. V is a proposition of value involving a modal operator 
‘should’, meaning that it is obligatory for the group to campaign against any policy 
which causes severe noise pollution. B is a proposition of belief whose truthfulness 
can be verified by being tested against empirical facts. Both V and B represent 
reasons for campaigning or not campaigning against the proposal. 
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2007, p. 501; see also Dennett, 1971) further suggest 
that preferences or choices are a function of both values and beliefs. This means that 
C is related in some ways to V and B. According to inter-subjective rationality, any 
two individuals agreeing (and disagreeing) on V and B are expected to agree (and 
disagree respectively) on C. Consistently with inter-subjective rationality, the 
connection between C and (V and B) may be a form of material implication such as C 
if and only if (V and B). There could, of course, be other connections, but what 
matters from the perspective of inter-subjective rationality is that all individuals 
make the connection in the same way. The present agreement, on the consideration 
of four interconnected propositions, V, B, C if and only if (V and B), and C, is one 
example of meeting the demands of meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality. 
Suppose the five members of the group submit the following judgments on the 
four propositions (Table 5.1):  
 
Member V B C if and only if (V and B) C 
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 No Yes Yes No 
3 Yes No Yes No 
4 Yes No Yes No 
5 No Yes Yes No 
Table 5.1: Example of individual judgments on the four propositions 
 
According to normative meta-consensus, any disputed values will be recognised as 
legitimate. In Table 5.1, Members 1, 3 and 4 disagree with Members 2 and 5 in such 
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a way that the former three accept V while the latter two reject V. No individual 
judgment on V is dismissed simply due to its divergence from those of other 
individuals, and thus normative meta-consensus is satisfied. Similarly, according to 
epistemic meta-consensus, any disputed beliefs will be accepted as credible. 
Although Members 1, 2 and 5 accept B, this does not rule out the opposing 
judgments of Members 3 and 4. We can therefore say that epistemic meta-consensus 
is also satisfied. Likewise, according to preference meta-consensus, individuals will 
agree on the nature of any disputed preferences or choices. Here, Member 1 accepts 
C, whilst the remaining four individuals reject C. However, since all five individuals 
agree that C is to be considered on the dimension of severity of noise pollution, 
preference meta-consensus is also satisfied. 
At the same time, Members 3 and 4 accept V, reject B, accept [C if and only if 
(V and B)], and reject C. Both sets of judgments are logically consistent and both 
individuals agree on C, given that they agree also on V and B. This is an example 
where the first requirement of inter-subjective rationality is fulfilled – individuals 
who agree on values and beliefs ought to also agree on preferences or choices. As for 
the second requirement of inter-subjective rationality, individuals who disagree on 
both values and beliefs are reasonably expected to disagree on preferences or choices. 
As we can notice from Table 5.1, the judgments of Members 1 and 2 differ on V, in 
the sense that Member 1 accepts this whilst Member 2 rejects it. They both accept B 
and [C if and only if (V and B)], but Member 1 accepts C, whereas Member 2 rejects 
C. Since both individuals are not required to disagree on both V and B in such a way 
that they disagree on C, this is still consistent with the second requirement of inter-
subjective rationality.  
A more difficult case is the disagreement between (Members 2 and 5) and 
(Members 3 and 4) on both V and B while they all agree on C. At first sight, this may 
contradict the second requirement of inter-subjective rationality, but such a 
requirement, with the operator of ‘reasonably expected’ rather than ‘ought’, is not as 
strict as the first. We may, for instance, interpret the second requirement as meaning 
that individuals who disagree on values and beliefs should disagree on preferences or 
choices only if this does not violate any logical rules in standard propositional logic. 
Suppose Member 5 changes his/her mind and rejects B, and will thus disagree with 
Member 1 on both V and B. In this case, they should, according to inter-subjective 
rationality, disagree on C, since the resulting judgment sets are logically consistent. 
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On the other hand, (Members 2 and 5) and (Members 3 and 4) do not have to 
disagree on C simply because they disagree on V and B, since doing otherwise will 
result in an inconsistent set of judgments. Thus, strictly speaking, the second 
requirement of inter-subjective rationality is not contravened.          
Therefore, we can regard the sets of individual judgments in Table 5.1 as 
satisfying, or at least being consistent with, both meta-consensus and inter-subjective 
rationality. If, after some deliberation, the group reaches these sets of judgments, it is 
said to have achieved what Dryzek and Niemeyer take to be the two normative ends 
of deliberation. In DTA, meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality may define 
the cut-off point of deliberation where deliberation terminates and is followed by 
aggregation for decision-making.   
 
The merits of meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality 
In terms of the merits of these two normative ends, Dryzek and Niemeyer 
(2006/2007) contend that “… [meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality] are 
consistent with ideal deliberative procedure” (2007, p. 497), and that they “produce 
collective outcomes that are more stable …” (2007, p. 508). Moreover, “even when 
disagreement can be solved only by voting, meta-consensus can facilitate the 
generation of better outcomes …” (2006, p. 642). We can infer two theses from their 
claims: 
Normative thesis: Meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality (in 
Dryzek and Niemeyer’s sense) are consistent with democratic equality, 
which is a necessary condition for an ideal deliberative procedure. 
Positive thesis: If meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality are 
present, then a deliberative arrangement will generate (more) stable 
collective decisions according to an appropriate criterion of stability. 
 
The first thesis is normative because it touches on the relationship between three 
normative concepts which specify a set of minimal conditions for a deliberative- 
democratic institution, such as DTA. The normative thesis can be evaluated for its 
theoretical plausibility. The second thesis, on the other hand, is positive, since it 
involves the issue of stability which can be examined empirically according to a 
particular measurement of stability. Notice that the positive thesis can be tested both 
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for its empirical adequacy and for its theoretical plausibility. Are the two theses 
correct? And what do these theses imply for the institutionalisation of deliberative 
democracy? I address both questions in the following sections.  
 
 
5.3 The deliberative cut-off problem 
 
I show, in this section, that the two theses are incorrect, drawing on the well-
discussed problem of the discursive dilemma in social choice/judgment aggregation 
theory. I label this as the deliberative cut-off problem. Note that I discuss both theses 
in the context of a DTA institution.  
 
A model of DTA 
We should first model DTA in terms of meta-consensus, inter-subjective rationality 
and democratic equality. From Figure 5.1, for deliberative democracy serving as a 
decision-making procedure, there are input, output and responsiveness conditions. 
When deliberative democracy is institutionalised as DTA, it can be further split into 
the deliberation component and the aggregation component. The input condition for 
DTA specifies what types of inputs, in the form of individual opinions, should be 
accepted as admissible for deliberation in the first instance. The output condition for 
DTA specifies what kinds of collective decision outcomes, in the form of binary 
choices, preferences or judgments, should be produced after aggregation. The 
responsiveness condition for DTA specifies how the collective outcomes are 
generated from the individual opinions through deliberation and aggregation.  
Following the requirements as demonstrated in Figure 5.1, all individual 
opinions are accepted as admissible as long as they are consistent, and collective 
outcomes should also at least be consistent. Democratic equality, broadly understood, 
refers to equality between individuals in determining collective decisions. Since, in 
DTA, there are both deliberation and aggregation components, these should be 
upheld in the responsiveness conditions for both components. The output condition 
for the deliberation component is subject to the normative ends of meta-consensus 
and inter-subjective rationality, so that individual choices, preferences or judgments 
should satisfy, or at least be consistent with, both meta-consensus and inter-
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subjective rationality before being submitted to aggregation. At the same time, the 
input condition for the aggregation component should, similarly, accept only 
consistent individual choices, preferences or judgments as admissible. Figure 5.2 is a 
diagrammatic representation of DTA: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: DTA institution 
 
We may now formulate more precisely the necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for 
both the deliberation and aggregation components of DTA. First, the deliberation 
component should satisfy the following three minimal conditions: 
(D1) Robustness to pluralism: The deliberation procedure is able to 
function under pluralism, i.e., it accepts individual opinions as 
admissible, subject to the constraint of individual consistency.
97
 
(D2) Deliberative equality: The deliberation procedure enables 
individuals to participate equally throughout the process of deliberation 
and to influence equally the deliberative outcomes.
98
 
(D3) Rational meta-consensus: The deliberation procedure generates 
outputs which meet, or are at least consistent with, the requirements of 
meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality as Dryzek and Niemeyer 
recommend.
99
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 This mirrors the inclusiveness condition in Figure 5.1. 
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 This modifies slightly the equality condition in Figure 5.1. 
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 This modifies the rational consensus condition in Figure 5.1. 
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Second, the aggregation component should satisfy at least the following three 
conditions (List, 2011c): 
(A1) Individual consistency: The aggregation procedure accepts 
individual post-deliberation choices, preferences or judgments as 
admissible, subject to the constraint of individual consistency. 
(A2) Majoritarianism: The collective choices, preferences or judgments 
are the alternatives, orderings or propositions accepted by the majority of 
individuals. 
(A3) Collective rationality: The aggregation procedure generates 
consistent collective choices, preferences or judgments. 
           
Notice that the democratic equality requirement mirrored in (A2) is relatively basic 
and not necessarily sufficient. Democratic equality may require more than formal 
majoritarianism. However, majoritarianism certainly captures some key features of 
democratic equality, insofar as it implies anonymity (i.e., all individual opinions 
sharing equal weight) and consensus preservation (i.e., no alternative opinion 
overruling any universal consensus). In other words, (A2) upholds democratic 
equality by ruling out not only dictatorship (in the form of imposed rule), but also 
any bias in counting individual inputs. Furthermore, the conditions for both 
components are related: (A1), (A2) and (A3) are relevant to, and coherent with, (D1), 
(D2) and (D3) respectively.     
 
The discursive dilemma (revisited) 
The problem of the discursive dilemma originates from the doctrinal paradox in the 
area of jurisprudence (Kornhauser and Sager, 1986, 1993; Kornhauser, 1992; see 
also List, 2010 and the discussion in Chapter 2). This highlights an instance where a 
court with multiple judges is unable, using majority voting, to reach consistent 
judgments on some propositions connected by legal doctrine. In recent years, this 
problem has been further developed under the name of the discursive dilemma in the 
literatures of social choice theory, deliberative democracy and group agency (Pettit, 
2001; List, 2006; List and Pettit, 2006, 2011). 
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Consider again the set of individual post-deliberation judgments in the airport 
example in Table 5.1. This is a conjunctive decision problem with V, B, and C if and 
only if (V and B) as premises and C as conclusion. From Table 5.2, all individual 
judgments are consistent and should be accepted as admissible (A1). By aggregating 
these sets of judgments using simple majority rule (A2), the group accepts V, B, and 
C if and only if (V and B), but rejects C. This results in an inconsistent collective 
judgment set, {V, B, C if and only if (V and B), not-C}, which violates (A3). This 
represents the discursive dilemma.  
 
Member V B C if and only if (V and B) C 
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 No Yes Yes No 
3 Yes No Yes No 
4 Yes No Yes No 
5 No Yes Yes No 
Majority Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 5.2: Example of the discursive dilemma 
 
The discursive dilemma shows that, for agendas with multiple propositions which are 
logically connected, the majority judgment of premises (e.g., V, B, and C if and only 
if (V and B)) can differ from the conclusion (e.g., C). Given that the sets of 
individual judgments, as in Table 5.2, are entirely possible deliberative outputs 
which satisfy (D3), this is a case which a DTA institution should seek to avoid in its 
design.
100
 
Is there any other scenario that may encounter the discursive dilemma? Let us 
turn to the plastic bag example. Recall that the citizens’ jury has to rank three 
proposals, i.e., to educate (PE), to tax (PT), and to ban (PB), in order of preference. 
During deliberation, they consider the following propositions: whether educating is 
preferable to taxing (PE > PT), whether taxing is preferable to banning (PT > PB), and 
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 It is true that individuals can revise their opinions / judgments following the end of deliberation 
and before aggregation, i.e., periodic updating as discussed in Section 5.1. However, there is no 
guarantee that individuals will always revise their judgments, so their judgments submitted for 
aggregation will not generate inconsistent collective outcomes under all circumstances. In this way, in 
designing DTA institutions, we need, in the first instance, to avoid any profile of individual judgments 
which may lead to the discursive dilemma.  
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whether educating is preferable to banning (PE > PB). Consider a possible profile of 
deliberative outputs for aggregation, as in Table 5.3. The individual judgments on the 
three propositions may be seen as premises, in the form of values and/or beliefs, for 
substantiating both their preference ordering of the three proposals and the 
conclusions. (D3) is achieved in the sense that the individuals all agree on a decision 
to be made on the basis of the three propositions in spite of their disputes over these.   
    
Individual PE > PT PT > PB PE > PB (Ordering) 
1 Yes Yes Yes PE > PT > PB 
2 No Yes No PT > PB > PE 
3 Yes No No PB > PE > PT 
Majority Yes Yes No PE > PT > PB > PE 
Table 5.3: Another example of the discursive dilemma 
 
Individual 1 accepts PE > PT, PT > PB, and PE > PB, and his/her preference ordering 
can be deduced to be PE > PT > PB, which is consistent relative to the constraint of 
transitivity. Likewise, the preference orderings of Individuals 2 and 3 are consistent 
for the same reason. What would happen if we tried to aggregate these individual 
judgments using a DTA institution? For (A1), all the individual judgment sets should 
be accepted as admissible. For (A2), the collective preference ordering of the group 
should be that supported by the majority. Since the majority judgments on PE > PT 
and PT > PB are in favour of acceptance, while that on PE > PB is in favour of 
rejection, the collective preference ordering is PE > PT > PB > PE, which is a cycle. 
As transitivity is a necessary condition for consistency, {PE > PT > PB > PE} is an 
inconsistent judgment set, which violates (A3). This is another example of the 
discursive dilemma. 
From the plastic bag example, we can see that we may also encounter the 
discursive dilemma when aggregating preferences, as long as the profile of 
preferences as demonstrated is perfectly possible even after deliberation. This is, 
again, a scenario which a good DTA institution should seek to circumvent.  
Can we say something more general about the discursive dilemma and the 
conditions for a DTA institution? What the two examples have in common is that the 
agenda concerned is more complex than a single binary issue such as deciding 
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between options A and B. The airport example involves a decision on four logically 
connected propositions, whilst the plastic bag example involves the ranking of three 
alternatives (expressed in the form of judgments). These agendas can be labeled as 
‘non-simple’ agendas.101  
List (2006) proves that no decision procedure can simultaneously meet the 
demands of pluralism, majoritarian responsiveness and integrity. Pluralism means 
that the decision procedure accepts all possible combinations of individual judgments 
as admissible in the agenda. Majoritarian responsiveness means that the collective 
judgment on each proposition in the agenda is the majority judgment on the same 
proposition. Integrity means that the collective judgments produced by the decision 
procedure are mutually consistent. These three demands can be mapped to the three 
conditions we have specified for a DTA institution, in which pluralism corresponds 
to (A1), majoritarian responsiveness corresponds to (A2) and integrity corresponds to 
(A3). From here, the problem of the discursive dilemma for a DTA institution can be 
generalised as follows: 
For a non-simple agenda, there exists no procedure in the aggregation 
component of the DTA which satisfies simultaneously the conditions of 
individual consistency (A1), majoritarianism (A2) and collective 
rationality (A3). 
   
What does the finding above imply for the two theses which we examine in this 
section? In the deliberation component of a DTA institution, democratic equality, 
meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality are upheld, as in (D2) and (D3). In its 
subsequent aggregation, any profiles of individual judgments, as long as these satisfy 
the requirements of meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality, should be 
accepted as admissible, which satisfies (A1). However, as demonstrated, aggregating 
these judgments on the basis of (A2) may result in inconsistent collective outcomes, 
which contradicts (A3). Hence, we cannot claim more generally that democratic 
equality, meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality in the deliberation 
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 In more technical terms, a non-simple agenda includes at least two ‘atomic’ propositions plus at 
least one ‘compound’ proposition stipulating the logical connections between the ‘atomic’ 
propositions (List, 2006). For instance, V, B, and C are ‘atomic’ propositions, whereas C if and only if 
(V and B) is a ‘compound’ proposition. Similarly, PE > PT, PT > PB, PE > PB and the preference 
ordering are ‘atomic’ propositions while the (implicit) ‘compound’ proposition is the transitivity 
constraint.  
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component are retainable in the aggregation component, due to the fact that (A1), 
(A2) and (A3) conflict with each other.  
In this way, any DTA institution which attempts to meet the demands of 
democratic equality, meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality simultaneously 
may produce inconsistent collective outcomes. Here, inconsistency arguably 
contributes to the instability of these outcomes, since it is unclear whether a 
particular outcome, or its negation, should serve as the binding collective decision. 
Therefore, we can dismiss the normative thesis as incorrect because meta-consensus 
and inter-subjective rationality (in Dryzek and Niemeyer’s sense) are inconsistent 
with democratic equality, at least in the context of DTA, and in the presence of the 
other conditions I have introduced. This is due to the problem of the discursive 
dilemma to which meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality pave the way. At 
the same time, we can assert that the positive thesis is incorrect without empirical 
verification, since it makes sense to believe that inconsistent collective outcomes are 
themselves unstable. This is the deliberative cut-off problem. 
 
 
5.4 Two concepts of meta-level agreement 
 
What lessons can we learn from our discussion above for the institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy? We know that the normative thesis is incorrect, but what 
else can the two normative ends of deliberation, as proposed by Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, tell us about the institutional design of DTA?  
Although the discursive dilemma illuminates the inconsistency between 
individual consistency (A1), majoritarianism (A2) and collective rationality (A3), 
this does not mean that collective outcomes can never be stable if the requirements of 
meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality are satisfied. To ensure (a higher 
level of) stability of outcomes from a DTA institution, we must find ways to avoid 
the discursive dilemma, and this can be done by relaxing (A1), (A2) or (A3) in the 
aggregation component. In particular, by relaxing (A2), or democratic equality, one 
can secure meta-consensus as mirrored in (A1) and inter-subjective rationality as 
mirrored in (A3). Then, the DTA institution so constructed will reflect the normative 
ends of meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality whilst keeping a distance 
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from the challenge of logical consistency as in the discursive dilemma. In other 
words, it is possible to rehabilitate the positive thesis by relaxing (A2). 
There are at least two paths we can take to relaxing (A2), i.e., adopting 
dictatorship or adopting a premise-based procedure.
102
 These two approaches are 
based on relaxing, respectively, the anonymity condition and the independence 
condition, as in the notion of majoritarianism. The anonymity condition requires that 
the decision procedure treat all individuals equally. The independence condition, on 
the other hand, demands that the collective judgment on each proposition depend 
only on individual judgments of the same proposition.  
Consider Table 5.2 again. Suppose Member 1 is appointed as the dictator of the 
group. Then, the collective judgments on V, B, C if and only if (V and B), and C will 
follow immediately from those of Member 1, i.e., acceptance for all propositions. 
Thus, the collective judgment on C will be acceptance, which is consistent with the 
collective judgments on V, B, and C if and only if (V and B). However, this results in 
inequality between Member 1 and the remaining individuals, and hence in violation 
of the anonymity requirement.  
Alternatively, the group can identify V, B, and C if and only if (V and B) as 
premises, take a majority vote on each of these premises, and then deduce conclusion 
C from the majority judgments on these premises. This means, however, that the 
independence condition is violated. The collective judgment on C no longer depends 
on the individual judgments on C, but the collective judgments on V, B, and C if and 
only if (V and B), i.e., acceptance, and the collective judgment set {V, B, C if and 
only if (V and B), C}, thus become logically consistent. 
It is possible to design a DTA institution with meta-consensus and inter-
subjective rationality by relaxing (A2), using either of the approaches. There is a 
price to pay, however. First, adopting dictatorship infringes the fundamental 
principle of democratic equality, i.e., treating all individual decision-makers as 
equals in terms of participation in decision-making as well as determination of 
decisions. This is inconsistent with the spirit not only of deliberative democracy, but 
also of democracy more broadly. Second, although the premise-based procedure is 
consistent with what deliberative democrats would value about the ‘collectivization 
of reason’ (Pettit, 2001; Chapman, 2002; see also the relevant discussions in 
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 See also our discussions on eco-authoritarianism in Chapter 3 and on distributed cognition in 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapters 3 and 7), it is vulnerable to strategic manipulation (Dietrich and List, 2007). 
If individuals do not reveal their decisions truthfully after deliberation, strategic 
manipulation remains a risk (Dryzek and List, 2003). 
 
Reformulating meta-consensus as an alternative 
Given the relatively high cost associated with adopting dictatorship and the potential 
threat of manipulation in adopting the premise-based procedure, is there any better 
alternative? One possible answer is to further restrain the input condition of the 
aggregation component of DTA in such a way that any profile of post-deliberation 
outputs which may encounter the problem of the discursive dilemma is rejected in 
the first instance. This can be done by redefining the notion of meta-consensus in a 
more stringent manner, and ensuring that the inputs submitted for post-deliberation 
aggregation satisfy certain demands required for avoiding the discursive dilemma. 
The ‘demands required’ are hinted at by Riker (1982): 
“If, by reason of discussion, debate, civic education, and political 
socialization, voters have a common view of the political dimension (as 
evidenced by single-peakedness), then a transitive outcome is 
guaranteed.”  (p. 128) 
 
The idea of single-peakedness was introduced by Black (1948). It represents a 
situation in which every individual in a group has one most-preferred option, and the 
options which are preferred less are located further from his/her most-preferred 
option. This single-peakedness condition assumes that an individual’s preferences 
over different decision alternatives can be ranked by measuring the distances of these 
alternatives from his/her ideal alternative. The greater the distance from the ideal 
alternative, the lower the rank the alternative concerned is.
103
 Black proves that if all 
individuals’ preferences are single-peaked, then the corresponding majority 
preferences are transitive. 
Recall that, in the plastic bag example, a consistency requirement for 
preference orderings is that these should be transitive, i.e., if PE > PT and PT > PB, 
then it must follow that PE > PB. As we have seen, the discursive dilemma (in the 
generalised sense, applying to both judgments and preferences) occurs if, and only if, 
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 This is also an assumption for the spatial model of politics or policy-making as in political science. 
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the collective preference ordering is cyclic, or intransitive. According to Riker, it is 
possible, through deliberation, for the three individuals to arrive at single-peaked 
preference orderings. If this is so, then the collective preference ordering will be 
transitive and the discursive dilemma will have been circumvented.  
To illustrate, suppose that, after deliberation, Individual 3 changes his/her 
opinion and rejects PE > PT, and at the same time continues to reject PT > PB and PE 
> PB. Now the preference ordering of Individual 3 becomes PB > PT > PE, which is 
transitive. Suppose further that neither Individual 1 nor Individual 2 changes his/her 
opinion/judgments after deliberation. In other words, the preference orderings of 
Individuals 1 and 2 are still PE > PT > PB and PT > PB > PE respectively. We can then 
plot the preference orderings of the three individuals on a graph (Figure 5.3).  
In Figure 5.3, the preference orderings of Individuals 1, 2 and 3 are all single-
peaked. By aggregating the individual judgments on the three propositions (on 
preferences) using simple majority rule, the group collectively rejects PE > PT, 
accepts PT > PB, and rejects PE > PB. The resulting collective preference ordering is 
PT > PB > PE, which is transitive, and the discursive dilemma is thus avoided.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Example of single-peaked preference orderings 
 
While Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006/2007) do not discuss the idea of single- 
peakedness in the context of the discursive dilemma, they acknowledge that single- 
peaked preference orderings represent one aspect of their notion of preference meta-
consensus. They contend that: 
“Preference meta-consensus consists of agreement on the nature of 
disputed choices across alternatives and … [it] concerns the range of 
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alternatives considered acceptable … [D]eliberation itself could produce 
consensus on the range of acceptable alternatives … [Also], preference 
meta-consensus concerns the validity of different ways that choices 
across alternatives can be structured … [, though] single-peakedness is 
not the only type of structuration of choices.” (2006, p. 641) 
 
Dryzek and Niemeyer appear to agree with Riker that deliberation can generate 
consensus on how preferences for alternatives on an agenda are structured and that 
this structuration can be in the form of single-peaked preference orderings. 
If we follow Dryzek and Niemeyer’s preference meta-consensus in 
determining the cut-off point of deliberation, we can be sure that the profile of 
deliberative outputs for subsequent aggregation is single-peaked, which, once 
accepted for aggregation, guarantees transitive or consistent collective preference 
orderings. However, this is restricted to agendas which involve only the ranking of a 
set of options in order of preference.   
To reiterate, for cases of judgment aggregation on other complex agendas, such 
as the airport example, Dryzek and Niemeyer (2007) acknowledge that preferences 
or choices are related to values and beliefs in the form of a function. This means that 
propositions of preferences or choices can be logically connected to propositions of 
values and beliefs in order to constitute an agenda for judgment aggregation. For 
example, Dryzek and Niemeyer would consider an agenda, as in the airport example, 
of V, B, C if and only if (V and B), and C (and their negations), as valid for decision-
making. Nevertheless, by following their general notion of meta-consensus, it is 
possible to generate inputs for post-deliberation aggregation which will encounter the 
discursive dilemma, or the deliberative cut-off problem, as demonstrated earlier. 
To avoid such difficulties, we can formulate a less general and more precise 
notion of meta-level agreement for stipulating what deliberation should achieve 
before proceeding to aggregation, or where the cut-off point of deliberation should be. 
This notion covers a wider range of agendas, including not only preferences but also 
judgments on multiple inter-connected propositions.  
List (2002b) proposes a concept of ‘meta-agreement’. In contrast with 
substantive agreement, meta-agreement does not require individuals to agree on the 
same preferences or judgments in decision-making, but only demands a certain level 
of agreement on preferences or judgments among the individuals. This notion is 
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similar to Dryzek and Niemeyer's meta-consensus, especially when contrasted with 
universal consensus. List (2002b) thinks that "the structure condition of single-
peakedness may be seen as an implication of agreement at a meta-level …" (p. 77; 
his emphasis). This also captures the single-peakedness requirement, as in Dryzek 
and Niemeyer's notion of preference meta-consensus.  
What makes meta-agreement distinctive from meta-consensus is that the 
former draws insights from Black's idea of single-peakedness and formulates a new 
structural condition for meta-level agreement for judgment aggregation. This 
structure condition is unidimensional alignment: 
"[If] there exists a single ordering of the individuals from "left"-most to 
"right"-most such that, for every proposition in the relevant domain of the 
issue, the individuals accepting that propositions are either all to the left, 
or all the right, of those rejecting it, …, then we say that the given profile 
of sets of judgments across individuals satisfies unidimensional 
alignment (List, 2002b, p. 77; his emphasis). 
   
In other words, unidimensional alignment means that all individuals who hold the 
same judgment on a proposition, no matter it is acceptance or rejection, are 
structurally grouped either on the left or on the right. List (2003) proves that if a 
profile of judgments satisfies unidimensional alignment, then simple majority rule 
will produce consistent collective outcomes. When applied to the context of DTA, 
this means that if, after deliberation, the combination of inputs accepted as 
admissible by the aggregation component satisfies unidimensional alignment, then 
consistency is ensured in the corresponding collective judgments, and thus the 
discursive dilemma, or the deliberative cut-off problem, is avoided. 
To illustrate the above, consider again the airport example. Suppose, after 
deliberation, Members 2 and 5 change their judgments on B from acceptance to 
rejection, whilst Members 3 and 4 change their judgments on B from rejection to 
acceptance. In this way, the judgments of Members 2 and 5 on V, B, C if and only if 
(V and B), and C, are respectively rejection, rejection, acceptance and rejection, 
while the judgments of Members 1, 3 and 4 on all propositions are acceptance. 
Suppose also that the judgments of Members 2 and 5 are both grouped on the left (or 
on the right), leaving the judgments of Members 1, 3 and 4 on the right (or on the 
left). Then, this profile of individual judgments is unidimensionally aligned and the 
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corresponding collective judgments obtained by simple majority rule are consistent 
(Table 5.4). 
What lessons can we learn from this? As highlighted by the discursive dilemma, 
it is possible for a set of individual post-deliberation judgments to generate 
inconsistent collective judgments. To avoid the discursive dilemma, we must design 
the DTA institution in such a way that any set of individual judgments submitted for 
post-deliberation aggregation will exhibit a certain level of agreement or cohesion. In 
Section 5.3, we reveal that, by using Dryzek and Niemeyer's notions of meta-
consensus and inter-subjective rationality in defining the cut-off point of deliberation 
in a DTA institution, we may encounter the problem of the discursive dilemma or the 
deliberative cut-off problem. In the present section, we notice that Dryzek and 
Niemeyer's notion of meta-consensus (or preference meta-consensus) constitutes the 
requirement of single-peakedness, such that post-deliberation individual preference 
orderings are accepted as admissible to the aggregation component if, and only if, 
they are structured in such a way as to guarantee transitive collective preference 
orderings after aggregation.   
 
Proposition / 
Member 
2 5 1 3 4 Majority 
V No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
B No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
C if and only 
if (V and B) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
C No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5.4: Example of unidimensionally aligned set of judgments 
 
However, following Dryzek and Niemeyer’s notion of meta-consensus does not rule 
out the possibility of the discursive dilemma if the agendas concerned involve not 
only ranking of alternatives in an order of preference, but also judgments on multiple 
interconnected propositions. For this reason, List's notion of meta-agreement is a 
more desirable alternative because it consists of both demands for single-peakedness 
(for preference aggregation) and unidimensional alignment (for judgment 
aggregation). If we use List’s notion of meta-agreement to specify the cut-off point 
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of deliberation in a DTA institution, we can ensure consistent, and hence stable, 
collective outcomes across a wider range of agendas. Therefore, by adopting this 
alternative concept of meta-level agreement rather than Dryzek and Niemeyer’s 
notion of meta-consensus, we can rehabilitate the positive thesis. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Figure 5.4: Domain of inputs without restrictions and domain restrictions as defined by meta-
consensus and meta-agreement 
 
Figure 5.4 summarises the difference between meta-consensus, meta-agreement and 
the case where neither of these is present in terms of the input domain of the 
aggregation component in DTA. The largest ellipse in dark grey represents the 
unrestricted domain with all logically possible inputs after deliberation. All these 
post-deliberation inputs are accepted as admissible to the subsequent aggregation 
procedure, which may lead to the discursive dilemma. The middle-sized ellipse in 
white represents the restricted domain according to Dryzek and Niemeyer’s notion of 
meta-consensus. When these inputs are submitted for post-deliberation aggregation 
using simple majority rule, they may, depending on the type of agenda, still result in 
the discursive dilemma or the deliberative cut-off problem. This occurs for agendas 
with multiple interconnected propositions. Lastly, the smallest ellipse in light grey 
represents the domain restricted according to List’s notion of meta-agreement, where 
the scope of domain restrictions is the largest. Whilst fewer inputs are accepted as 
admissible compared to the previous two cases, the discursive dilemma, or the 
Unrestricted domain 
for post-deliberation 
aggregation; may lead 
to the discursive 
dilemma 
Restricted domain for 
post-deliberation 
aggregation as 
defined by Dryzek and 
Niemeyer's meta-
consensus; may lead 
to the discursive 
dilemma / deliberative 
cut-off problem 
Restricted domain for 
post-deliberation 
aggregation as defined 
by List's meta-
agreement; avoids the 
discursive dilemma / 
deliberative cut-off 
problem across 
different agendas 
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deliberative cut-off problem, will be avoided in post-deliberation aggregation by 
simple majority rule. This holds for different types of agenda, including those 
involving multiple interconnected propositions. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have presented a critique of the two normative ends of deliberation 
proposed by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006/2007), i.e., meta-consensus and inter-
subjective rationality. I have discussed why 'deliberation-then-aggregation' (DTA) is 
a desirable institution for deliberative democracy. I have also illustrated how a DTA 
institution where the cut-off point of deliberation is defined by meta-consensus and 
inter-subjective rationality may encounter the discursive dilemma, which is also 
known as the deliberative cut-off problem. This explains why Dryzek and 
Niemeyer's theses that (1) meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality are 
consistent with democratic equality (i.e., normative thesis), and (2) meta-consensus 
and inter-subjective rationality produce stable collective decisions (i.e., positive 
thesis) are incorrect in the context of DTA. 
We can avoid the discursive dilemma, or the deliberative cut-off problem, by 
relaxing individual consistency (A1), majoritarianism (A2) or collective rationality 
(A3) in the aggregation component. One possible way to rehabilitate the positive 
thesis is to relax majoritarianism (A2). By following Dryzek and Niemeyer's notion 
of meta-consensus (or preference meta-consensus), we can restrict the domain of 
post-deliberation inputs in such a way that only individual preference orderings 
which meet the demand of single-peakedness are accepted as admissible for 
subsequent aggregation. However, their notion of meta-consensus does not consider 
the case of aggregation of judgments on multiple interconnected propositions. In 
light of this shortcoming, List's notion of meta-agreement, which consists of not only 
the demand of single-peakedness but also unidimensional alignment, is a more 
desirable alternative, and can be applied across different types of agenda in order to 
circumvent the discursive dilemma or deliberative cut-off problem. 
The significance of this argument lies in the reasonable desideratum of 
designing a deliberative-democratic institution, no matter whether this is for 
environmental or other kinds of collective decision-making, in a way which can cater 
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for various types of decision agendas, including binary choices and preferences as 
well as judgments. It is, in particular, not uncommon for groups of individuals, as in 
the plastic bag and the airport examples above, to deliberate and decide on agendas 
which are more complex than simply a choice between two or more alternatives. 
Therefore, the benchmark we choose for determining the cut-off point of deliberation 
in a DTA institution should be capable of avoiding, at the very least, inconsistent 
collective outcomes after deliberation and aggregation regardless of the types of 
agendas. This depends crucially on the range of agendas which we expect the 
institution to process. Figure 5.5 depicts a simple decision tree which shows how 
such a benchmark can be determined. 
It is clear that, unless we are designing a DTA institution which processes 
agendas limited to binary choices or preferences, List's notion of meta-agreement 
(together with Dryzek and Niemeyer’s inter-subjective rationality) serves as a better 
benchmark than Dryzek and Niemeyer’s meta-consensus (together with their inter-
subjective rationality) for defining such a cut-off point of deliberation.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Simple decision tree for institutionalising DTA 
Is the DTA expected to process complex 
agendas (e.g., ranking of three or more 
alternatives and/or judgments on multiple 
interconnected propositions)? 
No 
Yes 
No discursive 
dilemma; no domain 
restrictions required  Is the DTA expected to 
process agendas involving 
judgments on multiple 
interconnected propositions? 
No 
Yes 
Domain restrictions, 
according to Dryzek and 
Niemeyer's meta-
consensus, are sufficient 
for avoiding the discursive 
dilemma / deliberative cut-
off problem     
Domain restrictions, 
according to List's meta-
agreement, are necessary 
for avoiding the discursive 
dilemma / deliberative cut-off 
problem     
 180 
 
CHAPTER 6 
     
DISTRIBUTED COGNITION AND THE 
RECONCILIATION OF TECHNOCRACY 
AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that if we expect a deliberation-then-aggregation (DTA) 
institution to arrive at stable collective decisions, it is necessary to avoid the 
discursive dilemma in the aggregation component. This requires the deliberation 
component to terminate at an appropriate point such that the domain is restricted in 
order to exclude certain profiles of individual inputs for aggregation. I also argued 
that, if the agendas are non-simple
104
, the cut-off point of deliberation should be 
determined by List’s (2002b) meta-agreement in order to bypass the discursive 
dilemma. In other words, stable collective decisions are possible by relaxing the 
input condition of the aggregation component of DTA (which mirrors the robustness 
to pluralism condition discussed earlier).  
Owing to certain practical limitations, however, such meta-agreement may not 
be achieved by deliberation. For example, individual opinions may be so deeply 
divided that not even any form of structural alignment of preferences or judgments is 
attainable via deliberation. To circumvent the discursive dilemma, we may, instead, 
focus on how the DTA institution processes the profiles of post-deliberation inputs as 
given. In this way, stable collective decisions are possible by adjusting the 
responsiveness condition of the aggregation component. As introduced in Chapter 5, 
the premise-based procedure is an example in which the majoritarianism condition is 
relaxed. 
One mainstream debate about the methods of collective environmental 
decision-making is centred on a divide between technocracy and democracy, or the 
‘Technocratic-democratic Divide’. On the technocratic side, emphasis is placed on 
the correctness of environmental decisions with respect to certain criteria of the 
‘truth’. The high level of complexity and uncertainty of environmental issues 
                                                 
104
 To reiterate, a non-simple agenda consists of multiple propositions which are logically connected. 
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provides an epistemic reason for decision-making being vested in specialist 
individuals with sufficiently high competence (‘experts’). On the democratic side, 
emphasis is placed, instead, on the legitimacy of environmental decisions with 
respect to certain procedural considerations, such as inclusion, equality and 
rationality. The extensive coverage of the impact of environmental decisions 
provides a procedural reason for democratising decision-making by giving decision 
power to the general public (‘ordinary people’). 
Can we reconcile the Technocratic-democratic Divide, and if so, how? In this 
chapter, I shall borrow an inter-disciplinary concept – distributed cognition – and 
demonstrate that such reconciliation is possible through relaxing the demand of 
majoritarianism. Recently, distributed cognition has been widely discussed in studies 
of computing, law, philosophy of science, psychology and sociology. Simply put, it 
means that the processes of forming certain representations of the world, such as 
beliefs and desires, are distributed across different agents or components (List, 2008). 
A phrase which roughly captures the essence of distributed cognition is ‘cognitive 
division of labour’, and through such a division of the constituent parts we can boost 
the overall performance of a system (e.g., the efficiency in an economy).  
I shall argue that distributed cognition is relevant to political theory in terms of 
constructing institutions for collective (environmental) decision-making. More 
specifically, I shall show that it is possible to model a DTA institution for 
environmental decision-making as a ‘distributed-cognitive’ system, which I label 
Specialist Environmental Democracy (SED). This assigns decision power to 
individuals with different competences on different matters on an agenda. SED not 
only balances the two contending demands, i.e., procedural fairness and epistemic 
quality, but is also consistent with some normative desiderata for environmental 
decision-making. Following List’s (2008) formal analysis of distributed cognition 
from the perspective of social choice theory, I shall discuss the normative application 
of this concept in resolving the tension between technocracy and democracy in a 
DTA institution in order to facilitate collective (environmental) decision-making.  
My discussion is structured as follows. Section 6.1 introduces the ideas of 
distributed cognition and the Technocratic-democratic Divide. Then, drawing on two 
impossibility theorems in the theory of judgment aggregation, Section 6.2 
demonstrates that some normative conditions for environmental decision-making 
may together lead to an anti-democratic result. I shall also explain how we can 
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determine a set of minimal benchmarks for SED without retrogressing this to a non-
democratic procedure. Section 6.3 illustrates what options are available for fulfilling 
the above minimal benchmarks, formulating two models of SED based on distributed 
cognition. I shall argue that both models can balance epistemic performance as in 
technocracy with procedural fairness as in democracy. In resolving the Technocratic-
democratic Divide, which model should be adopted depends on the relative 
importance of the two values. In Section 6.4, I shall make some concluding remarks. 
 
 
6.1 Distributed cognition and the Technocratic-democratic Divide 
 
Let us start by considering a hypothetical example. 
The congestion charge example: In the central district of a metropolitan 
area, the heavy traffic during weekday rush hours has been causing not 
only journey delays but also severe air pollution. Six council members 
are examining whether a congestion charge should be levied on every 
vehicle which enters the district. They would like collective decisions on 
both the above conclusion and its supporting reasons. After some 
deliberation, they reach a meta-agreement on the agenda consisting of 
three interconnected propositions on which they will make judgments:              
Proposition 1: The air pollution in the central district poses a health 
threat to pedestrians and to residents nearby (P). 
Proposition 2: If the air pollution in the central district poses a health 
threat to pedestrians and to residents nearby, then a congestion charge 
should be imposed (if P then C). 
Proposition 3: A congestion charge should be imposed (C). 
How should the group arrive at a collective decision in the form of 
judgments on these propositions? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, if, after deliberation, there is no universal consensus on 
any of the above propositions on the agenda, it will be necessary to resort to 
aggregation for a collective decision. Suppose, immediately before aggregation, 
every member of the group formulates his/her attitudes which correspond to 
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judgments on all the propositions on the agenda, i.e., P, if P then C, and C (and their 
negations). These propositional attitudes are examples of cognitions. Suppose further 
that the collective decisions, understood as the propositional attitudes or cognitions 
of the group, are determined by putting together the propositional attitudes of all the 
group members; and the formation of the group’s cognitions is carried out by having 
these distributed across different subgroups of members. This is an instance of 
distributed cognition (List, 2008).
105
 
At the heart of distributed cognition, collaborations take place between 
different (human) agents and/or devices through cognitive division of labour. If a 
decision-making process is collaborative, it entails the absence of pre-assigned 
collective decisions or of any single individual dominating collective decisions. In 
other words, there is no imposed rule or dictatorship. In the congestion charge 
example, whether the three propositions on the agenda will be accepted or rejected 
depends on what the members submit as their judgments, and no judgment of a 
single member determines any collective judgment.  
At the same time, if cognitive division of labour is involved, this means that no 
individual will determine the collective judgments on all propositions. Instead, 
different subgroups of individuals are assigned different propositions, and the 
collective judgment on a proposition depends on the judgments of the individuals 
who are assigned that proposition. For instance, Members 1 and 2 work on P, 
Members 3 and 4 on (if P then C), and Members 5 and 6 on C, etc., and simple 
majority rule is then applied in order to obtain the collective judgments on P from 
Members 1 and 2, and so on for (if P then C) and C. Figure 6.1 illustrates this 
diagrammatically. 
 
The Technocratic-democratic Divide 
How relevant is distributed cognition to environmental decision-making? Consider 
the congestion charge example. Suppose only Member 1 is an expert – 
environmental scientist and medical doctor – who knows how to measure the air 
quality in the district, estimates its corresponding health implications for pedestrians 
and residents, and recommends suitable actions. If he/she, on the grounds of 
                                                 
105
 More broadly, a distributed-cognitive system can also involve non-human agents or devices as well 
as a mixture of both human and non-human agents/devices. See Giere (2002), Hutchins (1995) and 
Knorr Cetina (1999) for examples (cited by List, 2008). 
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competence, claims exclusive power in determining all three propositions on the 
agenda, the remaining five members will not be able to influence the collective 
decisions by submitting judgments on these propositions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Example of distributed cognition in collective decision-making 
 
In the above case, Member 1 becomes a dictator because he/she is more likely to, or 
the only one who can, make the correct decisions. This is an example of technocratic 
decision-making which prioritises the judgmental power of experts and professionals. 
It is a common discourse in environmental problem-solving – ‘administrative 
rationalism’ – which is manifested through institutions and practices like resource-
management bureaucracies and environmental impact assessments (Dryzek, 2005). 
Analogously, these technocratic institutions/practices are represented by the situation 
when Member 1 dominates decision-making on the basis of superior knowledge and 
expertise on the issues/propositions concerned. 
In environmental decision-making, the epistemic quality of decisions is often 
emphasised owing to the high level of complexity and uncertainties of the 
environment. Ophuls (1977), for example, advocates a notion of ‘priesthood of 
responsible technologists’ which states that only a governing elite of politicians, 
scientists and professionals, such as systems modellers, population biologists and 
ecologists, can master the depth and scope of knowledge which is sufficient for 
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dealing with complex ecological matters (see also Dryzek, 2005). Sunstein (2002) 
endorses, similarly, the relatively superior status of experts by comparing how 
experts and ordinary people deal with issues (including environmental issues) 
bearing the concerns of risk and safety: 
“… [E]xperts have more information and are also prepared to look at the 
benefits as well as the risks associated with controversial products and 
activities. Ordinary people often make judgments on the basis of a quick, 
intuitive assessment, in which affect plays a large role … Of course 
experts make mistakes, and they may even be biased, … [b]ut precisely 
because they are experts, they are more likely to be right than ordinary 
people.” (p. 77) 
 
If Ophuls and Sunstein are correct in the sense that experts are more competent than 
ordinary people, and if correct decisions are crucial to environmental decision-
making, then eco-technocracy in such decision-making is prima facie justifiable (see 
discussion of eco-technocracy in Chapters 1 and 3). 
Nevertheless, the epistemic quality of decisions is, arguably, not the only 
desideratum in environmental decision-making. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
some procedural qualities are also necessary to a decision mechanism, such as 
inclusiveness of different opinions and equality of participation and decision power 
among people. This is often grounded in the extensive coverage of environmental 
impacts, and hence the need to represent the interests of parties that are affected but 
nonetheless (naturally) excluded from the decision-making process, such as future 
generations of humans (e.g., Dobson, 1996; Dryzek, 2000; Eckersley, 2000; Goodin, 
2003). This can be referred to as ‘democratic pragmatism’ (Dryzek, 2005). 
In contrast with administrative rationalism, democratic pragmatism, or more 
simply democracy, stresses the interactions in the process rather than the accuracy of 
the outcomes. It sees collective decisions not as products of experts and professionals, 
but as resulting from forces arising from citizens in society (Anderson, 1995; Dryzek, 
2005). In other words, even if Member 1 is truly more competent than the five other 
members, democracy requires that Member 1 is not granted more judgment power on 
any of the three propositions. Instead, the opinions of all six members will be equally 
accepted as admissible and given equal weight. 
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Apart from procedural concerns, an epistemic reason for prioritising 
democracy over technocracy lies in “the impossibility of incontrovertible proof of 
anything” (Saward, 1993, p. 76). In this view, no individuals, including experts, can 
ever be certain of what counts as objectively right or wrong, and the best that any 
environmental decision-making institution can deliver is provisional decisions only. 
These provisional decisions, which are expected to be challenged and reassessed on a 
regular basis, can only be a result of an open democratic process rather than of closed 
technocracy (Dobson, 2007). 
Another reason against technocracy concerns the fallibility of humans in terms 
of our imaginations and calculating abilities (Fearon, 1998; see also Torgerson, 1999; 
Smith, 2001). By this account, while experts may be more likely than ordinary 
people to accurately identify right decisions, as humans they are still fallible, i.e., 
their competence is less than certain. Whenever experts are wrong, technocracy, as a 
closed process of decision-making, produces wrong decisions which cannot be 
rectified (Beck, 1992; Barry, 1999; Dobson, 2007). 
At the same time, it is claimed, contrary to Sunstein’s assertion, that ordinary 
people, while also fallible, can be more competent than experts in assessing risk. For 
instance, Slovic (2000) contends that ordinary people display a qualitative rather than 
(merely) a quantitative mind set, and hence their “basic conceptualization of risk is 
much richer than that of experts and reflects legitimate concerns that are typically 
omitted from expert risk assessments” (p. 238; cited in Sunstein, 2002, pp. 58-59). In 
other words, ordinary people are more capable than experts of making use of (lay) 
knowledge to reach correct decisions (see also Wynne, 1989; Jasanoff, 2006; Kusch, 
2007). If this is true, then, even from an epistemic point of view, technocracy may 
not perform any better than democracy.
106
 
The tension between technocracy and democracy, as approaches to collective 
environmental decision-making, can be summarised as follows. While technocracy is 
criticised as generating collective decisions without fair treatment of inputs from 
ordinary people, it also leaves something to be desired from an epistemic perspective. 
The complex and uncertain nature of environmental issues may, instead, support a 
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 Undoubtedly, all these arguments in favour of either technocracy or democracy are worth more 
detailed discussion. This is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. These arguments are, instead, 
briefly stated here to highlight the theoretical background of the controversies over technocracy and 
democracy. I aim at only spelling out, from these arguments, the Technocratic-democratic Divide as 
below, but not evaluating the soundness of each of these arguments (although the latter is arguably 
valuable for research in substantive environmental thoughts). 
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Popperian view that no single individual, not even an expert, can possibly know 
enough, not to mention the fact that he/she is fallible (Dryzek, 2005). Excluding the 
wisdom of the crowd, then, may hamper epistemic performance. On the other hand, 
although experts may not possess absolute epistemic superiority, it is far from clear 
whether ordinary people are in any sense more capable of arriving at correct 
decisions. In principle, decentralising decision power by assigning it to ordinary 
people can sacrifice any correct decisions identifiable by experts in favour of those 
preferred by the majority. This motivates us to reflect on the possibility of 
reconciling what I call the Technocratic-democratic Divide. Table 6.1 summarises 
the differences between technocracy and democracy for collective environmental 
decision-making. 
 
 
 Technocracy Democracy 
Decision-makers Experts Ordinary people 
Issue stressed  
Complexity and 
uncertainties of 
environmental issues 
Extensive coverage of 
environmental impacts 
Value prioritised  Epistemic performance Procedural fairness 
Table 6.1: Comparison of technocracy and democracy as approaches to collective           
environmental decision-making 
 
Below I suggest that distributed cognition illuminates insights into reconciling the 
Technocratic-democratic Divide in environmental decision-making. In particular, I 
demonstrate that, by adopting a procedure which distributes propositions on an 
agenda to different individuals, including so-called experts and ordinary people, the 
aggregation component of the DTA can balance the demands of procedural fairness 
and epistemic performance. I focus on the aggregation component because the final 
collective decisions are a crucial determinant of the epistemic performance of the 
DTA institution as a whole. This distributed-cognitive procedure, or Specialist 
Environmental Democracy (SED), can take two forms, and which of these is to be 
used depends on circumstances. 
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6.2 Constraints of Specialist Environmental Democracy 
 
It is important to highlight two assumptions of SED. First, it considers decision 
scenarios with aggregation of binary judgments, i.e., either acceptance or rejection, 
on agendas consisting of multiple interconnected propositions, or non-simple 
agendas.
107
 Second, which individuals in a group are ‘experts’ and which are 
‘ordinary people’ is exogenously determined case by case. This means that the same 
individual can be an expert in one case, but one of the ordinary people in another, 
depending on his/her competence in judging the propositions on the agenda 
concerned. This makes good sense – a person, for example, may be ‘ordinary’ on 
global warming, while he/she can be an expert when it comes to dealing with local 
pollution problems which he/she experiences on a day-to-day basis. 
In Chapter 5, we discussed the discursive dilemma which reveals a paradox of 
majoritarian aggregation on non-simple agendas. In the recent literature on judgment 
aggregation, the discursive dilemma has been further generalised in impossibility 
theorems which illuminate essential trade-offs of democratic aggregation (List and 
Pettit, 2002; Dietrich and List, 2007). In this section, I shall suggest that these 
theorems have significant implications for designing SED. In particular, on the basis 
of two impossibility theorems, I shall show that it is logically impossible to 
simultaneously satisfy several conditions which are all appealing for collective 
environmental decision-making. It is necessary, therefore, to relax at least one of 
these conditions. This serves as a basic principle for constructing SED. 
 
Desiderata for SED 
To reiterate, SED is designed to reconcile the Technocratic-democratic Divide. In 
order to search for suitable proposals for such reconciliation, we may start by 
considering the ‘value prioritised’ parameter as in Table 6.1. Broadly speaking, 
technocracy prioritises epistemic performance, while democracy prioritises 
procedural fairness. In one interpretation, technocracy requires that SED is more 
likely to produce correct than incorrect decisions, whereas democracy demands, 
minimally, that SED does not take the form of dictatorship and does not overrule any 
unanimously accepted collective judgments. 
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 The aggregation of non-binary judgments on propositions which concern subjective probability 
assignments to these propositions is beyond the scope of our discussion. 
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We can now formulate three minimal benchmarks of SED which should not be 
compromised: 
(E) Epistemic quality: It is more likely that collective decisions on the 
agenda are correct than incorrect.  
(P1a) Consensus preservation: A proposition on the agenda is accepted 
if it is accepted by all individuals in the group. 
(P1b) Non-dictatorship: There exists no single individual such that the 
collective judgments on all propositions on the agenda are solely 
determined by that individual.   
 
(E) is an epistemic desideratum, whereas (P1a) and (P1b) are procedural desiderata. 
Notice that (E) makes sense from both the technocratic and the democratic 
perspectives. Even in democratic decision-making, we generally value correct 
decisions more than incorrect decisions, given that the corresponding truth is 
accessible.
108
 This is also in line with the defence of (deliberative) democracy, from 
the green perspective, as an open process which stresses the importance of 
eliminating decisional errors and defects through public participation (Dobson, 1996, 
2007; Barry, 1999; Dryzek, 2005). Besides, in social choice theory, there is also the 
celebrated Condorcet jury theorem which endorses the truth-tracking power of 
simple majority rule upon fulfilling certain conditions (see Chapter 4).
109
 In principle, 
therefore, democracy is compatible with epistemic performance, and it is reasonable 
to expect SED to satisfy (E) even on democratic grounds.  
Then, what other procedural desiderata, in addition to (P1a) and (P1b), may we 
expect SED to satisfy? For democracy as an aggregation procedure, there are certain 
generic requirements concerning its input, responsiveness and output conditions, 
such as robustness to pluralism, majoritarianism and collective rationality 
respectively. The first and the last desiderata can be formulated as follows: 
(P2) Robustness to pluralism: The individual judgments on all 
propositions on the agenda are accepted as admissible for decision-
making if, and only if, they are consistent and complete.
110
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 This is regardless of whether the realist assumption of the truth existing as independent facts holds. 
109
 The epistemic justification by Condorcet’s jury theorem will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
110
 This modifies slightly the individual consistency condition (A1) in Chapter 5. 
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(P3) Collective rationality: The collective judgments on all propositions 
on the agenda are consistent and complete.
111
 
 
(P2) is a reasonable condition given the existence of pluralistic values concerning the 
environment. Since these values are incommensurable and incompatible, they may 
not be reduced to one single value and may not be dismissed before decision-making 
on the basis of any objective measurement of ‘rightness’ or ‘goodness’ (Brennan, 
1992; O’Neill, 1997; Smith, 2003; see Chapter 2). This is also consistent with the 
commitment of environmental democracy to diversity and inclusiveness (Dryzek, 
2000; Goodin, 2003; Ball, 2006). The consistency and completeness requirement is 
minimal, which rules out only logically invalid and fragmentary individual 
judgments. A set of individual judgments is complete if it contains either acceptance 
or rejection of every proposition on the agenda. 
(P3) consists of the consistency and completeness demand for collective 
judgments. This is particularly important for environmental issues owing to the rise 
of ‘new constituencies’ such as citizens in other countries, future generations and 
non-human entities that are affected but are unable to participate in the relevant 
decision-making (Dobson, 2007; Goodin, 1996; Eckersley, 2004). A rational 
collective decision, with collective judgments on both the conclusion and its 
supporting reason(s), makes it possible for the group as a whole to justify decisions 
to the excluded constituencies as well as to other parties who may respond to, discuss 
and/or challenge these decisions. This ensures that groups are conversable and 
contestable with collective reasons (Pettit, 2001).
112
 
 
Two impossibility results 
Can SED satisfy (P2), (P3) and majoritarianism at the same time? The discursive 
dilemma, as illustrated in Chapter 5, shows the impossibility of this, given that the 
agenda is non-simple, i.e., it consists of multiple interconnected propositions. In the 
congestion charge example, the agenda is P, if P then C, and C (and their negations), 
which are logically connected. Table 6.2 shows a possible profile of individual 
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 This modifies slightly the collective rationality condition (A3) in Chapter 5. 
112
 To reiterate, a group is conversable if its collective decisions can be justified by reasons which are 
collectively accepted (see Chapter 2). 
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judgments. We notice that (P3) is violated when (P2) and majoritarianism are both 
satisfied, which represents, once again, the discursive dilemma. 
Majoritarianism, to reiterate, means that majority acceptance of each 
proposition is a necessary and sufficient condition for the same proposition to be 
collectively accepted.
113
 It is satisfied only if consensus preservation (P1a) plus the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
(P1c) Anonymity: All individual inputs are treated equally. 
(P1d) Systematicity: All propositions are treated equally (i.e., 
neutrality), and the collective judgment on each proposition depends on 
the individual judgments of the same proposition (i.e., independence).   
 
 
Member P if P then C C 
1 Yes Yes Yes 
2 Yes Yes Yes 
3 No Yes No 
4 Yes No No 
5 Yes No No 
6 No Yes No 
Majority Yes Yes No 
Table 6.2: Example of the discursive dilemma 
 
In other words, (P1a), (P1c) and (P1d) are all required for majoritarianism. The 
problem of majoritarian inconsistency as highlighted in the discursive dilemma can 
be further generalised in different impossibility results of judgment aggregation. List 
and Pettit (2002) prove that, for non-simple agendas comprising at least two atomic 
propositions (e.g., P and C) and at least one compound proposition (e.g., if P then C), 
there exists no aggregation function satisfying universal domain (or robustness to 
pluralism) (P2), collective rationality (P3), anonymity (P1c) and systematicity (P1d). 
In other words, the paradox of judgment aggregation is not restricted to simple 
majority rule but, more generally, applies to any aggregation procedure which 
attempts to meet the above four conditions, given a non-simple agenda.  
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 It is worth noting that the majoritarianism condition can also be weakened to its basic form which 
states that majority acceptance of a proposition is only a necessary condition for the collective 
acceptance of that proposition. See List (2011b).     
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Based on List’s and Pettit’s result, Dietrich and List (2007) further prove the 
following theorem: 
Anti-democratic result: If the agenda is non-trivially connected, any 
aggregation function which satisfies universal domain, collective 
rationality and systematicity is a dictatorship or inverse dictatorship of 
one individual (Dietrich and List, 2007).
114
 
 
What do both impossibility results have to do with determining the procedural 
constraints of SED? To recall, dictatorship (P1b) must at least be avoided. If we are 
faced, in environmental decision-making, with a non-trivially connected agenda such 
as that in the congestion charge example, then it is impossible to construct an 
aggregation procedure of SED satisfying universal domain (or robustness to 
pluralism) (P2), collective rationality (P3), non-dictatorship (P1b) and systematicity 
(P1d). Therefore, to make such SED possible, we must avoid the anti-democratic 
result by relaxing (P2), (P3) or (P1d).  
 
Escape routes 
The first exit route is to relax robustness to pluralism (P2). This, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, can be done by persuading certain individuals to change their judgments 
on certain propositions so that the profile of individual judgments is aligned in a way 
which avoids the discursive dilemma. The persuasion can take the form of 
deliberation, and the revised matrix of individual judgments is regarded as a 
deliberation-induced agreement (Dryzek and List, 2003; Dryzek and Niemeyer, 
2006). Although deliberation is generally democratic, which will also be acceptable 
to environmental deliberative democrats (e.g. Barry, 1999; Dryzek, 2000; Eckersley, 
2004), there is no guarantee that the resulting matrix can always circumvent the 
discursive dilemma. 
The second exit route is to relax collective rationality (P3). Arguably, there is 
little ground for the group to give up consistency of judgments between propositions. 
To implement this proposal without compromising consistency, the group may 
                                                 
114
 An agenda is non-trivially connected if (1) it has an inconsistent set of size greater than two, with 
all its proper subsets being consistent; and (2) it is not structurally equal to a set of propositions with 
trivial logical connectives, i.e., ‘not’ and ‘if and only if’. The agenda in the congestion charge example 
fulfils both conditions. See Dietrich and List (2007) and List (2011d, footnote 9). 
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abstain from judgment on any proposition whenever the individual judgments on that 
proposition are not all the same. This mirrors the unanimity rule. However, it often 
results in leaving the issues on the agenda undecided, which hampers the efficiency 
of decision-making. For example, in the congestion charge example, applying the 
unanimity rule will lead to no collective judgment on any single proposition (Table 
6.2). Unless for some ideal conception of deliberative democracy which seeks 
universal consensus (e.g. Elster, 1986), this approach is not generally appealing.
115
 
Another way to relax collective rationality is to adopt a conclusion-based 
procedure. This means that the collective judgment on the conclusion (as designated) 
is obtained by aggregating the individual judgments on that conclusion only, without 
considering the remaining propositions on the agenda, i.e., the premises. For example, 
from Table 6.2, the collective judgment on C is obtained by aggregating the 
individual judgments on C, and no collective judgments are made on either P or (if P 
then C). In other words, the group will not arrive at any supporting reasons for C at 
the collective level. This can be a problem for environmental decision-making, since 
groups will no longer be conversable, and their decisions can hardly be contested by 
any other parties (on behalf of the excluded constituencies, e.g., future generations). 
This result is probably unacceptable to most environmental theorists. 
The last exit route is to relax systematicity (P1d). This can be done by dropping 
the independence condition. In this way, the collective judgment on some 
propositions may depend on the individual judgments on various other propositions. 
Environmental theorists, particularly deliberative theorists, may accept this exit route 
on the grounds of collectivisation of reasons, where there are judgments on the 
supporting reasons for a conclusion at the collective level (Pettit, 2001). There are at 
least two possible designs for the corresponding aggregation procedure:
116
 
(1) Premise-based procedure: The collective judgment on the 
conclusion, as designated, is obtained by aggregating only the individual 
judgments on the corresponding premises, i.e., the remaining 
propositions on the agenda. For instance, from Table 6.2, the collective 
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 See also the discussion on the epistemic performance of deliberative democracy in Chapter 7. 
Another alternative is supermajority rule with a sufficiently large supermajority threshold. See List 
and Pettit (2002). It still runs the risk of leaving certain propositions undecided but the chance of such 
is not as high as that of the unanimity rule. 
116
 Another example of an aggregation procedure violating independence is a distance-based 
procedure. See Pigozzi (2006) and Miller and Osherson (2009). 
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judgment on C is obtained by aggregating the individual judgments on P 
and (if P then C). 
(2) Sequential priority procedure: All propositions on the agenda are 
ranked in an order of priority which specifies the order in which 
propositions are to be considered by the group. For each proposition 
considered, the collective judgment on that proposition is obtained by 
aggregating the individual judgments on the same proposition, unless that 
proposition is logically constrained by earlier judgments (List, 2004). In 
the latter case, the collective judgment on that proposition is derived 
from those earlier judgments.  
For example, from Table 6.2, suppose P, (if P then C) and C are 
designated as the first, second and third propositions respectively. Then, 
using simple majority rule, P and (if P then C) are accepted by the group, 
whereas C, instead of being rejected, follows the earlier collective 
judgments of P and (if P then C) and hence deduced as accepted by 
group. The sequential priority procedure is a generalisation of the 
premise-based procedure.    
 
Distributed cognition can be realised in both the premise-based procedure and the 
sequential priority procedure. In the former case, the premises are assigned to 
different individuals in the group for decision-making, regarded as the distributed 
premise-based procedure (List, 2008). In the latter case, all propositions, instead of 
merely the premises, are distributed across the individuals in the group, regarded as 
the distributed sequential priority procedure.
117
  
With the distributed premise-based procedure, it is possible to achieve formal 
equality of judgmental power among individuals by assigning an equal number of 
proposition(s) to every individual. For example, each of the six members in the 
congestion charge example is allocated one proposition to judge on, say, Members 1, 
2 and 3 on P and Members 4, 5 and 6 on (if P then C). On the other hand, with the 
                                                 
117
 The premise-based procedure and the sequential priority procedure both violate the independence 
condition of systematicity (P1d), and for this reason, both decision procedures are not strategy-proof. 
In other words, it is possible for individuals to manipulate collective judgments by expressing 
untruthful individual judgments. For more discussion, see Dietrich and List (2007). This is the 
potential price we have to pay for adopting either procedure, as individuals sometimes do exhibit 
strategic behaviour in voting and other decision-making. The discussion of strategic manipulation is, 
however, outside the scope of this thesis. My focus here is to show that, the idea of distributed 
cognition can be realised in the design of democratic institutions, as the premise-based procedure and 
the sequential priority procedure. 
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distributed sequential priority procedure, members who are assigned sequentially 
prior propositions possess more judgmental power than members assigned 
sequentially later propositions. This is because individual judgments on the prior 
propositions can constrain those of the latter on the basis of logic. 
For instance, consider again the cognitive division of labour in Figure 6.1, with 
the order of priority P > (if P then C) > C. If Members 1 and 2 both accept P and 
Members 3 and 4 both accept (if P then C), then it is a logical requirement that 
Members 5 and 6 accept C regardless of the actual judgments of Members 5 and 6. In 
this way, Members 5 and 6 have less judgmental power as their judgments may be 
overruled. Both procedures are models of SED, and are, as we shall see below, 
workable proposals for reconciling the Technocratic-democratic Divide. 
The lesson learnt so far is that the anti-democratic result, on the basis of earlier 
works on the paradox of judgment aggregation, highlights the procedural constraints 
or trade-offs of constructing the aggregation procedure of SED. In order to satisfy the 
minimal benchmarks of non-dictatorship and consensus preservation, it is necessary 
to relax one of the three desiderata, i.e., robustness to pluralism, collective rationality 
or systematicity. Relaxing systematicity, or the independence condition, is a possible 
exit route, and the distributed premise-based procedure and the distributed sequential 
priority procedure represent two examples of how distributed cognition may be 
realised in this manner.           
 
 
6.3 Epistemic performance of Specialist Environmental Democracy and the 
reconciliation of the Technocratic-democratic Divide  
 
In the previous section, I introduced the procedural constraints of SED. These 
constraints are based on two procedural benchmarks, i.e., non-dictatorship and 
consensus preservation, serving as the minimal requirements of democracy. As for 
the minimal requirement of technocracy, the corresponding benchmark is epistemic 
quality (E). As a basic principle, the Technocratic-democratic Divide may not be 
reconciled in a way which violates either the procedural or the epistemic benchmark. 
How can SED satisfy benchmark (E)?         
An aggregation procedure is said to perform well, in an epistemic sense, if it is 
good at generating collective judgments that track the truth. In particular, the truth 
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refers to a fact regarding the best decision output, where this piece of fact is 
independent of the aggregation procedure. Tracking the truth means that a certain 
judgment on a proposition, x, is chosen by the procedure if, and only if, x is correct 
(Nozick, 1981; see Chapters 4 and 7).  
Consider again the congestion charge example with the six members judging 
whether or not to accept P. According to standard propositional logic, there are two 
possible states of the world: (1) either P (i.e., the air pollution in the central district 
poses a health threat to pedestrians and to residents nearby) or not-P (i.e., it is not 
true that the air pollution in the central district poses a health threat to pedestrians 
and to residents nearby). The aggregation procedure is regarded as truth-tracking on 
the state of the world if it satisfies the following two criteria: 
Criterion 1: It accepts P, or judges P to be true, if, and only if, P is true. 
Criterion 2: It rejects P, or judges P to be false, if, and only if, P is false. 
 
When would we say an aggregation procedure is good in this epistemic sense? There 
appears to be no guarantee that a procedure must be able to arrive at correct 
collective judgments all the time, since this always depends on how far the individual 
judgments correspond to the truth. Nevertheless, it may be sufficient to say that an 
aggregation procedure is good in this epistemic sense if its probability of generating 
collective judgment on a proposition is high, or higher than that of its counterparts. 
In what ways can SED track the truth, or satisfy benchmark (E)? How can we 
formulate proposals for reconciling the Technocratic-democratic Divide? Below, I 
examine the epistemic performances of the distributed premise-based procedure and 
the distributed sequential priority procedure in three possible cases. 
 
First possibility: Absence of the ‘expert-ordinary people’ distinction 
Case 6.1: All individuals in the group (with an odd number in total) 
make their judgments on all propositions on the agenda independently 
and truthfully, and they have the same competence, p, in making a 
correct judgment on every proposition on the agenda. Each individual is 
more likely to be correct than incorrect in their own judgments, i.e., the 
value of p is between 0.5 and 1. 
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Case 6.1 describes a situation in which there exists no individual who is either more 
or less competent than others in making a judgment on any proposition on the agenda. 
In other words, among these individuals there is no distinction between the so-called 
experts and ordinary people as in the Technocratic-democratic Divide. From another 
angle, they may all be regarded as experts to a certain extent, since they tend to judge 
all the propositions correctly. This can happen to any (odd-number) combination of 
individuals in the congestion charge example when, say, they are equally capable of 
collecting a wide range of evidence and reasoning with sound arguments before 
submitting judgments on P and (if P then C), but none of them is superior in terms of 
knowledge in the fields involved in both propositions. 
Suppose Member 1 temporarily abstains from decision-making so that the size 
of the group is reduced to five, i.e., an odd number. Suppose further that the 
individual competences in judging P and (if P then C) are 0.6 and 0.55 respectively, 
meaning that each of the five members shares the same probability of 0.6 of judging 
P correctly and of 0.55 of judging (if P then C) correctly. 
Consider the following three aggregation procedures with simple majority rule: 
(1) standard premise-based procedure; (2) distributed premise-based procedure; and 
(3) distributed sequential priority procedure with the order of priority P > (if P then 
C) > C. For (1), all members submit their judgments on both P and (if P then C). For 
(2), some members focus on P and some on (if P then C), e.g., 2, 3 and 4 on P, whilst 
4, 5 and 6 on (if P then C). For (3), some members focus on P, some on (if P then C), 
and some on C, e.g., 2, 3 and 4 on P, 4, 5 and 6 on (if P then C), and 2, 3 and 5 on C. 
Let us work out the epistemic performances of the three procedures based on 
the arrangements above as an illustration (cf. List, 2008): 
(1) Standard premise-based procedure: With five members judging on 
P and (if P then C), simple majority rule requires at least three members 
to accept each proposition in order for the same proposition to be 
collectively accepted. For P, its probability of being judged correctly by 
the group equals the total probabilities of all majority judgment 
combinations which are correct. This includes instances when all 
members judge P correctly, i.e., 0.6
5
, when four members judge P 
correctly, i.e., (0.6)
4
(1-0.6), and when three members judge P correctly, 
i.e., (0.6)
3
(1-0.6)
2
.  
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The probability of P being correctly judged by the group is, hence, 0.6
5
 + 
5(0.6)
4
(0.4) + 10(0.6)
3
(0.4)
2
, which is approximately 0.683. Likewise, the 
probability of (if P then C) being correctly judged by the group is 0.55
5
 + 
5(0.55)
4
(0.45) + 10(0.55)
3
(0.45)
2
, which is approximately 0.593. The 
overall epistemic performance of the procedure equals the product of the 
probabilities of P and (if P then C) being judged correctly by the group, 
which is approximately 0.405. 
(2) Distributed premise-based procedure: With three individuals 
judging on P and (if P then C), simple majority rule requires at least two 
members to accept each proposition in order for the same proposition to 
be collectively accepted. Then, the probability of P being correctly 
judged by the group is 0.6
3
 + 3(0.6)
2
(0.4), which is 0.648. The 
probability of (if P then C) being correctly judged by the group is 0.55
3
 + 
3(0.55)
2
(0.45), which is 0.575 approximately. The overall epistemic 
performance of the procedure is, therefore, 0.372 approximately. 
(3) Distributed sequential priority procedure: There are three 
members judging each of the three propositions, P, (if P then C), and C. 
Since C is constrained by, and depends on, P and (if P then C) which are 
sequentially prior, the epistemic performance of the procedure is equal to 
that of the distributed premise-based procedure with three members each 
on P and (if P then C), i.e., 0.372 approximately. This is independent of 
the individual competence on C. 
 
 
Aggregation 
procedure 
Probability of P 
being judged 
correctly by the 
group 
Probability of (if P 
then C) being judged 
correctly by the 
group 
Overall epistemic 
performance 
(1) Standard 
premise-based 
procedure 
0.683 (app.) 0.593 (app.) 0.405 (app.) 
(2) Distributed 
premise-based 
procedure 
0.648 0.575 (app.) 0.372 (app.) 
(3) Distributed 
sequential priority 
procedure 
0.648 0.575 (app.) 0.372 (app.) 
Table 6.3: Epistemic performances of different procedures (Case 6.1) 
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Table 6.3 summarises the epistemic performances of the three procedures. We note 
that, if the five members have equal levels of competence in judging both 
propositions P and (if P then C), the overall epistemic performances of all three types 
of procedures (i.e., 0.405; 0.372; 0.372) are higher than the probability of one single 
member judging both propositions correctly (i.e., (0.6)(0.55), or 0.33). This result is 
consistent with the celebrated Condorcet jury theorem (see Chapters 4 and 7). 
However, the distributed premise-based procedure performs less well than the 
standard premise-based procedure. This is because the number of members judging 
each proposition in the former case (i.e., three) is fewer than in the latter (i.e., five), 
which is also consistent with the Condorcet jury theorem. 
 
On the other hand, the epistemic performances of both distributed procedures 
are the same, given that the premises are equivalent to the sequentially prioritised 
propositions, and the profile of individual competences and the cognitive division of 
labour in both procedures are the same.
118
 Therefore, if we are to maximise the 
epistemic performance of collective decision-making when there is no individual in a 
group who is either more or less competent, i.e., no distinction between experts and 
ordinary people, then the standard premise-based procedure is recommended. At the 
same time, the standard premise-based procedure also engages more individuals in 
decision-making, which can also be justified from the procedural perspective. 
 
Second possibility: Relative ‘expert-ordinary people’ distinction  
Case 6.1 may look more ideal than we can expect in any collective decision-making 
on controversial issues involving specific knowledge and expertise. As the 
Technocratic-democratic Divide spells out, it is necessary for an aggregation 
procedure for environmental decision-making to be sensitive to the following fact: 
there exist certain individuals in a group who are more competent than others in 
making judgments on certain propositions, such as in the case below: 
Case 6.2: All individuals (with an odd number in total) make their 
judgments on propositions independently and truthfully, and they are 
                                                 
118
 Having said that, the epistemic performances of the distributed premise-based procedure and the 
distributed sequential priority procedure can differ. This is possible for agendas with multiple 
propositions which are not logically connected, since there would be no distinction between 
‘premises’ and ‘conclusion’, and hence the sequentially prioritised propositions (as in the latter 
procedure) are not necessarily equivalent to the premises (as in the former procedure). 
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more likely to be correct than incorrect in their own judgments. At the 
same time, some individuals have a higher competence, p′, in making 
correct judgments on a proposition on the agenda, while some other 
individuals have a higher probability, p″, of making correct judgments on 
another proposition on the agenda, and so on.  
 
Refer to the congestion charge example in Case 6.1. Suppose the individual 
competence of Members 2, 3 and 4 in judging P is increased from 0.6 to 0.7, while 
that of Members 5 and 6 remains at 0.6. Suppose further that Members 4, 5 and 6 
have an increased individual competence from 0.55 to 0.6 in judging (if P then C), 
whereas the corresponding competence of Members 2 and 3 remains at 0.55. The 
cognitive division of labour, for the distributed procedures, follows that in Case 6.1, 
i.e., with Members 2, 3 and 4 on P, and Members 4, 5 and 6 on (if P then C). Table 
6.4 shows the epistemic performances of the three procedures for Case 6.2.
119
 
From Table 6.4, we see that both distributed procedures outperform (i.e., 
0.508), in terms of truth-tracking, the standard premise-based procedure (i.e., 0.506). 
Besides, both distributed procedures and the standard premise-based procedure 
perform better than having Member 4, the most competent member on P and (if P 
then C), judge both propositions alone (i.e., (0.7)(0.6), or 0.42). Therefore, if we wish 
to maximise the epistemic performance of collective decision-making where 
different individuals are more competent in judging different propositions, we should 
opt for either of the two distributed procedures. 
 
Aggregation 
procedure 
Probability of P 
being judged 
correctly by the 
group 
Probability of (if P 
then C) being judged 
correctly by the 
group 
Overall epistemic 
performance 
(1) Standard 
premise-based 
procedure 
0.781 (app.) 0.648 (app.) 0.506 (app.) 
(2) Distributed 
premise-based 
procedure 
0.784 0.648 0.508 (app.) 
(3) Distributed 
sequential priority 
procedure 
0.784 0.648 0.508 (app.) 
Table 6.4: Epistemic performances of different procedures (Case 6.2) 
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 The values are found, similarly to that in Case 6.1, by summation of probabilities of the cases in 
which the majority decisions are correct. 
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Using a distributed procedure, individuals are assigned propositions for decision-
making if their corresponding competence is relatively high. In this way, individuals 
who make decisions on a particular proposition can be regarded as experts relative to 
that proposition, whilst those who do not make decisions on that proposition are 
ordinary people relative to that proposition. If the number of propositions in which 
each individual is an expert is the same, all individuals will be assigned the same 
number of propositions, which is consistent with democratic equality in terms of 
equality of judgmental power among individuals. However, if, in the group, there are 
some individuals who are experts in more propositions than others, e.g., Member 4 in 
Case 6.2, the distributed procedure becomes less democratically equal. 
It is essential to note that, with the distributed sequential priority procedure, 
even if every individual is assigned an equal number of proposition(s) to make 
judgment(s) on, those who are assigned propositions which are sequentially prior 
may have more judgmental power, since their judgments potentially constrain the 
judgments of individuals who are assigned some sequentially later propositions. In 
other words, with the distributed sequential priority procedure, what matters is not 
only the number of propositions allocated but also the priority of the propositions in 
the sequence.     
 
Third possibility: Partial ‘expert-ordinary people’ distinction  
Case 6.2 represents a situation in which every individual is competent in making a 
judgment on at least one proposition on the agenda, and each individual is an expert 
in some area(s) as reflected by which proposition(s) he/she is assigned. In other 
words, no individual is an ordinary person on all propositions on the agenda. 
However, what the Technocratic-democratic Divide represents can be more 
complicated than that. An important assumption of technocracy is that, on a given 
agenda, there exist a number of individuals (i.e., ordinary people) who are not in any 
sense more competent than other individuals (i.e., experts). On epistemic grounds, 
the task of decision-making may, therefore, be left exclusively to experts who are 
more likely to reach decisions that track the truth. This is captured by the following 
case: 
Case 6.3: All individuals make their judgments on propositions 
independently and truthfully, and they are more likely to be correct than 
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incorrect in their own judgments. At the same time, some individuals 
have a higher competence, p′, in making correct judgments on a 
proposition on the agenda; and for other propositions, all individuals 
share the same competence, p, in making their judgments.  
 
Case 6.3 represents a typical scenario in environmental decision-making. Some 
propositions are positive, which may be verified only through the use of certain 
expert knowledge and skills. P in the congestion charge example may demand some 
kind of medical and environmental knowledge in order for an individual to judge it 
correctly. Other common examples in the environment arena include “policy X 
reduces carbon dioxide by y% annually” and “the globe is heating up”, etc. If there 
are people who possess the relevant knowledge, while others do not, it is possible 
that the former possess higher competence in judging these propositions.  
On the other hand, some propositions are normative, which, at least partly, 
involves value judgments. For these propositions, such as (if P then C) in the 
congestion charge example, it is more difficult, if not impossible, to verify whether 
they are true. Some other examples in environmental decision-making include “if 
policy X reduces carbon dioxide by y% annually, then policy X should be adopted” 
and “the globe is heating up, so we should minimise air travel”, etc. Our experience 
shows that it is generally harder to identify certain individuals who possess more 
knowledge, or higher competence, than some other individuals in judging these 
normative propositions.  
Now, suppose Members 2, 3 and 4 still share, as in Case 6.2, the competence of 
0.7 in judging P, which is higher than that of Members 5 and 6 (i.e., 0.6). At the 
same time, the probability of a correct individual judgment on (if P then C) is, as in 
Case 6.1, equal across all individuals, which is 0.55. For P, we may regard Members 
2, 3 and 4 as experts but Members 5 and 6 as ordinary people, whilst there is no 
distinction between experts and ordinary people for (if P then C). For the standard 
premise-based procedure, to reiterate, all the five members make judgments on both 
propositions regardless of their competence. For the distributed procedures, Members 
2, 3 and 4, on the grounds of having higher competence, specialise in judging P, 
whilst (if P then C) is left to all the five individuals. Table 6.5 shows the epistemic 
performances of the three procedures for Case 6.3. 
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From Table 6.5, we note that, by letting the three experts in P specialise in that 
proposition, both distributed procedures are more likely to produce correct collective 
judgments on P (i.e., 0.784) than the standard premise-based procedure (i.e., 0.781). 
Also, in terms of truth-tracking in both propositions, the former procedures perform 
better (i.e., 0.465) than the latter procedure (i.e., 0.463). At the same time, all three 
procedures perform better than having any single expert in P, such as Member 2, 
judge both propositions alone (i.e., (0.7)(0.55), or 0.385). Therefore, if we wish to 
maximise the overall epistemic performance of collective decision-making where 
there is such an ‘expert-ordinary people’ distinction in some but not all proposition(s) 
on the agenda, then we should adopt the distributed procedures. 
 
 
Aggregation 
procedure 
Probability of P 
being judged 
correctly by the 
group 
Probability of (if P 
then C) being judged 
correctly by the 
group 
Overall epistemic 
performance 
(1) Standard 
premise-based 
procedure 
0.781 (app.) 0.593 (app.) 0.463 (app.) 
(2) Distributed 
premise-based 
procedure 
0.784 0.593 (app.) 0.465 (app.) 
(3) Distributed 
sequential priority 
procedure 
0.784 0.593 (app.) 0.465 (app.) 
Table 6.5: Epistemic performances of different procedures (Case 6.3) 
 
Lessons learnt 
What general observations can we make from the three cases above? As mentioned, 
our aim is to identify suitable decision-making procedures for constructing SED for 
reconciling the Technocratic-democratic Divide. The Divide states that there is 
tension between two competing approaches in collective environmental decision-
making, i.e., technocracy and democracy, on both the procedural and the epistemic 
dimensions. To reconcile this tension, we have formulated three minimal 
benchmarks, as in Section 6.2, i.e. epistemic quality, consensus preservation and 
non-dictatorship. I have, based on these benchmarks and the impossibility results in 
the theory of judgment aggregation, arrived at three models of decision-making, 
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namely the standard premise-based procedure, the distributed premise-based 
procedure and the distributed sequential priority procedure. 
All three cases assume that individuals (1) are more likely to be correct than 
incorrect; and (2) make their judgments independently and truthfully. We note, from 
these cases, that dictatorship by one single individual does not necessarily maximise 
the overall epistemic quality, even if the individual is an expert in some or all 
propositions on the agenda. At the same time, it is possible to boost the epistemic 
performance of a decision-making procedure without violating the minimal 
procedural benchmarks of non-dictatorship and consensus preservation. If there is no 
‘experts-ordinary people’ distinction, the standard premise-based procedure 
outperforms, in an epistemic sense, both distributed procedures. 
However, the distributed procedures are more likely than the standard premise-
based procedure to produce correct collective judgments on propositions in which 
individuals possessing higher competence, or experts, specialise, provided that the 
increased probability of truth tracking through such specialisation is not too small 
(List, 2008). The overall epistemic performances of the former procedures are also 
better than that of the latter procedure when the ‘experts-ordinary people’ distinction 
is partial and specialisation only takes place for certain proposition(s). As for the two 
distributed procedures, their epistemic performances are the same for non-simple 
agendas, provided that the premises are equivalent to the sequentially prioritised 
propositions, with the profile of individual competences and the cognitive division of 
labour being the same in both procedures.
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In terms of procedural fairness, equality of judgmental power is preserved by 
using the standard premise-based procedure in all cases. As for both distributed 
procedures, this hinges on whether all individuals are assigned an equal number of 
propositions. If this is so, as in Case 6.1 and Case 6.2, then they all have equal 
judgmental power over the agenda. Otherwise, the experts possess more judgmental 
power overall even if they are only more competent in judging certain proposition(s), 
as in Case 6.3. 
It is worth remarking that, for non-simple agendas, the distributed sequential 
priority procedure is less democratically even-handed than the distributed premise-
based procedure. This is because, even if individuals are assigned an equal number of 
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 See footnote 97. 
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propositions, as in Case 6.1 and Case 6.2, those who judge propositions which are 
sequentially prior may constrain the decisions of those judging the sequentially later 
propositions, depending on the logical relations between these propositions. As for 
Case 6.3, if the ordinary people are assigned sequentially prior propositions where 
their judgments may constrain those of the experts on the sequentially later 
propositions, then the inequality between their judgmental power may be relieved. 
But if, instead, the experts are assigned sequentially prior propositions, then such 
inequality will be intensified. As we can see, the distributed sequential priority 
procedure allows fine-tuning of the reconciliation of the tension between epistemic 
performance and procedural fairness, particularly for Case 6.3.
121
  
Figure 6.2 shows a simple decision tree for choosing between the three 
procedures for reconciling the Technocratic-democratic Divide under different 
circumstances, given a non-simple decision agenda as well as the assumptions that (1) 
individuals are more likely to be correct than incorrect; and (2) they make their 
judgments independently and truthfully. 
 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed how the inter-disciplinary concept of distributed 
cognition illuminates insights into constructing a DTA institution for environmental 
decision-making. This institution, called Specialist Environmental Democracy (SED), 
comprises an aggregation procedure which assigns decision power to individuals 
with different competences on different propositions on an agenda. It aims to 
reconcile the Technocratic-democratic Divide which highlights the tension between 
the two desiderata for collective environmental decision-making, i.e., epistemic 
performance and procedural fairness. I have shown, on the basis of the theory of 
judgment aggregation, that SED is possible in the forms of either the distributed 
premise-based procedure or the distributed sequential priority procedure. I have, in 
addition, compared the epistemic performances of both models of SED with that of 
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 Note, however, that this issue does not apply to decision agendas with propositions which are not 
logically connected. This is because, for these agendas, the judgments on the sequentially prior 
propositions no longer constrain the judgments on the sequentially later propositions. In this way, the 
distributed sequential priority procedure treats all individuals equally in terms of decision power, as 
the distributed premise-based procedure does. 
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the standard premise-based procedure, and suggested how we may choose between 
these procedures in order to reconcile the Technocratic-democratic Divide under 
different circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: A simple decision tree for reconciling the Technocratic-democratic Divide
122 
 
 
In fact, SED is more than a theoretical construct for reconciling the Technocratic-
democratic Divide, and it can be extended to a useful practical application. It 
supplements, for example, an innovative method for public engagement developed 
by a group of researchers in the U.K., namely Deliberative Mapping. It aims to 
involve both specialists and citizens from a wide range of social groups in making 
assessments, through deliberation, on complex technological and environmental 
policy issues.  
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 This applies only to non-simple decision agendas. It is assumed that individuals are sufficiently 
competent and that they make their judgments independently and truthfully. 
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Broadly speaking, Deliberative Mapping works as follows. For a given policy 
issue, a number of citizens are recruited and grouped into panels differentiated by 
gender and socio-economic class. At the same time, some specialists are also 
recruited across different perspectives, disciplines and institutional affiliations. Both 
citizens and specialists are offered a common set of options regarding the policy 
issue which they are asked to appraise. The panels of citizens meet on several 
occasions to discuss and evaluate the given options, whereas the specialists appraise 
the options in interviews. Then, the citizens and specialists gather at a joint workshop 
to interact and exchange information and opinions through facilitated deliberation. 
After that, both groups of people meet separately to finalise their respective 
appraisals of the options. An experiment was carried out between 2001 and 2003 on 
an issue concerning kidney transplantation, and there was a significant level of 
agreement between citizens and specialists on the appraisal criteria (Davies et al., 
2003). 
While Deliberative Mapping is expected to enhance cooperative policy 
dialogues between citizens and specialists, there is great potential for developing this 
into a decision-making mechanism for environmental issues which engages both 
groups of people. However, in order for Deliberative Mapping to deliver collective 
decisions, it has to be sensitive to the possibility of non-decision after deliberation, 
since deliberation alone does not guarantee universal consensus (see Chapter 5). If 
decisions are necessary, then there must be a separate arrangement which resolves 
any post-deliberation disagreement, such as an aggregation procedure.  
SED enriches Deliberative Mapping in the sense that it turns the latter into a 
DTA institution such that substantive collective decisions are possible. In addition, it 
gives weight to both procedural and epistemic concerns of decision-making. In case 
of unresolvable disagreement after deliberation, experts and ordinary people 
specialise in judging on propositions according to their areas and levels of 
competence (if any). The resulting decision-making process will then reflect an 
appropriate balance between epistemic performance and procedural fairness. 
At the same time, SED, as a DTA institution, does not exclude the possibility 
of deliberation before aggregation. With the original Deliberative Mapping in place, 
experts and ordinary people can learn from each other and hence boost the chance of 
correct decisions. This responds to a classical challenge to technocracy that experts 
alone cannot grasp all the necessary knowledge for correct judgments. Since such 
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knowledge is fragmentary and dispersed, it is possible that wisdom will be found in 
the perspective of ordinary people even for some highly technical and scientific 
issues. We may, then, expect some epistemic benefits once experts and ordinary 
people are given an opportunity to communicate with each other, such as that in 
Deliberative Mapping. Therefore, SED supplements and complements the original 
Deliberative Mapping, offering more than simply a theoretical model for reconciling 
the Technocratic-democratic Divide in environmental decision-making.      
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CHAPTER 7 
     
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND THE 
EPISTEMIC PERFORMANCE OF 
(ENVIRONMENTAL-) DELIBERATIVE- 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
In the last two chapters, I demonstrated, by drawing on the concepts of meta-
agreement and distributed cognition, how we can avoid the paradox of judgment 
aggregation by modifying the input and responsiveness conditions of the aggregation 
component for a deliberation-then-aggregation (DTA) institution. Such a paradox, as 
illustrated by the discursive dilemma and the associated impossibility theorems, 
points out that no aggregation procedure can simultaneously satisfy all three 
desiderata for democracy, i.e., robustness to pluralism, majoritarianism and 
collective rationality. Chapter 5 examines how robustness to pluralism may be 
relaxed in order to avoid the paradox across different decision agendas, whereas 
Chapter 6 focuses more specifically on environmental decision-making and shows 
how majoritarianism may be relaxed in order to reconcile the Technocratic-
democratic Divide in agendas with multiple interconnected propositions. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the paradox of judgement aggregation can also be 
avoided by relaxing collective rationality. To reiterate, collective rationality demands 
that the aggregation procedure produces consistent and complete collective 
judgments as decisions. We may relax the requirement of completeness by adopting 
a conclusion-based procedure such as supermajority rule or unanimity rule, so that 
collective judgments need not be made on all propositions on the agenda. An 
example of unanimity rule is a deliberation-only decision mechanism which requires 
a universal consensus on a proposition in order to obtain a collective decision on the 
same proposition. However, a deliberative-democratic institution adopting such 
procedures is, as pointed out in Chapter 5, prone to producing no decisions, and it is 
also questionable how many individuals can be engaged face to face in a large-scale 
mass public. 
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In response to both shortfalls, we may rearrange the deliberative process in 
such a way as to maximise the number of individuals who can participate in 
deliberation and to settle any disagreements after deliberation and before a final 
decision. To achieve the latter, we may, as argued in Chapter 5, incorporate a post-
deliberation aggregation procedure as in a DTA institution. To achieve the former, 
we may restrict the inputs of individuals, such as the length and time of their 
speeches. Alternatively, we may adopt Goodin’s (2003) ‘internal-reflective 
deliberation’ proposal. This asks individuals to deliberate by carrying out reflection 
in their own minds instead of face-to-face debates/discussions with others. How 
plausible is such a proposal? What would happen if a DTA institution was so 
arranged? 
The theory of cognitive dissonance in psychology offers insights into 
addressing both these questions. Cognitive dissonance refers to a situation in which 
an individual experiences a negative state of emotion. It was first theorised by Leon 
Festinger in 1957, and the theory has since been influential in social psychology, 
particularly in the area of judgment and decision-making (Plous, 1993). Its 
applications have also spanned different disciplines in explaining consumer, health, 
economic and political behaviours (Cooper, 2007). The cognitive dissonance theory 
explains and predicts individual behaviour in terms of dissonant or inconsistent 
cognitions.
123
 
In this chapter, I shall demonstrate how the cognitive dissonance theory reveals 
an epistemic pitfall for a DTA institution employing Goodin’s ‘internal-reflective’ 
deliberation followed immediately by aggregation, which can be labelled as a 
‘reflect-and-vote arrangement’ (RAVA). In particular, I shall examine the effect of 
cognitive dissonance on decision-making on what I shall call ‘behavioural-
adjustment agendas’, where individuals make decisions regarding the adjustment of 
their own existing behaviour. Drawing on the cognitive dissonance theory and the 
Condorcet jury theorem, I shall show that individual decisions on behavioural-
adjustment agendas can be distorted by inconsistent cognitions, which undermines 
                                                 
123
 While some kinds of behaviour mainly relate to one’s own concerns, such as choosing to sleep 
rather than study, others carry implications at the collective level. For example, how consumers 
choose between two goods determines the corresponding demand for both goods in the market. 
Likewise, how members of a committee decide on an issue determines the corresponding verdict of 
the committee. In both cases, the cognitive dissonance theory informs us about how dissonant 
cognitions may affect individual inputs into the market exchange as well as the decision-making 
process. 
 211 
 
the epistemic quality of collective decisions from a RAVA. I also suggest several 
solutions to the epistemic pitfall of a RAVA, which may serve as a foundation for 
constructing DTA institutions with capacity for collective (environmental) decision-
making on behavioural-adjustment agendas. 
My discussion has the following structure. In Section 7.1, I shall begin by 
introducing Goodin’s model of reflective democracy and explaining how this 
attempts to address two practicability constraints of institutionalising (environmental) 
deliberative democracy. In Section 7.2, I shall briefly recapitulate the Condorcet jury 
theorem which assesses the epistemic quality of (environmental) deliberative 
democracy. In Section 7.3, I shall demonstrate how the cognitive dissonance theory 
predicts individual decisions on behavioural-adjustment agendas and why this 
hampers the epistemic quality of democratic inputs. In Section 7.4, I shall suggest 
several proposals which mitigate the tensions between three desiderata for a RAVA. 
In Section 7.5, I shall make some concluding remarks. 
 
 
7.1 Reflective democracy and the practicability desideratum  
 
Consider the following hypothetical example (which is similar to the congestion 
charge example in Chapter 6): 
The road tax example: In a town hall meeting, 100 residents gather to 
decide whether or not the local government should levy a road tax on 
private vehicles which enter into the high street during rush hours. They 
attempt, by the end of the meeting, to reach a substantive decision on the 
above agenda through deliberation. The duration of the meeting is three 
hours. 
 
Suppose it takes ten minutes for the chairperson to open the meeting and wrap up the 
discussion. Assuming that all the remaining time is allocated to continuous 
deliberation among the 100 residents, each resident has on average 1.7 minutes to 
speak. Since they would like to reach a decision at the end, each is expected to, at 
least, express in his/her speech a judgment on the agenda as to whether a road tax 
should be levied. 
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There are two practical concerns, however. First, does each resident have 
sufficient time to express everything he/she wants to? If a person speaks at a speed of 
100 words per minute, then in 1.7 minutes he/she can probably deliver a speech of 
fewer than 200 words. With such a limited time-frame, it is questionable whether the 
person can clearly articulate his/her own opinion or effectively respond to the 
opinions of others. Second, can the residents reach a substantive decision on the 
agenda through deliberation alone? This depends on whether they can achieve a 
universal consensus, or whether all 100 individuals hold the same opinion on the 
agenda. As long as there is one single individual who disagrees with the other 
individuals, and his/her opinion remains unchanged after deliberation, then there will 
be no universal consensus and hence no collective decision. 
The first concern, or what I call the ‘time-and-size challenge’, speaks of the 
likely trade-offs between the number of decision-makers and the amount of time 
allocated to each individual for deliberation. Given that the time available is finite, as 
the number of individuals increases, the time each individual receives decreases. In 
other words, within a particular time-frame, the more time each individual is 
allocated, the fewer individuals can participate in decision-making. This brings about 
a challenge for democracy when the size of the group is considerable, and it is 
practically difficult, if not impossible, to engage every individual in the process of 
deliberation.  
The second concern, as highlighted in Chapter 5, is the ‘non-decision 
challenge’. This means that using deliberation as the only mechanism for decision-
making demands unanimous agreement on the agenda in order to arrive at a 
collective decision. This concern is related to the first one. When the size of the 
group is large, it is likely that disagreements will emerge. When the time for 
deliberation is limited, it becomes hard to change individual opinions so as to bring 
about agreements. If individual opinions are deeply divided, or if the agenda is more 
complex, it is not likely that universal consensus will be reached by the end of 
deliberation. This hampers the decision-making function of deliberative democracy.    
Both the time-and-size and the non-decision challenges can be considered as 
practicability constraints on institutionalising (environmental) deliberative 
democracy. They impose restrictions on the operational design of (environmental-) 
deliberative-democratic institutions. A practicable design should, therefore, take into 
account, and identify ways to tackle, these challenges. 
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Goodin’s proposal: Reflective democracy 
Goodin (2008) suggests that the time-and-size and the non-decision challenges can 
be tackled by making deliberation ‘internal-reflective’. He asserts that: 
“In any moderately large community, of course, deliberation must almost 
inevitably be supplemented by voting as the ultimate decision procedure. 
It is simply unrealistic to expect any moderately large group to come to 
complete consensus, however long they talk together.” (p. 108) 
 
What Goodin contends is that, as discussed in Chapter 5, deliberative democracy 
should be arranged as ‘first talk, then vote’, or a ‘deliberation-then-voting’ (DTA) 
institution as I have suggested. He claims that voting is necessary for conferring 
democratic legitimacy and for settling disagreements which are irresolvable through 
alternative means. According to Goodin, since it is unrealistic to expect universal 
consensus from deliberation in a sizeable group, there must be a separate mechanism 
for making decisions – a post-deliberation aggregation procedure is an example of 
such mechanism. This responds to the non-decision challenge.
124
 
At the same time, Goodin (2003) is aware of how the context may affect the 
implementation of deliberative democracy. He argues that, while face-to-face 
interaction is an ideal form of deliberation, it is technically infeasible in any large-
scale society. Imagine, in the road tax example above, that the number of residents 
grows to 1,000. If each resident was still allocated 1.7 minutes to speak, this would 
require more than 28 hours (i.e., more than one day) in order to let all the residents 
speak. In most contemporary democracies, the number of citizens (who may be 
involved in collective decision-making) is undoubtedly far greater than 1,000. This 
relates to the time-and-size challenge. 
To tackle the time-and-size challenge, Goodin (2003) recommends a model of 
reflective democracy which focuses on the ‘internal-reflective’ aspect of 
deliberation.
125
 Contrary to its ‘external-collective’ counterpart, this model of 
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 Goodin also argues that aggregation after deliberation avoids the undesirable effect of path 
dependence. See Goodin (2008, pp. 108-126) and my discussion in Chapter 5. 
125
 Goodin identifies some other possible strategies to tackle the time-and-size challenge, but claims 
that these are unsuccessful. This is because these strategies constrain either the number of people 
participating in deliberation or the diversity of admissible inputs, which makes the process 
insufficiently deliberative or even undemocratic. Disjointed deliberation, for instance, breaks a large 
community down into smaller groups, which allows genuine deliberation to take place with a 
manageable group size. In the real world, however, it is hardly democratic because numerous 
individuals are still excluded from participating in any of these groups (Goodin, 2003, pp. 172-174). 
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deliberation is an internal mental process which takes place inside the minds of 
individuals, and in order to deliberate people do not need to be ‘communicatively 
present’ (pp. 171, 179). Individuals are asked instead to understand and internalise 
each other’s perspectives by imagining themselves in the situations of others with, 
for example, literary, visual or performing arts. Individuals are expected, having 
considered all these perspectives, to carry out internal dialogues. This is followed by 
some ‘external-collective’ measures, i.e., spoken exchange of opinions and voting to 
settle disagreements. Goodin thinks that it is not difficult to realise reflective 
democracy, since such ‘empathetic imaginings’ are often used in ordinary 
conversations (p. 171). 
Through this kind of ‘empathetic imagining’, deliberation becomes possible in 
large-scale mass societies without compromising, as other ‘external-collective’ 
deliberative arrangements must, on the number of individuals who can participate in 
deliberation or the diversity of individual inputs (pp. 172-178). Goodin asserts that, 
by emphasising the ‘internal-reflective’ aspect of deliberative democracy, we can 
guarantee not only “the free and equal expression of opinions in the public sphere”, 
but also opportunities for individuals to “hear or read, internalize and respond” (p. 
178). This is particularly important for representing the interests of the 
‘communicatively inept’ or the ‘communicatively inert’ who, in such a reflective 
process of democracy, “need not be physically present in order for them to be 
imaginatively present” (p. 183).   
Goodin’s reflective democracy is highly relevant to collective environmental 
decision-making owing to its emphasis on representing the mute interests of future 
generations and non-humans. The underlying rationale for this representation – “the 
interests of non-humans as well as of future humans are as deserving of protection as 
are the interests of anyone or anything else” – is in line with mainstream 
environmental thinking (p. 214). In order to realise such protection, individuals must 
be induced “to internalize the interests of nature and the future” (p. 220), and this can 
take place through participatory democracy. For this internalisation to be possible, 
however, it is necessary for individuals, in the first place, to inform themselves “as to 
the content of mute interests such as those of nature or the future” (p. 225). This can 
be achieved, as Goodin argues, through ‘internal-reflective’ deliberation. 
Having said that, Goodin stresses that ‘internal-reflective’ deliberation is only a 
necessary, and not a sufficient, component of democratic institutions, and should be 
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followed by ‘external-collective’ mechanisms. This is because the results of 
‘internal-reflective’ deliberation have to be publicly validated at some point in order 
to become democratically legitimate collective decisions. While talking is one of 
these ‘external-collective’ mechanisms, Goodin states explicitly that any 
deliberative-democratic process should end with voting: 
“Deliberation is supposed to have an end, it is supposed to resolve 
something. Occasionally deliberation yields a decision directly, as when 
a genuine consensus has emerged. But deliberative assemblies even of 
the most ideal sort more typically have to force a decision, announcing an 
end to the deliberations and calling for a vote. That final show of hands is 
what is crucial in conferring democratic legitimacy on the decision.” (p. 
108; his emphasis) 
 
According to Goodin, therefore, both the time-and-size and the non-decision 
challenges of (environmental) deliberative democracy in large-scale mass societies 
can be tackled by combining ‘internal-reflective’ deliberation, ‘external-collective’ 
deliberation and aggregation in order to settle disagreements and ensure legitimate 
collective decisions. It is worth noting that, although Goodin acknowledges the value 
of talking after internal reflection, he does not exclude the possibility of internal 
reflections being followed directly by aggregation: 
“[I]n large-scale mass societies the requirements of deliberative 
democracy may be met by expansive internal-reflective deliberations 
culminating in a distinctively non-deliberative visit to the poll booth. And 
the more democratically deliberative our internal reflections manage to 
be, the less it will matter that external-collective decision procedures can 
never be as directly deliberatively democratic as we might like in large-
scale mass societies.” (p. 193) 
 
In other words, it is possible, in large-scale mass societies, for deliberation to take the 
form of internal reflection instead of talking, followed by aggregation. This is 
sensible since, under some circumstances, the time-and-size challenge may be so 
immense that it is infeasible to expect genuine verbal exchange of opinions after 
internal reflection. What seems hard to avoid is another ‘external-collective’ 
procedure following internal reflection, i.e., aggregation. This makes sense also if we 
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consider the non-decision challenge. On the basis of Goodin’s proposal, we can 
formulate a practicability desideratum for a good DTA institution in response to both 
challenges: 
(P) Practicability: The DTA institution consists of ‘internal-reflective’ 
deliberation by individuals followed by aggregation, which I label as a 
‘reflect-then-vote arrangement’ (RAVA). 
 
In the following sections, I shall examine whether we can construct a DTA 
institution with a RAVA which satisfies such a practicability desideratum and, at the 
same time, is applicable to different types of decision agenda and maximises the 
epistemic performance of (environmental) decision-making. 
 
 
7.2 The epistemic performance of DTA institutions 
 
Let me set out a standard for evaluating the epistemic performance of a decision-
making procedure with both deliberation and aggregation. Note that our discussion is 
slightly different from that in Chapter 6, which focused exclusively on non-simple 
agendas with multiple interconnected propositions. In this chapter, we expect a DTA 
institution to be applicable to different types of agenda, including those comprising 
choices between two or more alternatives as well as judgments on a single or 
multiple proposition(s), on any kind of decision issue. This is arguably a desideratum 
for a good DTA institution for collective (environmental) decision-making: 
(UA) Universal agendas: The DTA institution is applicable to different 
types of agenda on any kind of decision issue for collective 
(environmental) decision-making. 
 
The deliberation component of a DTA institution is desirable from the viewpoint of 
both procedure and outcome.
126
 From the latter perspective, deliberation is justified 
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 On the other hand, there are arguments which focus on the procedural benefit of deliberation. For 
example, democratic deliberation is inclusive of all individuals affected (see, for example, Cohen, 
1989; Elster, 1998; Young, 1996, 2000), egalitarian towards all individuals in terms of participation 
and influence (see, for example, Bohman, 1996; Christiano, 1996a, 2008; Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996) as well as reasoned and other-regarding (see, for example, Estlund, 1993; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996; Mansbridge, 1996). 
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because it produces good or correct decisions (see, for example, Cohen, 1986; 
Estlund, 1993; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Gaus, 1997). At the same time, in 
green political theory, deliberation is considered appealing for environmental 
decision-making on similar epistemic grounds.
127
 The open nature of deliberation 
produces collective decisions which tend to reflect environmental values or the 
common good (see, for example, Dryzek, 1990; Dobson, 1996a; Barry, 1999; Smith, 
2003). This is because deliberation, as some green theorists argue, enables public 
participation to take place, which eliminates any decisional errors and defects of 
fallible humans and hence makes collective decisions more likely to be correct 
(Dobson, 2007). 
Can a DTA institution be justified in such an epistemic sense? To answer this, 
we shall focus on the decision mechanism, or the aggregation component of DTA, 
since this determines the final collective decision. To reiterate what was introduced 
in Chapters 4 and 6, the ‘truth’ refers to a fact regarding the best decision outcome 
(e.g., in terms of goodness or correctness), where this piece of fact is independent of 
the decision mechanism (Cohen, 1986; List, 2002a). ‘Tracking the truth’ means that 
a certain decision output is chosen by a decision mechanism if, and only if, it is good 
or correct (Nozick, 1981).
128
 
Consider a scenario where, in city A, there are an odd number of citizens, n, 
who are deciding whether a road tax should be imposed in order to reduce air 
pollution in A (Scenario 7.1). There are two possible states of the world and one of 
these serves as the truth: either (1) a road tax should be imposed in order to reduce 
air pollution in A; or (2) a road tax should not be imposed in order to reduce air 
pollution in A. A decision mechanism tracks the truth about the states of the world if 
it chooses (1) if, and only if, (1) is true; and it chooses (2) if, and only if, (2) is true 
(see also Chapters 4 and 6). 
In other words, if a DTA institution satisfies both conditions, then it excels in 
generating collective decisions that track the truth, and is thus said to be favoured by 
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 Deliberation is also justified in environmental decision-making on procedural grounds. For 
instance, it is inclusive of different opinions and interests and, through rational and other-regarding 
deliberation, it provides an equal opportunity for the interests of future generations, non-humans and 
nature to be internalised and represented in the decision-making process (see, for example, Dryzek, 
2000; Eckersley, 2000; Goodin, 2003). 
128
 I set aside the ontological debate as to whether there is a truth as such to be tracked since this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. I assume that this truth exists for all kinds of beliefs or propositions 
(i.e., realism; see Wright, 1992) and that a belief or proposition is true if, and only if, it corresponds to 
the relevant fact (i.e., the correspondence theory of truth; see Putnam, 1978). 
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the epistemic account of justification. In order to determine whether a DTA 
institution is desirable in the epistemic sense, we ask whether it is, relatively, 
favoured over other alternatives by such an account of justification. For example, if it 
is shown that, under certain assumptions, a DTA institution (with simple majority 
rule) is more likely than its alternatives (e.g., a deliberation-only institution) to 
produce correct decisions, then, under these assumptions, such a DTA institution is 
regarded as a more desirable decision mechanism. 
 
The Condorcet jury theorem (revisited) 
Let us focus on the aggregation component of DTA, and take simple majority rule as 
the decision mechanism used. Consider the following assumptions: 
Competence: All individuals have the same probability p of being 
correct and each is more likely to be correct than incorrect in his/her own 
decision, i.e., 0.5 < p < 1.
129
 
Independence and truthfulness: All individuals make their decisions 
independently and express their decisions truthfully, given the state of the 
world. 
 
If the three assumptions hold, then the probability that all individuals will make a 
correct collective decision using simple majority rule, Pn, is given by the following 
formula: 
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Since the value of p is greater than 0.5 and smaller than 1 (i.e., the competence 
assumption), the value of Pn approaches 1 (or certainty) as n increases. This is the 
Condorcet jury theorem, which we discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 (Condorcet, 1785; 
Grofman, Owen and Feld, 1983). 
                                                 
129
 It is worth noting that this assumption can be relaxed to require, instead, only that each individual 
shares an average probability, p , of being correct, where 0.5 < p  < 1 and 
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We can apply the Condorcet jury theorem to assessing the epistemic 
performance of DTA institutions (see also Goodin, 2003; Estlund, 2008). From the 
epistemic perspective, a DTA institution is desirable if it tracks the truth at least 
better than its rivals. A decision mechanism is democratic if, at least, it is not 
dictatorship but as inclusive as possible (see also Chapter 3). Simple majority rule 
and unanimity are both acceptable mechanisms in this respect, and a standard for 
measuring inclusiveness is the number of individuals. 
Suppose there are three citizens in Scenario 7.1, and each is more likely to be 
correct than incorrect in his/her decision, say, with a competence of 0.65. According 
to the above formula, Pn is approximately 0.718 when n is 3 and p is 0.65. Compared 
with dictatorship by one citizen, in which the probability of correct collective 
decision is p (i.e., 0.65), simple majority rule appears to work better in tracking the 
truth. Similarly, unanimity rule where the probability of correct collective decision is 
p
n
 (i.e., 0.65
3
 or approximately 0.275), is outperformed in such an epistemic sense by 
simple majority rule. 
However, it is worth noting that, as the number of individuals increases, simple 
majority rule outperforms dictatorship in identifying correct decisions only when p is 
larger than 0.5 (and smaller than 1), i.e., when the competence assumption of the 
Condorcet jury theorem holds. Otherwise, either dictatorship outperforms simple 
majority rule (when p is smaller than 0.5 and larger than 0) or they perform equally 
well (when p is 0.5). In other words, the relative epistemic performance of simple 
majority rule compared with dictatorship is contingent on the competence 
assumption. 
Apart from simple majority rule, deliberation itself can also serve as a decision 
mechanism, provided that universal consensus emerges in the end. Here, collective 
decisions follow from consensus, but if such consensus is not available, there will be 
no decision. This is equivalent to unanimity rule (see Chapter 4). Unanimity rule 
always underperforms simple majority rule and dictatorship, in terms of identifying 
correct decisions, as the number of individuals increases, regardless of the value of p 
as long as it is between 0 and 1. This means that relying solely on deliberation for 
decisions is, broadly speaking, not desirable as a means of identifying correct 
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collective decisions.
130
 This echoes the non-decision challenge as pinpointed in 
Section 7.1. 
Alternatively, aggregation with simple majority rule may be introduced after 
deliberation, thus forming a DTA institution (Cohen, 1989; Dryzek and List, 2003; 
Goodin, 2003, 2009; see also Chapter 5). In this way democratic decisions no longer 
depend on the availability of universal consensus, which may not in the end be 
achievable (Cohen, 1989; van Mill, 1996). Instead, collective decisions are always 
obtainable by aggregating post-deliberative, even if diverse, individual decisions. 
This avoids the non-decision challenge (van Mill, 1996; Ferejohn, 2000). More 
importantly, the epistemic performance of a decision mechanism is boosted by 
replacing unanimity rule with simple majority rule.
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At least two lessons can be drawn from the above: (1) according to the 
Condorcet jury theorem, the epistemic performance of a DTA institution with simple 
majority rule is superior to that of a deliberation-only institution; and (2) a DTA 
institution with simple majority rule is a desirable truth-tracker only if individuals are 
more likely to make correct than incorrect decisions, i.e., when the competence 
assumption holds. 
We may now formulate, in addition to desiderata (P) and (UA), another crucial 
desideratum for a good DTA institution for collective (environmental) decision-
making: 
Epistemic performance (EP): The DTA institution is a desirable truth-
tracker. 
 
In the rest of this chapter, I shall show that, owing to the effect of cognitive 
dissonance, there are tensions between the three desiderata, i.e., practicability (P), 
universal agendas (UA) and epistemic performance (EP). In other words, cognitive 
dissonance raises challenges for any attempt to construct a DTA institution based on 
all these three conditions. 
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 On the other hand, unanimity rule is good at avoiding incorrect decisions. This is because an 
incorrect decision is available if, and only if, all individuals unanimously choose the incorrect 
alternative, i.e. (1-p)
n
. Hence the probability that there is no incorrect collective decision is [1-(1-p)
n
] 
whose value increases as n increases, regardless of the value of p, as long as p is between 0 and 1. See 
List (2005) for further discussion. 
131
 This, of course, assumes that all the assumptions of the Condorcet jury theorem hold. It is 
important to note that the independence assumption does not cease to hold as a result of deliberation, 
as long as individuals do not decide, after deliberation, in such a way that they comply blindly with 
the decisions of other individuals. See Estlund (1994) for further discussion. 
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7.3 Cognitive dissonance, behavioural adjustment agendas and the epistemic 
quality of aggregative inputs  
 
The concept of cognitive dissonance was introduced in 1957 by Festinger, a social 
psychologist. It refers to an unpleasant state, or more precisely a negative emotion, 
which people experience upon recognising inconsistency between their cognitions. 
These cognitions can be in the forms of attitudes (beliefs) or actual behaviour. If an 
individual, Andy, holds a set of cognitions  and  such that  and  are mutually 
inconsistent, then  and  are dissonant cognitions, and hence Andy will experience 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Say, for example, that Andy holds the 
following set of attitudes (Scenario 7.2): 
Cognition : “I should protect the environment.” 
Cognition : “If I should protect the environment, then I should take the 
underground rather than drive to work.” 
 
Meanwhile, Andy is also aware of his actual behaviour: 
Cognition  : “I drive rather than take the underground to work.” 
 
As we can see, cognitions  and  are (practically) inconsistent with cognition .132 
In other words, the two attitudes on what Andy should do, i.e., protect the 
environment and hence take the underground to work, conflict with Andy’s 
behaviour, what he actually does, i.e., he drives instead of taking the train to work. In 
psychology, this state of the world is described as Andy experiencing cognitive 
dissonance. 
The theory of cognitive dissonance is premised on the view that individuals 
cannot tolerate the unpleasant feeling of inconsistent cognitions and are driven to 
reduce such a feeling (Festinger, 1957; Cooper, 2007). It explains and predicts 
individual behaviour on the basis of how individuals restore consistency to their 
conflicting cognitions. For example, if, in Scenario 7.2, it turns out that Andy keeps 
driving to work, the theory offers an explanation of why Andy does this in order to 
resolve the inconsistency between cognitions. The theory also serves to predict what 
                                                 
132
 Note that the inconsistency here is not a logical but a practical one. 
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another person would do if he/she possessed the same set of inconsistent cognitions 
as Andy. 
How can such an unpleasant feeling be reduced? According to the cognitive 
dissonance theory, the greater the inconsistency between an individual’s cognitions, 
the greater the discomfort the individual feels, and hence, the more motivated he/she 
is to reduce the feeling. The level of inconsistency is measured by dissonance 
magnitude, which is proportional to the number of inconsistent cognitions but 
inversely proportional to the number of consistent cognitions, each weighted by its 
importance (Cooper, 2007).
133
  
This implies that there are at least two approaches to reducing the level of 
inconsistent cognitions. First, one may seek new cognitions or bolster consistent 
cognitions and/or boost their importance (Sherman and Gorkin, 1980). Second, one 
may also alter inconsistent cognitions and/or shrink their importance (Simon et al., 
1995; Cooper, 2007). Both approaches can be applied through changing one’s 
attitudes and/or behaviour: 
Changing attitudes: This can be done by adding new attitudes and/or 
removing or modifying existing attitudes. For example, Andy may (a) 
dismiss  so that he believes that “It is not necessary for me to protect 
the environment” (); or (b) conditionalise  so that it becomes “If I 
should protect the environment, then I should take the underground rather 
than drive to work, as long as this does not cause a lot of inconvenience” 
(), and supplement  with “taking the underground to work is very 
inconvenient” (). Thus, for (a), with ,  is consistent with ; and for 
(b), , ,  and  are also mutually consistent. 
Changing behaviour: This can be achieved more directly by adjusting 
one’s behaviour. For instance, Andy may give up driving and take the 
underground to work. In this way,  will be modified as “I take the 
underground rather than drive to work” () which is consistent with  
and . 
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 This is represented by the following formula: 
 
 

) importancecognitions consonant   all (
) importance  cognitions  discrepant  all (
magnitude  Dissonance  
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To reduce the unpleasant feeling of dissonant cognitions, it is sufficient for an 
individual to change either his/her attitudes or his/her behaviour. However, it has 
been shown in a number of psychological studies that people in the real world tend to 
take the route of changing their attitudes in order to make these consistent with their 
existing behaviour (Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Petty and Wegener, 1998; Smith and 
Mackie, 2000). This is usually explained by the view that people will change 
cognitions with the least resistance to change (Festinger, 1957), since changing a 
cognition of one’s behaviour is more difficult than changing a cognition of one’s 
attitude (Cooper, 2007). 
On the basis of the above empirical observation, the cognitive dissonance 
theory is able to predict what an individual will do with dissonant cognitions. 
According to the cognitive dissonance theory, Andy will, for example, change his 
attitudes about environmental protection and/or commuting instead of changing his 
behaviour from driving to taking the train. 
 
Cognitive dissonance and behavioural adjustment agendas 
In real life, we often make decisions between changing something and retaining the 
status quo. From shifting from one supermarket to another in order to buy cheaper 
groceries to resigning from a career in order to begin a doctorate, this type of 
decision-making expects the individual concerned to choose between continuing with 
his/her existing behaviour and replacing it with a new behaviour. At the same time, 
at the collective level, group members and citizens may also make binding decisions 
which require them to alter certain of their own behaviours. For example, a group of 
tenants in a shared flat decide whether they should restrict everyone’s use of heating, 
or a group of drivers decide whether or not to impose a charge for driving at certain 
times in their city. These are decision-making instances with behavioural adjustment 
agendas, which are very common in collective environmental decision-making. 
How does cognitive dissonance affect collective decision-making on these 
behavioural-adjustment agendas? Consider one of these agendas on whether or not to 
prohibit citizens from driving private cars into the city centre during rush hours 
(Scenario 7.3). Suppose all citizens are to make a collective decision on this agenda, 
and all citizens have been driving their own cars into the city centre during rush 
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hours. Let us identify some relevant sets of cognitions which each individual holds 
when he/she is making his/her decision: 
Existing behaviour (B1): This represents what the individual has been 
doing, for example, “I drive into the city centre during rush hours”. 
Existing attitude (A1): This explains or justifies what the individual has 
been doing, for instance, “I drive into the city centre during rush hours 
because the underground, the only alternative, are very crowded”.    
Potential attitude (A2): This explains or justifies why the individual 
should change his/her behaviour, for example, “I should not drive into 
the city centre during rush hours because this pollutes the environment 
and causes congestion”. 
Potential behaviour (B2): This represents how the individual may 
possibly behave if his/her behaviour is changed according to A2, for 
instance, “I do not drive into the city centre during rush hours”. 
 
Suppose the agenda consists of a single proposition that: “it is prohibited to drive 
private cars into the city centre during rush hours” (δ). There are three possible 
outcomes from this decision-making: (1) δ is collectively accepted; (2) δ is 
collectively rejected; or (3) there is no decision. For the first possible outcome, 
citizens would be required to change their existing behaviour and hence would no 
longer be able to drive into the city centre during rush hours. The second and third 
outcomes speak of the status quo, in which citizens would be able to ‘drive as usual’. 
From an outcome-based perspective, each citizen, in effect, chooses between being 
prohibited from ‘driving as usual’ (B2) and being permitted to ‘drive as usual’ (B1). 
B1 applies to all citizens in the current state of the world (or ‘original state’, S1). On 
the other hand, B2 does not apply to any citizen in S1, but does so only possibly after 
the decision-making (or in ‘potential state’, S2).  
In deciding on δ, it is possible that a citizen, e.g., Andy, will be faced with four 
conflicting cognitions. First, since, in S1, he drives into the city during rush hours, B1 
is true. This behaviour, B1, may have been a well-reasoned or justifiable choice all 
along, and if so, A1 can be true. When he considers B2 as in δ, an explanation or 
justification may come to his mind, i.e., A2. If he finds B2 and A2 are false, we can 
predict that he will reject δ in his/her decision. In this case, there is no dissonant 
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cognition, since, by denying B2 and A2, the only remaining true cognitions are B1 and 
A1, which are obviously consistent. However, if he finds that B2 and/or A2 is/are true, 
his set of cognitions will be inconsistent, because on accepting B2 and/or A2 as true 
for S2, this conflicts with what exists as true in S1, i.e., B1 and A1. This is an instance 
of cognitive dissonance. 
According to the cognitive dissonance theory, individuals will reduce the 
unpleasant feeling of inconsistent cognitions by changing their attitudes rather than 
their behaviour, since the former sets of cognitions are less reluctant to change. In the 
case of a citizen accepting (B1 and A1) and (B2 and/or A2) as true, we can predict, 
based on the cognitive dissonance theory, that he/she is more likely to adjust A1 or A2 
in order to restore consistency between cognitions. 
Is A1 or A2 less reluctant to change? Since Andy has been behaving as B1, A1 is 
necessary for supporting B1 which already exists in S1. On the other hand, he has not 
been behaving as B2, and A2 is not necessary for supporting any behaviour in S1. 
Before Andy makes a decision on δ, he is situated in S1 instead of S2, and hence we 
infer that it is easier for him to change A2 rather than A1. There are many examples 
concerning how Andy may modify A2 as A2, such that A2 will be consistent with 
other cognitions, such as the following: 
Conditionalising A2: “I should not drive into the city centre during rush 
hours as long as the underground, the only alternative, are not very 
crowded.” 
Denying the significance of A2: (1) “I can drive into the city centre 
during rush hours because it is not true that doing so pollutes the 
environment and causes congestion.”; or (2) “I can drive into the city 
centre during rush hours because, even if doing so pollutes the 
environment and causes congestion, it will not be that serious.” 
Denying responsibility for A2: “I can drive into the city centre during 
rush hours because, even if doing so severely pollutes the environment 
and causes severe congestion, it is not my responsibility at all.” 
 
The list of examples above is not exhaustive. On accepting either of these versions of 
A2, Andy may reject B2 as false, so that the remaining sets of cognitions, A1, B1 and 
A2, are mutually consistent. In this way, we can predict that, in S1, Andy will find 
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that B1 is still true and then reject δ.
134
 Figure 7.1 summarises the attitude change as 
predicted by the cognitive dissonance theory as in Scenario 7.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive dissonance and the epistemic quality of democratic inputs 
How does the attitude change as such undermine the epistemic quality of democratic 
inputs? According to the Condorcet jury theorem, one justification for democracy (in 
the form of aggregation using simple majority rule) is that it produces good or 
correct decisions. This depends essentially on the quality of inputs into democracy, 
and the Condorcet jury theorem is valid only if its competence assumption holds. It is 
perfectly possible for each individual, when deciding on the behavioural-adjustment 
agendas, to be sufficiently competent that, as in the competence assumption of the 
Condorcet jury theorem, he/she is more likely to make a correct than an incorrect 
decision. 
However, the attitude change as predicted by the cognitive dissonance theory 
challenges the competence assumption in the sense that it does not hold generally for 
decision-making scenarios with behavioural-adjustment agendas. This is because, for 
these agendas, the decision that each individual makes may not reflect his/her 
competence, but may be a result of reducing inconsistency between his/her 
cognitions. For example, in Scenario 7.3, Andy may well be able to identify that it is 
correct to both accept B2 as true and decide to accept δ. Nevertheless, if it turns out 
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 Another possibility is that Andy abstains from deciding in this situation. 
Original State (S1) Potential State (S2) 
Existing attitude (A1) 
Existing behaviour (B1) 
Potential attitude (A2) 
Potential behaviour (B2) 
endorses endorses 
INCONSISTENT 
Cognitive 
dissonance 
Modified attitude (A2) 
generates 
consistent 
with 
Figure 7.1: Cognitive dissonance and the resulting attitude change as predicted by the 
cognitive dissonance theory as in Scenario 7.3 
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that, as predicted by the cognitive dissonance theory, he modifies A2 to A2 in order to 
make his cognitions consistent, B2 may be rejected and he may, instead, decide to 
reject δ. As a result, he will make an incorrect decision despite the fact that he is able 
to identify the correct one. 
In this way, individual competence does not necessarily fall into the range 
between 0.5 and 1 as assumed by the Condorcet jury theorem. Instead, it is subject to 
the probability that the accepted state of the world is true. For instance, given Andy 
decides to reject δ, his competence is equivalent to the probability that δ is false. The 
latter probability, however, varies across different circumstances, which can 
theoretically be anywhere between 0 and 1. Therefore, the competence assumption of 
the Condorcet jury theorem is valid only if we can verify that the probability of the 
state of the world accepted by individuals is between 0.5 and 1. Otherwise, it remains 
questionable whether individuals will submit democratic inputs which are more 
likely to be correct than incorrect as long as they are exposed to the effect of 
cognitive dissonance when making decisions on behavioural-adjustment agendas. 
 
 
7.4 Constraints of institutionalising (environmental) deliberative democracy  
 
What does the effect of cognitive dissonance on the epistemic quality of democratic 
inputs imply for the design of (environmental-) deliberative-democratic institutions? 
From one perspective, deliberation may, in principle, be useful for identifying 
instances of cognitive dissonance. This is because, through reasoned debate and 
discussion, any inconsistency in an individual’s attitudes and/or behaviour can be 
revealed and be made more salient to him/her. For example, by deliberation, Andy, 
as in Scenario 7.2, may recognise that his attitudes about environmental protection 
(i.e.,  and ) are (practically) inconsistent with his behaviour of driving (i.e., ) – a 
fact of which he is not even aware in the first place.  
The point, then, becomes how individuals react, after deliberation, in order to 
reduce the dissonant feeling of inconsistent cognitions when making collective 
decisions. If deliberation, or the decision-making process as a whole, is channelled in 
an appropriate way such that individuals are motivated to accept revised attitudes 
and/or behaviour which correspond to the truth, then a deliberative-democratic 
institution as such is a desirable truth-tracker. 
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As demonstrated in Chapter 5, deliberative democracy may take the form of a 
DTA institution employing both deliberation and post-deliberation aggregation. A 
prominent democratic aggregation mechanism is simple majority rule. As argued, the 
competence assumption of the Condorcet jury theorem determines whether a DTA 
institution with simple majority rule can be justified from the epistemic perspective. 
If, for behavioural-adjustment agendas, individual competence, p, can theoretically 
fall into the range between 0 and 1 instead of between 0.5 and 1, then the probability 
of a correct collective decision (Pn) will, accordingly, increase (when p is between 
0.5 and 1), decrease (when p is between 0 and 0.5) or stay the same (when p is 0.5) 
as the number of individuals increases. Here, the epistemic performance of a DTA 
institution with simple majority rule relies crucially on the epistemic quality of 
individual decisions. 
How does this epistemic pitfall of majoritarian aggregation on behavioural- 
adjustment agendas constrain the design of (environmental-) deliberative-democratic 
institutions? Recall the three desiderata for a good DTA institution for 
(environmental) decision-making, as outlined in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, i.e., 
practicability (P), universal agendas (UA) and epistemic performance (EP). Bearing 
in mind the time-and-size and non-decision challenges to deliberation, in order to 
satisfy desideratum (P), we may adopt Goodin’s proposal of reflective democracy. In 
this, deliberation will predominately take the form of internal reflection in the mind 
of each individual, and there will be a democratic aggregation process, e.g., (private) 
voting, to resolve any disagreement straight after the ‘internal-reflective’ deliberation. 
This is the ‘reflect-and-vote arrangement’ (RAVA) of (environmental) deliberative 
democracy. 
A possible problem with RAVA is that, by channelling deliberation as an 
internal mental process, the whole decision-making process will be rendered 
sensitive to the effect of emotions on individuals’ minds. This is where cognitive 
dissonance may take a role in shaping individual decisions in (environmental) 
deliberative democracy. For example, when reflecting upon δ in Scenario 7.3, one 
may, through imagination, put oneself in the shoes of future generations and think 
about how the air pollution caused by driving will impair the latter’s well-being. 
Nevertheless, such internal deliberation does not preclude the possibility that 
individuals will eventually compromise such reasons in favour of emotions simply 
for the sake of restoring the consistency of their sets of cognitions. Furthermore, 
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individuals may also prioritise their own perspective or need over those of others.
135
 
With this shortcoming, it is reasonable to suspect that such ‘internal-reflective’ 
deliberation is subject to the effect of cognitive dissonance. 
At the same time, desideratum (UA) demands that (environmental) deliberative 
democracy should remain applicable to any type of agenda, including behavioural-
adjustment agendas. However, if (environmental) deliberative democracy is applied 
to behavioural-adjustment agendas, and it is possible or even likely that cognitive 
dissonance may undermine the epistemic quality of individual decisions after internal 
reflection and (private) voting, then it is questionable whether desideratum (EP) can 
also be satisfied. 
This is because, according to the Condorcet jury theorem, simple majority rule 
(employed as the decision mechanism following deliberation) performs well in the 
epistemic sense only if individuals are more likely to make a correct than an 
incorrect judgment. On the other hand, as argued above, we have reasons to believe 
that, due to the effect of cognitive dissonance, individuals may not be sufficiently 
competent when making decisions on behavioural-adjustment agendas. Thus, there 
are tensions between the three desiderata for a good DTA institution for collective 
(environmental) decision-making. 
Therefore, in order to construct a desirable DTA institution, we must mitigate 
the tensions between the three desiderata. This can be achieved by adopting one (or 
more) of the following escape routes: 
(1) Relaxing practicability (P): If (environmental) deliberative 
democracy does not tackle the time-and-size and non-decision 
challenges, instead of taking the form of a RAVA as Goodin 
recommends, it may consist of only ‘external-collective’ deliberation and 
a post-deliberation aggregation procedure becomes unnecessary. In this 
case, we may be able to reduce the emotional effects on individuals by 
asking them to articulate and justify their decisions in a public setting. In 
this way, individuals cannot simply adjust their cognitions in a private 
manner, but what they decide will be, instead, subject to scrutiny by 
others. This directs individuals to decide on the basis of reasons and 
justifications rather than according to the levels of ease in changing 
certain sets of cognitions. Besides, as discussed in Section 7.2, with 
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 As a matter of fact, Goodin (2003) does recognise similar dangers of internal deliberation due to 
“the obvious absence of an insistent ‘other’ who is pressing her perspective upon you” (p. 183). 
 230 
 
deliberation alone, the whole decision mechanism is equivalent to 
unanimity rule, and performs well only in avoiding incorrect collective 
decisions. 
One obvious downside of this approach, nevertheless, is that, without 
taking into account the time-and-size and the non-decision challenges, an 
(environmental-) deliberative-democratic institution as such is far from 
practically feasible for application to decision-making in large-scale mass 
societies. As Goodin argues, it is virtually impossible to administer any 
‘external-collective’ deliberation among a citizen group of considerable 
size in a truly democratic and deliberative manner. Besides, there will 
also be no collective decision until a universal consensus is reached 
among individuals, which speaks of a practical drawback that decisions 
are likely to be unavailable when individual opinions remain diverse 
even after deliberation. Moreover, since the decision mechanism is 
equivalent to unanimity rule, it always underperforms simple majority 
rule and even dictatorship in identifying correct decisions, and hence 
deliberation without aggregation is not favourable in terms of truth-
tracking. Given the empirical fact of pluralism in environmental politics, 
as well as the significance of epistemic performance in terms of 
identifying correct decisions, (environmental-) deliberative-democratic 
institutions of this kind are unlikely to be desirable. 
(2) Relaxing universal agendas (UA): If (environmental) deliberative 
democracy is only applicable to a restricted set of agendas for collective 
decision-making, excluding behavioural-adjustment agendas, then it is 
possible to avoid the potential effect of cognitive dissonance on the 
epistemic quality of decisions.  
However, many environmental issues do require collective decisions on 
behavioural adjustments. Common examples include whether or not to 
prohibit the distribution and use of plastic bags or whether or not to 
coerce citizens to classify and recycle waste before disposal. Without 
such decisions, it is impossible to take any collective action to resolve 
these issues. Unless we are developing (environmental-) deliberative-
democratic institutions for making collective decisions merely on 
specific issues, this option is not very appealing in general. 
(3) Relaxing epistemic performance (EP): If truth-tracking is not, after 
all, a crucial property of (environmental) deliberative democracy, then 
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we may disregard the problem of epistemic pitfall altogether as long as 
the deliberative procedures, rather than the deliberative outcomes, remain 
unaffected by cognitive dissonance. However, it is far from clear how 
appealing this approach is in general. On the one hand, the recent 
development in democratic theory has seen a growing emphasis on the 
epistemic values of, and justifications for, (deliberative) democracy (see, 
for example, Cohen, 1986; Estlund, 1993; Gutmann and Thompson, 
1996; Gaus, 1997; Goodin, 2003; Estlund, 2008). It appears that the 
bottom line consensus among these accounts is that the epistemic aspect 
of (deliberative) democracy is, from a normative point of view, not 
trivial. 
On the other hand, in many environmental decision-making instances, 
such as when deciding whether or not to build a nuclear power plant in a 
certain area, whilst valuing inclusiveness as well as equal participation 
and influence in the decision process, people may also strictly prefer a 
right decision to a bad decision for the sake of protecting the interests of 
future generations or simply avoiding devastating outcomes. If this is the 
case, it remains hard to dismiss the very notion of epistemic performance 
purely for the purpose of circumventing the epistemic pitfall caused by 
cognitive dissonance. 
 
As we can see, it is difficult to institutionalise (environmental) deliberative 
democracy as a DTA which simultaneously satisfies all three desiderata, i.e. 
practicability (P), universal agendas (UA) and epistemic performance (EP). Having 
said that, a way out can be found by relaxing any one of these desiderata. For small-
scale deliberation with relatively few individuals which focuses more on gathering 
opinions than making decisions, we may relax practicability (P). For deliberation 
which does not involve any ‘conflict of interests’ for decision-makers (such as 
behavioural adjustments for decision-makers themselves), we may relax universal 
agenda (UA). Lastly, for deliberation which focuses more on the (democratic) 
process than the epistemic quality of decision outcomes, we may relax epistemic 
performance (EP). As to which of these desiderata should be relaxed, it largely 
depends on the corresponding price that we are ready to pay. 
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7.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated, through the lens of cognitive dissonance, a case 
of epistemic pitfall in (environmental-) deliberative-democratic institutions. In 
Section 7.1, I outlined the time-and-size and non-decision challenges, and explained 
why Goodin’s (2003) reflective democracy can tackle both challenges. I then 
discussed, in Section 7.2, why the Condorcet jury theorem is relevant to assessing the 
epistemic performance of (environmental-) deliberative-democratic institutions. In 
Section 7.3, I introduced the theory of cognitive dissonance and showed how 
cognitive dissonance undermines the epistemic quality of democratic inputs on 
behavioural-adjustment agendas. I then identified, in Section 7.4, several escape 
routes which we may take in order to mitigate the tensions between the three 
desiderata for (environmental-) deliberative-democratic institutions, i.e., 
practicability (P), universal agendas (UA) and epistemic performance (EP). However, 
which of these escape routes is more desirable for constructing deliberative-
democratic institutions for collective (environmental) decision-making remains an 
open question. 
Here, we notice an issue which extends beyond (environmental) deliberative 
democracy and can possibly be developed into further research. Given Goodin’s 
(2003) caveat that ‘external-collective’ deliberations are not feasible in large-scale 
societies nowadays, what other innovative measures may be taken to mitigate such a 
problem of epistemic pitfall? One suggestion would be to make the whole collective 
decision-making process as transparent as possible so that individuals are prepared to 
be questioned about the grounds for their decisions. With deliberation, this may 
proceed with a random selection of individuals who will be asked to explain and 
justify their own decisions in a public setting (see also Goodin, 2003, pp. 222-223). 
With the subsequent aggregation, secret ballots may be replaced with another more 
‘public’ arrangement such as a show of hands or rising vote. 
An innovative measure would aim to channel deliberation, or the decision-
making process at large, appropriately so that individuals were motivated, instead of 
changing attitudes rather than behaviour (as predicted by the cognitive dissonance 
theory), to accept revised attitudes and/or behaviour that correspond to the truth. In 
this way, we would be able to construct deliberative-democratic institutions which 
are desirable for truth-tracking and, at the same time, applicable to behavioural-
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adjustment agendas. However, it remains debatable whether such an innovative 
measure is in any sense more feasible or desirable than the classical form of face-to-
face deliberation, as advocated by a number of deliberative-democratic theorists 
throughout the last three decades. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Can democracy secure environmental sustainability? Undoubtedly, this question 
matters, given the increasing importance we attach to both democracy and the 
environment. Moreover, the question is not a trivial one. In this capitalist economy, 
we constantly see the environment being sacrificed to other, more salient values such 
as development, consumption, convenience and resistance to lifestyle change. In any 
democratic process, the decisions we make may well be detrimental to the 
environment. We only need to think of urban sprawl, non-recyclable waste, the 
energy crisis, the water crisis and air pollution – all serious problems which may 
remain unresolved in any contemporary democracy.  
Part I of this thesis dealt with the first level of the question. In Chapter 1, I 
outlined the dilemma of green democracy which determines whether democracy can, 
in principle, secure environmental sustainability. Consideration of this dilemma 
demonstrates that it is logically impossible to construct an environmental-democratic 
institution which satisfies simultaneously three plausible demands: (1) that 
institutions are robust to the empirical fact of pluralism (i.e., robustness to pluralism); 
(2) that they are responsive to individual opinions (i.e., consensus preservation); and 
(3) that they also nonetheless respect environmental sustainability (i.e., green 
outcomes). We may, however, relax one of the three demands in order to avoid the 
dilemma, and a number of proposals are available for this purpose. In Chapters 2, 3 
and 4, I discussed these proposals in detail and evaluated their desirability in terms of 
procedure and outcome. The conclusion of Part I is that, as long as the dilemma of 
green democracy is resolved, democracy can secure environmental sustainability, 
meaning that environmental-democratic institutions are at least logically possible. 
Part II of the thesis has focused on the second level of the question, i.e., how 
we can construct good environmental-democratic institutions. I have considered 
some substantive issues of institutional design inspired by ideas drawn from social 
choice theory (i.e., the discursive dilemma), cognitive/computer science (i.e., 
distributed cognition) and psychology (i.e., cognitive dissonance). In Chapter 5, I 
have shown how the discursive dilemma and the normative ends of deliberation 
constrain the diversity of admissible inputs for post-deliberation aggregation, in a 
‘deliberation-then-aggregation’ (DTA) institution. In Chapter 6, I have demonstrated 
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how we can construct, on the basis of distributed cognition, a DTA institution for 
Specialist Environmental Democracy (SED) which reconciles the perennial tension 
between decisions by experts (i.e., technocracy) and decisions by ordinary people 
(i.e., democracy). In Chapter 7, finally, I have examined how cognitive dissonance 
undermines the epistemic quality of deliberative decisions, and explained why this 
challenges the design of a practicable DTA institution for collective (environmental) 
decision-making. 
To understand the big picture of my thesis from another perspective, consider a 
very simple analogy of a kitchen blender. We know that the food eventually 
produced from a blender depends on the ingredients added. To make pure tomato 
juice, for example, we add only tomatoes, which are then crushed by the blade. 
Suppose, for the purpose of making juice, the blender takes all kinds of crushable 
fruits and vegetables as ingredients. Also, the blade functions in such a way that all, 
and only, the ingredients added are crushed and turned into juice. Can we therefore 
guarantee that celery juice will be produced? Evidently, this is not the case, since the 
ingredient(s) may not be celery but may be, say, carrots or oranges.  
Using a blender for juice-making is similar to making collective environmental 
decisions through democracy. Like democracy, a blender is a procedure which (1) 
accepts different fruits and vegetables as long as they are crushable and (2) has a 
blade that turns the ingredient(s) added into juice of those same fruits and vegetables. 
If we also require that (3) the blender must always produce only a particular outcome, 
say celery juice, it is easy to spot the tension between the two former procedural 
conditions and the output condition. Whilst conditions (1) and (2) respectively mirror 
‘robustness to pluralism’ and ‘consensus preservation’ in green democracy, condition 
(3) is analogous to ‘green outcomes’. 
Setting out the logical space for environmental-democratic institutions, as in 
Part I, is like thinking about the technical possibility of creating a blender. We may 
relax (1) by installing a filter at the top of the jar which removes all fruits and 
vegetables except celery (cf. (exogenous) domain restrictions). We may, alternatively, 
relax (2). This can be done by dividing the jar into two levels, in which any 
ingredients may be added into the upper level, whereas celery is preloaded into the 
lower level; the blade only crushes the celery at the lower level, hence producing 
only celery juice (cf. eco-authoritarianism and substantive environmental rights). 
Lastly, we may relax (3), so that the blender is no longer expected to produce only 
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celery juice all the time (cf. pragmatic (green) democracy). Here, the tension between 
procedure and outcome, as in green democracy, is overcome, which is a pre-requisite 
for creating any technically feasible blender. Furthermore, we should consider some 
substantive issues concerning the specific design of the blender, which is similar to 
the case of environmental-democratic institutions as in Part II. 
Let me briefly summarise the main contributions of this thesis. I have 
constructed, using the most basic modelling technique in formal theory, an 
organising principle, i.e., the dilemma of green democracy, which sets out a logical 
framework for examining the relationship between democracy and environmental 
sustainability. No previous literature, in either democratic theory or environmental 
politics, has paid sufficient attention to the logical possibility of or constraints on 
achieving environmental sustainability through democracy. The present clarification 
not only enriches our conceptual understanding of both values, but also informs us 
about the necessary trade-offs we have to make in constructing a practicable 
environmental-democratic institution (cf. manufacturing a technically feasible 
blender). 
In terms of methodological innovation, I have demonstrated how social choice 
theory, as a formal theory, together with democratic theory, can serve as an 
integrated analytical framework for normative discussion of the substantive design of 
environmental-democratic institutions (cf. the specifics of how a blender should be 
designed). The discursive dilemma drawn from social choice theory, for example, 
constrains what the normative ends of deliberation can be for DTA institutions. The 
model of distributed cognition suggests how to reconcile the two normative values of 
procedural fairness (as in democracy) and epistemic performance (as in technocracy). 
The issue of cognitive dissonance, at the same time, reveals the tension between 
three normative demands for (environmental-) deliberative-democratic institutions. It 
is far from common, at least in the literature of green political theory, for formal 
theory to be applied in this way to the institutional design of collective environmental 
decision-making. 
Furthermore, I have made use of two inter-disciplinary ideas from 
cognitive/computer science (i.e., distributed cognition) and psychology (i.e., 
cognitive dissonance) in order to examine the design of (environmental-) democratic 
institutions. This sheds light on thinking about two recurrent issues in politics (or 
political theory), i.e., how democratic institutions can be designed to realise 
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collaborations between experts and ordinary people in decision-making; as well as 
how deliberation can best be arranged in order to minimise any emotional effect on 
decision-makers which may undermine the epistemic quality of democratic decisions. 
Looking ahead, this thesis has potential to be developed into further research 
bridging empirical and theoretical studies of politics. To give just one example, 
consider the model of distributed cognition (or Specialist Environmental Democracy, 
SED) as discussed in Chapter 6. SED informs us, in theory, about how we can 
construct decision-making institutions in such a way that science and democracy co-
exist and complement each other and contribute to better policy making. This issue is 
becoming increasingly prominent nowadays (Fischer, 2009; Keller, 2009; Ascher, 
Steelman and Healy, 2010). 
Here, we may be interested in the application of SED as well as in its empirical 
performance. How can SED be operationalised as an innovative means of democratic 
participation, for example to supplement the method of Deliberative Mapping as 
touched on in Chapter 6? How effective is SED in solving environmental problems 
in the empirical world? How can SED be extended to cover decision-making on 
other policy issues in which there are similar, or even deeper, divides between the 
opinions of experts and those of citizens? These questions are not only significant for 
academic enquiry but also of great value to practitioners seeking to promote and/or 
experiment with the widening of citizens’ participation in public policy making, 
particularly on issues which are complex, uncertain and controversial. 
While the exact agendas for any future research (such as that mentioned above) 
may, like environmental decision-making, be more complex than we think and have 
uncertain outcomes, one fact is in all senses beyond controversy: there are (logical) 
constraints and trade-offs in building any (environmental-) democratic institutions. 
This proposition is fitting and not trivial for understanding whether, and if so why 
and how, democracy secures environmental sustainability. Given the countless 
variables in any democracy, as in the environment, it remains paradoxical to claim 
that a decision outcome ‘in a particular colour’ can be guaranteed by a particular 
democratic procedure – which is, perhaps, as paradoxical as saying: 
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Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as 
it is black;
136
 or 
A blender can turn any crushable ingredients into juice as long as they 
are green. 
 
Can we ever guarantee environmental sustainability as an outcome of democracy? As 
with the black car or the celery juice in the cases above, I think we know the answer. 
 
                                                 
136
 This remark was made by Henry Ford about the Model T in 1909 (Ford, 1922, pp. 71-72; emphasis 
added); see also Chapter 1. 
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